CVE-2026-47732: Twig: Sandbox: multiple `__toString()` policy bypasses via unguarded string coercion points
Description SandboxNodeVisitor enforces SecurityPolicy::checkMethodAllowed() for implicit toString() calls by wrapping selected AST nodes in CheckToStringNode. The set of wrapped nodes is incomplete, and several Twig language constructs still trigger PHP string coercion on a Stringable operand without first consulting the policy.
Published Jun 5, 2026
Affected packages
twig/twig
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 3.25.0
- Fixed in
- 3.26.0
- Check
composer show twig/twig
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Description
SandboxNodeVisitor enforces SecurityPolicy::checkMethodAllowed() for implicit __toString() calls by wrapping selected AST nodes in CheckToStringNode. The set of wrapped nodes is incomplete, and several Twig language constructs still trigger PHP string coercion on a Stringable operand without first consulting the policy. A sandboxed template author can therefore invoke __toString() on any object reachable in the render context, even when __toString on its class is not allowlisted.
Confirmed bypass vectors:
- Conditional expressions (
a ? b : c,a ?: b,a ?? b) used as the input of a string-coercing filter or as a filter/function argument. - The
matchesoperator and the loose comparison operators (==,!=,<,>,<=,>=,<=>), which coerce aStringableoperand to string and can be used as an oracle to recover the value byte by byte (no tag, filter or function needs to be allowlisted). - Twig tests in general (which were never policy-gated), in particular
is emptywhich casts aStringablevalue via(string) $valueinCoreExtension::testEmpty(). - Null-coalesce expressions nested in concatenation, and the direct output of allowed functions or filters that return a
Stringableobject. - Arguments passed to allowed object methods, template-name expressions of template-loading tags (
include,extends,use, ...), dynamic attribute/property names, and spread arguments fromTraversableobjects. - The
dotag and the..range operator.
Resolution
The sandbox now wraps every child node that the parent will string-coerce at runtime, instead of relying on a hardcoded list of node types in SandboxNodeVisitor. A new Twig\Node\CoercesChildrenToStringInterface lets nodes declare which of their children must be guarded; core nodes (concatenation, comparison and range binaries, filter/function/test expressions, do, include, extends, use, ...) implement it. Spread arguments are materialised and policy-checked via the new SandboxExtension::ensureSpreadAllowed(), and dynamic attribute names are checked at runtime inside CoreExtension::getAttribute().
Credits
Twig would like to thank Anthropic Glasswing and El Kharoubi Iosif for reporting the issues, and Fabien Potencier for providing the fixes.
Credited to fabpot.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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