CVE-2026-47387: NocoDB: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Form View Redirect URL
Summary The shared form-view submit handler in NocoDB writes the form's redirecturl to window.location.href after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with editor role (or above) on any base can plant a javascript: URL in the form's redirecturl;
Published Jun 5, 2026 · Updated Jul 20, 2026
Affected packages
nocodb
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 2026.05.0
- Fixed in
- 2026.05.1
- Check
npm ls nocodb
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The shared form-view submit handler in NocoDB writes the form's redirect_url to window.location.href after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with editor role (or above) on any base can plant a javascript: URL in the form's redirect_url; when an authenticated viewer opens the share-link and submits the form, the payload executes in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token from localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].
Details
The vulnerable sink is in packages/nc-gui/composables/useSharedFormViewStore.ts:
isValidRedirectUrlvalidated onlytypeof === 'string'and non-empty trim — no scheme check.- The submit branch built an anchor element, compared
anchor.hosttowindow.location.host, and either pushState-reloaded (same host) or assignedwindow.location.href = redirectUrl(otherwise). - For non-network schemes such as
javascript:,data:,vbscript:, andfile:,anchor.hostis the empty string, so the same-host check is false and the code falls into the external-redirect branch — executing the URL same-origin in the NocoDB tab.
The redirect_url field is writable by any user with editor role on the base via the form-view PATCH endpoint, and the value is returned verbatim by the public shared-view meta endpoint, so no further privilege is required to weaponize a public form share.
Impact
- Same-origin script execution in the viewer's NocoDB tab. The payload runs in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token at
localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].token. - Action under the viewer's identity. With the token, an attacker can call authenticated APIs as the viewer, scoped to whatever workspaces, bases, and operations that viewer is permitted to use.
- Single-click viewer flow. Form share-links are the intended distribution channel for forms, so the phishing surface is on-brand; the form can be configured with a single hidden pre-filled required field to reduce the viewer flow to one click.
Credit
This issue was reported by @kah-ja (turingpoint.de).
Credited to kah-ja.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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