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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-46337: AVideo: Unauthenticated Arbitrary Image Read via Path Traversal in `view/img/image404Raw.php`

mediumCVSS 4.0 6.9 · 3.1 5.3GHSA-w4qq-74h6-58wq

Summary The endpoint requires no authentication. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary image files anywhere on disk that the PHP user can open — including private user-profile photos that the application's normal serving wrappers gate behind ACLs, admin-uploaded thumbnails, encrypted-video poster frames, and image content under sibling-app directories reachable via .. traversal.

Published May 19, 2026 · Updated Jun 9, 2026

Affected packages

WWBN/AVideo

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
<= 29.0
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
composer show WWBN/AVideo

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The endpoint requires no authentication. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary image files anywhere on disk that the PHP user can open — including private user-profile photos that the application's normal serving wrappers gate behind ACLs, admin-uploaded thumbnails, encrypted-video poster frames, and image content under sibling-app directories reachable via .. traversal.

Details

view/img/image404Raw.php reads the image GET parameter and joins it directly into a filesystem path served via readfile(). view/img/image404Raw.php (full file, current master @ 0dbadbcaaa1b415c7db078a72dc4b26d9fac0485):

<?php

// Fetch requested image URL
$imageURL = !empty($_GET['image']) ? $_GET['image'] : $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
$rootDir = dirname(__FILE__) . '/../../';
if ($imageURL == 'favicon.ico') {
    $imgLocalFile = "{$rootDir}/videos/{$imageURL}";
} else {
    $imgLocalFile = "{$rootDir}/{$imageURL}";   // ← attacker-controlled
}

if (file_exists($imgLocalFile)) {
    $imageInfo = getimagesize($imgLocalFile);   // ← format gate
    if (empty($imageInfo)) {
        die('not image');
    }
    // …extension → Content-Type mapping…
    header("HTTP/1.0 200 OK");
    header('Content-Type: ' . $type);
    header('Content-Length: ' . filesize($imgLocalFile));
    readfile($imgLocalFile);   // ← exfil bytes
    exit;
}

Issues:

  1. No authentication. The file is reachable via direct GET; no require of globals.php, no session check, no API-key gate.
  2. No basename / realpath / prefix containment. $_GET['image'] is concatenated into $imgLocalFile with no .. filtering, no realpath() resolution, no allowlist check against the intended view/img/ directory.
  3. `getimagesize()` is a magic-bytes check, not a path constraint. Any file on disk whose first bytes match a recognized image format (FFD8FF JPEG, 89504E47 PNG, 474946 GIF, 52494646…57454250 WebP) passes the gate — including images stored outside any ACL'd area of the application.
  4. `$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]` fallback when image is empty widens the attack surface (path components in the URI itself land in $imgLocalFile).

Re-verified pre-submission on 2026-05-13 against view/img/image404Raw.php blob SHA c670b0faff4fbea1fd0508f179956975477d4340 — unsafe shape unchanged since first discovery on 2026-05-12.

Recommended fix — three layered checks, any one alone is insufficient:

// view/img/image404Raw.php — proposed fix
<?php

$imageURL = !empty($_GET['image']) ? $_GET['image'] : '';
if ($imageURL === '') {
    http_response_code(400);
    exit('bad request');
}

// 1. Reject any path-traversal segment outright.
if (strpos($imageURL, '..') !== false
    || strpos($imageURL, "\0") !== false
    || strpos($imageURL, '://') !== false) {
    http_response_code(400);
    exit('bad request');
}

// 2. Resolve to a real path and verify prefix containment under the
//    intended image directory.
$rootDir = realpath(dirname(__FILE__) . '/../../');
$imgLocalFile = realpath($rootDir . '/' . $imageURL);
if ($imgLocalFile === false
    || (strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . '/videos/') !== 0
        && strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . '/view/img/') !== 0)) {
    http_response_code(404);
    exit('not found');
}

// 3. Existing getimagesize() check stays as defense-in-depth.
if (!is_file($imgLocalFile)) {
    http_response_code(404);
    exit('not found');
}
$imageInfo = @getimagesize($imgLocalFile);
if (empty($imageInfo)) {
    http_response_code(404);
    exit('not image');
}

// …rest of the original Content-Type + readfile() flow unchanged…

Drop the $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] fallback entirely; if no image parameter is provided, return 400.

PoC

Discovery probe — any HTTP client, no authentication, no cookies:

GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg HTTP/1.1
Host: avideo.example.com

If videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg exists on the server, the response is the raw image bytes (HTTP 200, Content-Type: image/jpeg). The application's normal user-photo serving wrapper (which can gate by session / channel ownership) is bypassed entirely.

Cross-directory probe — read images outside the AVideo install root:

GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../../../var/www/other-app/uploads/users/admin.jpg HTTP/1.1
Host: avideo.example.com

If the PHP user has read access to a sibling app's image directory, those files are exfiltrable too.

Enumeration — iterate over predictable numeric IDs:

GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg
GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo2.jpg
GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo3.jpg
...

…to harvest all profile images regardless of the application's intended privacy controls.

Impact

Path traversal → arbitrary image read (CWE-22 + CWE-284). Affects any AVideo deployment running master through commit 0dbadbca and likely every release on the supported branches. The attacker:

  1. Bypasses the application's image-content ACLs. Profile photos under videos/userPhoto/ and admin-uploaded private thumbnails that AVideo's normal image-serving wrappers gate by session / channel ownership become readable to any anonymous internet user.
  2. Reads images stored outside the AVideo install root. On shared-hosting / multi-tenant deployments, .. traversal lets the attacker page into sibling-app upload directories — anywhere the PHP user has read access on disk and the target file's first bytes form a valid image header.
  3. Enables enumeration at scale. Numeric ID schemes (photo1.jpg, photo2.jpg, …) and predictable filenames let an attacker harvest every private image on a deployment without detection (each request looks like a single 200-image-OK to the web log).

Because the read primitive is restricted to image-magic-bytes files, there is no source-code or credential exfiltration via this primitive alone — but the privacy / GDPR exposure is substantial on any deployment that hosts user-uploaded photos. CVSS 5.3 (Medium) reflects the limited but real confidentiality impact; many operators will rate this higher because the leaked content is user-private by intent.

This is not a silent-fix disclosure — the bug is still present on current master at submission time; the maintainer is being notified of a previously-unknown issue.

Credited to pr3ungdt.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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