CVE-2026-45288: Marten has an injection vulnerability in its full-text search regConfig parameter

Summary

Marten's full-text search APIs interpolated the user-supplied regConfig parameter directly into the generated SQL without parameterization or validation, making every code path that exposes regConfig to untrusted input a SQL injection sink.

Affected APIs

• IQuerySession.SearchAsync<T>(string searchTerm, string regConfig, ...)
• IQuerySession.PlainTextSearchAsync<T>(...)
• IQuerySession.PhraseSearchAsync<T>(...)
• IQuerySession.WebStyleSearchAsync<T>(...)
• IQuerySession.PrefixSearchAsync<T>(...)
• IQueryable<T>.Where(x => x.Search(term, regConfig)) and the matching PlainTextSearch / PhraseSearch / WebStyleSearch / PrefixSearch extension methods

Details

In the affected versions, `FullTextWhereFragment` renders the WHERE-clause SQL by string interpolation:

private string Sql =>
    $"to_tsvector('{_regConfig}'::regconfig, {_dataConfig}) @@ {_searchFunction}('{_regConfig}'::regconfig, ?)";

_regConfig arrives unchanged from the public API surface above. Any value containing a single quote terminates the SQL literal and lets an attacker append arbitrary PostgreSQL.

Confirmed exploit shapes (with regConfig set to attacker-controlled input)

| Goal | Payload |
| Time-based blind | `english'::text); SELECT pg_sleep(5); --` |
| Information disclosure | `english'; SELECT version(); --` |
| DDL execution | `english'; DROP TABLE mt_doc_article; --` |

All five overloads listed above produced SQL containing the verbatim payload.

Impact

• Confidentiality: an attacker can append arbitrary SELECT statements and exfiltrate database contents through error channels, response timing, or — if the application surfaces query results — directly.
• Integrity / Availability: DDL, UPDATE, DELETE, and pg_sleep-style denial-of-service payloads succeed under the same vector. Concrete impact depends on the database role used by the Marten connection string.
• Precondition: the calling application must forward attacker-controlled input into the regConfig parameter (e.g. a ?lang= query string mapped to regConfig). Applications that hard-code regConfig to a compile-time constant are not exploitable.

Patches

Fixed in Marten 8.36.1 (and forward) by #4343.

FullTextWhereFragment now validates regConfig against ^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$ (a simple PostgreSQL identifier, optionally schema-qualified, capped at NAMEDATALEN-1 per side) and throws ArgumentException for anything else. The default value ("english"), schema-qualified configs ("pg_catalog.english"), and the standard PostgreSQL text-search configurations all continue to work.

Workarounds

If users cannot upgrade immediately, do one of the following at the application boundary:

1. Hard-code regConfig to a compile-time constant ("english", "simple", …) and never accept it from request input.
2. Validate any externally-sourced regConfig value before passing it to Marten — e.g. against the same regex as the patch (^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$) or against an allowlist of PostgreSQL configurations the application actually uses.
3. Drop the regConfig argument from the call site so Marten falls back to the safe default.

Resources

• Patch PR: JasperFx/marten#4343
• Patched file: `FullTextWhereFragment.cs`
• Regression tests: `full_text_regconfig_sql_injection.cs`
• CWE-89:

Credit

Reported privately to the JasperFx team with a working proof of concept covering all five affected overloads.