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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-45016: EGroupware Vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Mail Compose

mediumCVSS 3.0 6.5GHSA-c8m7-r2jv-rw63

Summary The function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check !strstartswith($myUrl, 'http') evaluates to true for file:// URIs, causing filegetcontents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl)) to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.

Published Jul 7, 2026

Affected packages

egroupware/egroupware

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
>= 26.0.20251208, < 26.5.20260507
Fixed in
26.5.20260507
Check
composer show egroupware/egroupware

egroupware/egroupware

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
< 23.1.20260601
Fixed in
23.1.20260601
Check
composer show egroupware/egroupware

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') evaluates to true for file:// URIs, causing file_get_contents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl)) to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.

str_starts_with('file:///etc/passwd', 'http') → false !false → true

// api/src/Mail.php  
foreach($images[2] as $i => $url)
			{
				//$isData = false;
				$basedir = $data = '';
				$needTempFile = true;
				$attachmentData = ['name' => '', 'type' => '', 'file' => '', 'tmp_name' => ''];
				try
				{
					// do not change urls for absolute images (thanks to corvuscorax)
					if (!str_starts_with($url, 'data:'))
					{
						$attachmentData['name'] = basename($url); // need to resolve all sort of url
						if (($directory = dirname($url)) == '.') $directory = '';
						$ext = pathinfo($attachmentData['name'], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
						$attachmentData['type'] = MimeMagic::ext2mime($ext);
						if ( strlen($directory) > 1 && !str_ends_with($directory, '/')) { $directory .= '/'; }
..
...
....
// processURL2InlineImages function
if ( $myUrl[0]!='/' && strlen($basedir) > 1 && !str_ends_with($basedir, '/')) { $basedir .= '/'; }
						if ($needTempFile && empty($attachment) && !str_starts_with($myUrl, "http"))
						{
							try {
								$data = file_get_contents($basedir.urldecode($myUrl));
							}
							catch (\Throwable $e) {
								_egw_log_exception($e);
							}
						}
					}
					if (str_starts_with($url, 'data:'))

PoC

  1. Log in as any authenticated EGroupware user with mail access and open the mail compose window.
  2. Switch to HTML body mode and insert: ``.
  3. The server executes file_get_contents('file:///etc/passwd'), writes the content to a temp file, and attaches it as an inline MIME part.

Impact

An authenticated attacker can read arbitrary files accessible by the web server process, including /etc/passwd, application configuration files containing database credentials, private TLS keys, and environment files.

Remediation

Enforce a strict URI scheme allowlist before calling file_get_contents(). Replace the check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') with if (!preg_match('#^https?://#i', $myUrl)) { continue; } to reject file://, ftp://, php://, data://, and any other non-HTTP scheme.

Credited to smitocaru.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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