CVE-2026-42267: Kimai vulnerable to formula Injection via tag names in XLSX export
Summary Any ROLEUSER can create a tag with a formula string as its name (e.g. =SUM(54+51)) via POST /api/tags and assign it to a timesheet. When an admin exports timesheets to XLSX, ArrayFormatter.formatValue() joins tag names with implode() and returns the result unchanged. OpenSpout promotes any =-prefixed string to a FormulaCell, writing SUM(54+51) into the XLSX archive.
Published May 5, 2026 · Updated May 14, 2026
Affected packages
kimai/kimai
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 2.27.0, <= 2.53.0
- Fixed in
- 2.54.0
- Check
composer show kimai/kimai
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Any ROLE_USER can create a tag with a formula string as its name (e.g. =SUM(54+51)) via POST /api/tags and assign it to a timesheet. When an admin exports timesheets to XLSX, ArrayFormatter.formatValue() joins tag names with implode() and returns the result unchanged. OpenSpout promotes any =-prefixed string to a FormulaCell, writing <f>SUM(54+51)</f> into the XLSX archive. Excel evaluates the formula when the file is opened.
Details
1. ArrayFormatter does not sanitize before returning
sanitizeDDE() exists on StringHelper and is called by TextFormatter, but ArrayFormatter never calls it.
// src/Export/Package/CellFormatter/ArrayFormatter.php:24
return implode(', ', $value); // no sanitizeDDE() call2. Tag name validation does not block formula trigger characters
The API blocks commas in tag names but permits =, +, -, and @ - all valid formula prefixes in Excel and LibreOffice Calc.
3. OpenSpout silently promotes strings to formula cells
Cell::fromValue("=SUM(54+51)") returns a FormulaCell with no warning.
PoC
- It logs in as normal user, creates tag
=SUM(54+51), assigns it to a timesheet. - Admin has to export timesheets to Excel version via
/en/export/endpoint.
Impact
- Any
ROLE_USERcan plant a formula that executes on the workstation of any user who exports and opens timesheet data - A single malicious tag poisons all future exports across all users and date ranges until the tag is deleted
Fixes
- Prevent
=being part of the tag name (and other fields as well) - Use OpenSpout
TextCellfor everything that is a string
Credited to satexd.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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