CVE-2026-41249: CoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration
Summary The GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/static.yml) uses the pullrequesttarget trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (ref: ${{ github.event.pullrequest.head.ref }}). Subsequently, it executes a script (bin/console) from this untrusted checkout.
Published May 14, 2026 · Updated Jun 9, 2026
Affected packages
coreshop/core-shop
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- = 5.0.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show coreshop/core-shop
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/static.yml) uses the pull_request_target trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}). Subsequently, it executes a script (bin/console) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability.
Steps to Reproduce:
- Fork the target repository.
- In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the
pathscondition (e.g.,src/dummy.phporcomposer.json) to trigger the workflow. - Modify the
bin/consolefile (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload:
#!/bin/bash
echo "=== PWNED ==="
echo "whoami:"
whoami- Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the
5.0ornextbranch of the base repository. - The
Static Testsworkflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for theValidate YAML(or any step executingbin/console). - You will see the output of
whoami(typicallyrunner), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context.
Impact: Because pull_request_target runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., PIMCORE_SECRET, PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources.
Recommended Mitigation: Do not checkout untrusted PR code (head.ref) when using pull_request_target if the code will be built or executed. Consider adopting a separated architecture using the workflow_run event:
- Use the
pull_requestevent to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts. - Use the
workflow_runevent (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.
Credited to smiotani-aeyesec.
References
- https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop/security/advisories/GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41249
- https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop/commit/cc1e3f547228ec5ebfc1dc0472f9a3cc5f4137a4
- https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop/blob/5.1.0-beta.1/.github/workflows/static.yml#L14
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
