CVE-2026-41067: Astro: XSS in define:vars via incomplete </script> tag sanitization
Summary The defineScriptVars function in Astro's server-side rendering pipeline uses a case-sensitive regex / /g to sanitize values injected into inline tags via the define:vars directive. HTML parsers close elements case-insensitively and also accept whitespace or / before the closing , allowing an attacker to bypass the sanitization with payloads like , , or and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript.
Published Apr 21, 2026 · Updated Apr 27, 2026
Affected packages
astro
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 6.1.6
- Fixed in
- 6.1.6
- Check
npm ls astro
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The defineScriptVars function in Astro's server-side rendering pipeline uses a case-sensitive regex /<\/script>/g to sanitize values injected into inline <script> tags via the define:vars directive. HTML parsers close <script> elements case-insensitively and also accept whitespace or / before the closing >, allowing an attacker to bypass the sanitization with payloads like </Script>, </script >, or </script/> and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript.
Details
The vulnerable function is defineScriptVars at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/util.ts:42-53:
export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
let output = '';
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
/<\/script>/g, // ← Case-sensitive, exact match only
'\\x3C/script>',
)};\n`;
}
return markHTMLString(output);
}This function is called from renderElement at util.ts:172-174 when a <script> element has define:vars:
if (name === 'script') {
delete props.hoist;
children = defineScriptVars(defineVars) + '\n' + children;
}The regex /<\/script>/g fails to match three classes of closing script tags that HTML parsers accept per the HTML specification §13.2.6.4:
- Case variations:
</Script>,</SCRIPT>,</sCrIpT>— HTML tag names are case-insensitive but the regex has noiflag. - Whitespace before `>`:
</script >,</script\t>,</script\n>— after the tag name, the HTML tokenizer enters the "before attribute name" state on ASCII whitespace. - Self-closing slash:
</script/>— the tokenizer enters "self-closing start tag" state on/.
JSON.stringify() does not escape <, >, or / characters, so all these payloads pass through serialization unchanged.
Execution flow: User-controlled input (e.g., Astro.url.searchParams) → assigned to a variable → passed via define:vars on a <script> tag → renderElement → defineScriptVars → incomplete sanitization → injected into <script> block in HTML response → browser closes the script element early → attacker-controlled HTML parsed and executed.
PoC
Step 1: Create an SSR Astro page (src/pages/index.astro):
---
const name = Astro.url.searchParams.get('name') || 'World';
---
<html>
<body>
<h1>Hello</h1>
<script define:vars={{ name }}>
console.log(name);
</script>
</body>
</html>Step 2: Ensure SSR is enabled in astro.config.mjs:
export default defineConfig({
output: 'server'
});Step 3: Start the dev server and visit:
http://localhost:4321/?name=</Script>Step 4: View the HTML source. The output contains:
<script>const name = "</Script>";
console.log(name);
</script>The browser's HTML parser matches </Script> case-insensitively, closing the script block. The ` is then parsed as HTML and the JavaScript in onerror` executes.
Alternative bypass payloads:
/?name=</script >
/?name=</script/>
/?name=</SCRIPT>Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session on any SSR Astro application that passes request-derived data to define:vars on a <script> tag. This is a documented and expected usage pattern in Astro.
Exploitation enables:
- Session hijacking via cookie theft (
document.cookie) - Credential theft by injecting fake login forms or keyloggers
- Defacement of the rendered page
- Redirection to attacker-controlled domains
The vulnerability affects all Astro versions that support define:vars and is exploitable in any SSR deployment where user input reaches a define:vars script variable.
Recommended Fix
Replace the case-sensitive exact-match regex with a comprehensive escape that covers all HTML parser edge cases. The simplest correct fix is to escape all < characters in the JSON output:
export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
let output = '';
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
/</g,
'\\u003c',
)};\n`;
}
return markHTMLString(output);
}This is the standard approach used by frameworks like Next.js and Rails. Replacing every < with \u003c is safe inside JSON string contexts (JavaScript treats \u003c as < at runtime) and eliminates all possible </script> variants including case variations, whitespace, and self-closing forms.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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