CVE-2026-40928: WWBN AVideo: Missing CSRF Protection on State-Changing JSON Endpoints Enables Forced Comment Creation, Vote Manipulation, and Category Asset Deletion
Summary Multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under objects/ accept state-changing requests via $REQUEST/$GET and persist changes tied to the caller's session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently: 1. Cast/flip the victim's like/dislike on any comment (objects/commentslike.json.php). 2.
Published Apr 14, 2026 · Updated Apr 24, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 29.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under objects/ accept state-changing requests via $_REQUEST/$_GET and persist changes tied to the caller's session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently:
- Cast/flip the victim's like/dislike on any comment (
objects/comments_like.json.php). - Post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (
objects/commentAddNew.json.php). - Delete assets from any category (
objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php) when the victim has category management rights.
Each endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple `` tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource.
Details
AVideo exposes a helper, forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest() (objects/functionsSecurity.php:138), that rejects cross-origin requests when the Referer/Origin does not match webSiteRootURL. It is only invoked in one file in the tree — objects/userUpdate.json.php:18 — and is *not* applied to the endpoints below. There is also an isGlobalTokenValid() helper (objects/functions.php:2313) intended for CSRF-style token checks; none of the affected endpoints call it. allowOrigin() only sets CORS response headers and does not prevent cookie-bearing top-level or image requests from reaching the server.
1. objects/comments_like.json.php — CSRF → forced like/dislike
// objects/comments_like.json.php
15: if (empty($_POST['comments_id']) && !empty($_GET['comments_id'])) {
16: $_POST['comments_id'] = $_GET['comments_id'];
17: }
18:
19: $like = new CommentsLike($_GET['like'], $_POST['comments_id']);
20: echo json_encode(CommentsLike::getLikes($_POST['comments_id']));The endpoint deliberately promotes $_GET['comments_id'] to $_POST['comments_id'] so the call works for either verb. CommentsLike::__construct (objects/comments_like.php:18) reads User::getId(), calls load() to fetch any prior vote, then setLike() + save() — issuing an INSERT/UPDATE on comments_likes keyed to the session user (objects/comments_like.php:70-89). There is no token check and no origin check.
2. objects/commentAddNew.json.php — CSRF → forced comment posting
// objects/commentAddNew.json.php
34: if (!User::canComment()) {
35: $obj->msg = __("Permission denied");
36: die(json_encode($obj));
37: }
...
117: $objC = new Comment($_REQUEST['comment'], $_REQUEST['video']);
118: $objC->setComments_id_pai($_REQUEST['comments_id']);
...
124: $obj->comments_id = $objC->save();All inputs come from $_REQUEST, so GET is fully supported. The only gate is User::canComment(), which is true for ordinary logged-in users. isCommentASpam() (lines 39–97) is a per-session rate limiter, not a CSRF defense — it accounts the victim's own session bucket, so it does not block a single forged write. The comment is persisted under the victim's users_id via $objC->save().
3. objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php — CSRF → forced deletion of category assets
// objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php
14: $obj->id = intval(@$_REQUEST['id']);
15:
16: if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {
17: $obj->msg = __("Permission denied");
18: die(json_encode($obj));
19: }
20:
21: if (!Category::deleteAssets($obj->id)) {
22: $obj->error = false;
23: ...State-destroying operation reachable by GET with no CSRF defense. The attacker can enumerate category ids with a loop of `` tags — every one fires a credentialed request.
Root cause (shared)
All three endpoints follow the same pattern: objects/*.json.php handler that (a) reads mutating parameters from $_REQUEST/$_GET, (b) performs authorization against the victim's session, and (c) writes to the database — without calling forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), without validating a CSRF token, and without any SameSite mitigation in the session cookie set by AVideo's auth layer. Any logged-in victim loading an attacker-controlled HTML resource is sufficient.
PoC
Preconditions: attacker controls a page the victim loads while logged into the target AVideo instance. Cookies are sent by default on cross-site ``/top-level GETs.
Variant A — comments_like.json.php (force a downvote on comment id 10)
Attacker page:
Manual verification:
curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<victim-session>' \
'https://victim.example.com/objects/comments_like.json.php?like=-1&comments_id=10'
# → {"comments_id":10,"likes":...,"dislikes":...,"myVote":-1}
# Row inserted/updated in `comments_likes` with users_id = victim.Variant B — commentAddNew.json.php (force victim to post a phishing comment on video 123)
Attacker page:
Manual verification:
curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<victim-session>' \
'https://victim.example.com/objects/commentAddNew.json.php?comment=phish&video=123'
# → {"error":false,"comments_id":<id>,"msg":"Your comment has been saved!",...}Variant C — categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (force a category admin to delete assets on category 1)
Attacker page (enumerate several ids):
Manual verification:
curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<category-admin-session>' \
'https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=1'
# → {"error":false,"msg":"","id":1}
# Assets for category 1 are removed.Impact
- Integrity of social signals: Attackers can flip any logged-in user's likes/dislikes to upvote attacker comments or downvote legitimate comments at scale (driven by whichever users visit the attacker page). Because the endpoint accepts
like=-1|0|1, arbitrary vote states can be forced. - Identity abuse via forced comments: An attacker can cause any logged-in user with comment permission to "post" attacker-controlled text on any video. This enables impersonation, phishing link injection under a trusted account, harassment of third parties in a victim's name, and (if the victim is a moderator/admin) endorsement-shaped content in a privileged voice.
- Data loss: Any user with
canCreateCategory()who visits an attacker page can be made to silently delete assets belonging to arbitrary categories. Since category ids are small integers, a loop of `` tags can cover the full category space in one page load.
No special configuration is required; AVideo's default session cookie lacks a SameSite=Lax/Strict protection that would independently blunt the attack, and none of the affected endpoints verifies origin or token.
Recommended Fix
- Call the existing
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()helper at the top of every mutatingobjects/*.json.phphandler (the same pattern already used inobjects/userUpdate.json.php):
// objects/comments_like.json.php (add near line 9)
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();
// objects/commentAddNew.json.php (add after configuration.php include)
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();
// objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (add after configuration.php include)
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();- Require
$_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST'(orDELETE) for state-changing operations and stop promoting$_GET['comments_id']→$_POST['comments_id']incomments_like.json.php:15-17.
- Validate a per-session CSRF token on all mutating endpoints using the existing
isGlobalTokenValid()/getToken()helpers (objects/functions.php:2313), rejecting requests whoseglobalTokenis missing or invalid.
- As defense in depth, set the session cookie with
SameSite=Lax(orStrict) in the AVideo session initialization, so cross-site navigational GETs do not carry the session cookie even if a handler regresses.
Applying (1) alone closes all three reported variants; (2)–(4) harden the surface against variants of the same pattern in other objects/*.json.php handlers.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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