CVE-2026-39857: ApostropheCMS: Information Disclosure via choices/counts Query Parameters Bypassing publicApiProjection Field Restrictions
Summary The choices and counts query parameters in the Apostrophe CMS REST API allow unauthenticated users to extract distinct field values for any schema field that has a registered query builder, completely bypassing publicApiProjection restrictions that are intended to limit which fields are exposed publicly. Fields protected by viewPermission are similarly exposed.
Published Apr 16, 2026
Affected packages
apostrophe
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 4.28.0
- Fixed in
- 4.29.0
- Check
npm ls apostrophe
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The choices and counts query parameters in the Apostrophe CMS REST API allow unauthenticated users to extract distinct field values for any schema field that has a registered query builder, completely bypassing publicApiProjection restrictions that are intended to limit which fields are exposed publicly. Fields protected by viewPermission are similarly exposed.
Details
When a piece type configures publicApiProjection to enable public API access while restricting visible fields, the restriction is enforced via a MongoDB projection on the main query (piece-type/index.js:1130-1134). However, the choices and counts query builders bypass this protection through a separate code path.
The vulnerable flow:
getRestQueryat piece-type/index.js:1120 callsapplyBuildersSafely(req.query)(line 1122), which processes query parameters includingchoicesandcountssince both havelaundermethods (doc-type/index.js:2627-2628 and 2675-2676).
- The
publicApiProjectionis applied afterward (line 1130-1134) as a MongoDB projection on the main query.
- During query execution, the
choicesbuilder'safterhandler (doc-type/index.js:2636-2668) iterates over requested field names. The only validation is: - The field has a registered builder (
_.has(query.builders, filter)at line 2651) - The builder has a
laundermethod (line 2656)
All schema field types (string, integer, float, select, boolean, date, slug, relationship) register query builders with launder methods via addQueryBuilder in addFieldTypes.js.
toChoices(line 2661) calls the field'schoicesfunction, which typically callssortedDistinct→toDistinct. ThetoDistinctmethod (doc-type/index.js:2811) executesdb.distinct(property, criteria)— a MongoDB operation that returns all distinct values for the given property matching the criteria. MongoDB's `distinct` operation does not respect projections; it operates directly on the specified field regardless of any projection set on the query.
- The results are stored via
query.set('choicesResults', choices)(line 2666) and returned directly in the API response at piece-type/index.js:292-296 without any filtering againstpublicApiProjectionorremoveForbiddenFields.
The same bypass applies to viewPermission-protected fields: removeForbiddenFields (doc-type/index.js:1585-1611) only processes document results from toArray(), not the separate choices/counts data.
The page REST API has the same issue at page/index.js:371-376.
PoC
# Prerequisites:
# - An Apostrophe 4.x instance with a piece type configured with publicApiProjection
# - Example: an 'article' piece type with:
# publicApiProjection: { title: 1, slug: 1, _url: 1 }
# and additional schema fields like 'status' (select), 'priority' (integer),
# or 'internalNotes' (string) NOT in the projection
# 1. Verify normal API access only returns projected fields
curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article' | python3 -m json.tool
# Response results contain only: title, slug, _url (as configured)
# 2. Extract distinct values of a non-projected field via choices
curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?choices=status' | python3 -m json.tool
# Response includes:
# "choices": {"status": [{"value": "draft", "label": "draft"}, {"value": "published", "label": "published"}, ...]}
# 3. Extract distinct values with document counts via counts
curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?counts=priority' | python3 -m json.tool
# Response includes:
# "counts": {"priority": [{"value": 1, "label": "1", "count": 15}, {"value": 2, "label": "2", "count": 8}, ...]}
# 4. Multiple fields can be extracted at once
curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?choices=status,priority,internalNotes'Impact
- Distinct field values leaked: An unauthenticated attacker can extract all distinct values of any schema field on any piece type that has
publicApiProjectionconfigured, even when those fields are explicitly excluded from the projection. - Field types affected: All field types that register query builders: string, slug, integer, float, select, boolean, date, and relationship fields.
- Count disclosure: The
countsvariant additionally reveals how many documents have each distinct value, providing statistical information about the dataset. - viewPermission bypass: Fields protected with
viewPermission(intended for role-based field access) are also exposed via this path. - Both APIs affected: The piece-type REST API (piece-type/index.js:292-296) and page REST API (page/index.js:371-376) are both vulnerable.
- Real-world impact: If a CMS stores sensitive data in schema fields (e.g., internal status values, priority levels, internal categories, user-facing content marked as restricted), all distinct values are extractable by any unauthenticated visitor.
Recommended Fix
In the choices builder's after handler (doc-type/index.js:2636-2668), add validation to skip fields not permitted by publicApiProjection and viewPermission:
// doc-type/index.js, in the choices builder's after handler (line 2644 area)
for (const filter of filters) {
if (!_.has(query.builders, filter)) {
continue;
}
if (!query.builders[filter].launder) {
continue;
}
// NEW: Enforce publicApiProjection restrictions on choices/counts
const publicApiProjection = query.get('project');
if (publicApiProjection && !publicApiProjection[filter]) {
continue;
}
// NEW: Enforce viewPermission field restrictions
const field = self.schema.find(f => f.name === filter);
if (field && field.viewPermission &&
!self.apos.permission.can(query.req, field.viewPermission.action, field.viewPermission.type)) {
continue;
}
const _query = baseQuery.clone();
_query[filter](null);
choices[filter] = await _query.toChoices(filter, { counts: query.get('counts') });
}Additionally, apply the same fix in the page REST API handler (page/index.js) for consistency.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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