CVE-2026-33766: AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect in Image Download Endpoints
Summary isSSRFSafeURL() validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but urlgetcontents() follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target. Root Cause Check-time: isSSRFSafeURL() at objects/functions.php:4066 resolves the hostname and validates the IP.
Published Mar 26, 2026 · Updated Apr 8, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 26.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
isSSRFSafeURL() validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but url_get_contents() follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target.
Root Cause
Check-time: isSSRFSafeURL() at objects/functions.php:4066 resolves the hostname and validates the IP.
Use-time: url_get_contents() at objects/functions.php:1990 calls file_get_contents() with PHP's default follow_location=1 — redirects are followed without re-validation. The wget fallback at line 2047 also follows redirects by default.
Affected endpoint: objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php at lines 67-68, 107-108, 135-136, 160-161:
if (isValidURL($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image']) && isSSRFSafeURL($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image'])) {
$content = url_get_contents($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image']);Proof of Concept
- Attacker sets up
https://attacker.com/redirto respond with302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ - Authenticated user (with upload+edit permissions) triggers image download:
GET /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php?downloadURL_image=https://attacker.com/redir&...isSSRFSafeURL()resolvesattacker.com→ public IP → passes validationurl_get_contents()follows 302 redirect to169.254.169.254→ SSRF
Impact
- Cloud metadata access (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure)
- Internal network service access
- Bypasses the existing SSRF protection that was added to prevent exactly this class of attack
Note
The curl path in url_get_contents() does NOT set CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION so it is not affected. Only the file_get_contents and wget fallback paths are vulnerable.
Suggested Fix
Set follow_location to 0 in the stream context and handle redirects manually with re-validation, or add isSSRFSafeURL() check inside url_get_contents() after resolving the final URL.
Credited to kodareef5, Marcono1234.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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