CVE-2026-33501: AVideo has Unauthenticated Information Disclosure of User Group Permission Mappings via Permissions Plugin
Summary The endpoint plugin/Permissions/View/Usersgroupspermissions/list.json.php lacks any authentication or authorization check, allowing unauthenticated users to retrieve the complete permission matrix mapping user groups to plugins. All sibling endpoints in the same directory (add.json.php, delete.json.php, index.php) properly require User::isAdmin(), indicating this is an oversight.
Published Mar 20, 2026 · Updated Mar 25, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 26.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The endpoint plugin/Permissions/View/Users_groups_permissions/list.json.php lacks any authentication or authorization check, allowing unauthenticated users to retrieve the complete permission matrix mapping user groups to plugins. All sibling endpoints in the same directory (add.json.php, delete.json.php, index.php) properly require User::isAdmin(), indicating this is an oversight.
Details
The vulnerable file at plugin/Permissions/View/Users_groups_permissions/list.json.php:1-7 contains:
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Permissions/Objects/Users_groups_permissions.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$rows = Users_groups_permissions::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}This calls ObjectYPT::getAll() (defined in objects/Object.php:98-111), which executes:
$sql = "SELECT * FROM " . static::getTableName() . " WHERE 1=1 ";
$sql .= self::getSqlFromPost();This returns all rows from the users_groups_permissions table as JSON with no access control.
Compare with the sibling add.json.php:10-15 and delete.json.php:9-14, which both enforce:
$plugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled('Permissions');
if(!User::isAdmin()){
$obj->msg = "You cant do this";
die(json_encode($obj));
}Similarly, index.php:6-8 (the admin page that loads this data via AJAX) checks:
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
forbiddenPage("You can not do this");
exit;
}No .htaccess or web server configuration restricts direct access to this endpoint.
PoC
# Retrieve complete permission mappings without authentication
curl -s https://target/plugin/Permissions/View/Users_groups_permissions/list.json.phpExpected response (admin-only data):
{"data": [{"id":"1","name":null,"users_groups_id":"2","plugins_id":"5","type":"1","status":"a"}, ...]}Each row reveals:
users_groups_id— numeric ID of a user groupplugins_id— numeric ID of an installed plugintype— the permission level grantedstatus— whether the permission is active (a) or inactive
The getSqlFromPost() method also processes $_POST['sort'] and $_GET parameters, allowing an attacker to paginate and sort results to extract all data systematically.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate the complete authorization model of the AVideo instance:
- All user group IDs and which plugins each group can access
- All installed plugin IDs and their permission configurations
- Permission types and active/inactive status for each group-plugin pair
This information provides a detailed roadmap of the application's authorization architecture, significantly aiding targeted privilege escalation, as an attacker would know exactly which groups have access to which plugins and what permission types are assigned. While not directly exploitable for data modification, it reduces the attacker's effort for follow-up attacks.
Recommended Fix
Add the same admin authorization check used by the sibling endpoints. In plugin/Permissions/View/Users_groups_permissions/list.json.php:
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Permissions/Objects/Users_groups_permissions.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$plugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled('Permissions');
if(!User::isAdmin()){
die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'You cant do this']));
}
$rows = Users_groups_permissions::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}Credited to offset.
References
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-96qp-8cmq-jvq8
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33501
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/b583acdc9a9d1eab461543caa363e1a104fb4516
- https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/dc3c825734628bb32550d0daa125f05bacb6829c
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-96qp-8cmq-jvq8
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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