CVE-2026-33397: Protocol-Relative URL Injection via Single Backslash Bypass in Angular SSR
An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in @angular/ssr due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., ///), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (\) bypass.
Published Mar 19, 2026 · Updated May 6, 2026
Affected packages
@angular/ssr
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-next.2
- Fixed in
- 22.0.0-next.2
- Check
npm ls @angular/ssr
@angular/ssr
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.3
- Fixed in
- 21.2.3
- Check
npm ls @angular/ssr
@angular/ssr
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.21
- Fixed in
- 20.3.21
- Check
npm ls @angular/ssr
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in @angular/ssr due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., ///), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (\) bypass.
When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header:
- An attacker provides a value starting with a single backslash (e.g.,
\evil.com). - The internal validation failed to flag the single backslash as invalid.
- The application prepends a leading forward slash, resulting in a
Locationheader containing/\evil.com. - Modern browsers interpret the
/\sequence as//, treating it as a protocol-relative URL and redirecting the user to the attacker-controlled domain.
Furthermore, the response lacks the Vary: X-Forwarded-Prefix header, allowing the malicious redirect to be stored in intermediate caches (Web Cache Poisoning).
Impact
This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:
- Scale: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.
- SEO Poisoning: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.
- Trust: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.
Patches
- 22.0.0-next.2
- 21.2.3
- 20.3.21
Workarounds
Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in their server.ts before the Angular engine processes the request:
app.use((req, res, next) => {
const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'];
if (typeof prefix === 'string') {
// Sanitize by removing all leading forward and backward slashes
req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.trim().replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
}
next();
});References
- Fix: https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32771
- Original CVE: CVE-2026-27738
Credited to VenkatKwest, alan-agius4, securityMB, josephperrott, AndrewKushnir, dgp1130.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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