CVE-2026-32638: StudioCMS REST getUsers Exposes Owner Account Records to Admin Tokens
Summary The REST API getUsers endpoint in StudioCMS uses the attacker-controlled rank query parameter to decide whether owner accounts should be filtered from the result set. As a result, an admin token can request rank=owner and receive owner account records, including IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses, even though the adjacent getUser endpoint correctly blocks admins from viewing owner users.
Published Mar 16, 2026 · Updated Mar 18, 2026
Affected packages
studiocms
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 0.4.3
- Fixed in
- 0.4.4
- Check
npm ls studiocms
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The REST API getUsers endpoint in StudioCMS uses the attacker-controlled rank query parameter to decide whether owner accounts should be filtered from the result set. As a result, an admin token can request rank=owner and receive owner account records, including IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses, even though the adjacent getUser endpoint correctly blocks admins from viewing owner users. This is an authorization inconsistency inside the same user-management surface.
Details
Vulnerable Code Path
File: D:/bugcrowd/studiocms/repo/packages/studiocms/frontend/pages/studiocms_api/_handlers/rest-api/v1/secure.ts, lines 1605-1647
.handle(
'getUsers',
Effect.fn(
function* ({ urlParams: { name, rank, username } }) {
if (!restAPIEnabled) {
return yield* new RestAPIError({ error: 'Endpoint not found' });
}
const [sdk, user] = yield* Effect.all([SDKCore, CurrentRestAPIUser]);
if (user.rank !== 'owner' && user.rank !== 'admin') {
return yield* new RestAPIError({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
}
const allUsers = yield* sdk.GET.users.all();
let data = allUsers.map(...);
if (rank !== 'owner') {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank !== 'owner');
}
if (rank) {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank === rank);
}
return data;
},The rank variable in if (rank !== 'owner') is the request query parameter, not the caller's privilege level. An admin can therefore pass rank=owner, skip the owner-filtering branch, and then have the second if (rank) branch return only owner accounts.
Adjacent Endpoint Shows Intended Security Boundary
File: D:/bugcrowd/studiocms/repo/packages/studiocms/frontend/pages/studiocms_api/_handlers/rest-api/v1/secure.ts, lines 1650-1710
const existingUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(existingUserRank);
const loggedInUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(user.rank);
if (loggedInUserRankIndex <= existingUserRankIndex) {
return yield* new RestAPIError({
error: 'Unauthorized to view user with higher rank',
});
}getUser correctly blocks an admin from viewing an owner record. getUsers bypasses that boundary for bulk enumeration.
Sensitive Fields Returned
The getUsers response includes:
idemailnameusernamerank- timestamps and profile URL/avatar fields when present
This is enough to enumerate all owner accounts and target them for phishing, social engineering, or follow-on attacks against out-of-band workflows.
PoC
HTTP PoC
Use any admin-level REST API token:
curl -X GET 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/rest/v1/secure/users?rank=owner' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-api-token>'Expected behavior:
- owner records should be excluded for admin callers, consistent with
getUser
Actual behavior:
- the response contains owner user objects, including email addresses and user IDs
Local Validation of the Exact Handler Logic
I validated the filtering logic locally with the same conditions used by getUsers and getUser.
Observed output:
{
"admin_getUsers_rank_owner": [
{
"email": "[email protected]",
"id": "owner-1",
"name": "Site Owner",
"rank": "owner",
"username": "owner1"
}
],
"admin_getUser_owner": "Unauthorized to view user with higher rank"
}This demonstrates the authorization mismatch clearly:
- bulk listing with
rank=ownerexposes owner records - direct access to a single owner record is denied
Impact
- Owner Account Enumeration: Admin tokens can recover owner user IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses.
- Authorization Boundary Bypass: The REST collection endpoint bypasses the stricter per-record rank check already implemented by
getUser. - Chaining Value: Exposed owner contact data can support phishing, account-targeting, and admin-to-owner pivot attempts in deployments that treat owner identities as higher-trust principals.
Recommended Fix
Apply rank filtering based on the caller's role, not on the request query parameter, and reuse the same privilege rule as getUser.
Example fix:
const loggedInUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(user.rank);
data = data.filter((candidate) => {
const candidateRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(candidate.rank);
return loggedInUserRankIndex > candidateRankIndex;
});
if (rank) {
data = data.filter((candidate) => candidate.rank === rank);
}At minimum, replace:
if (rank !== 'owner') {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank !== 'owner');
}with a check tied to user.rank rather than the query parameter.
Credited to offset, Adammatthiesen.
References
- https://github.com/withstudiocms/studiocms/security/advisories/GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24
- https://github.com/withstudiocms/studiocms/commit/aebe8bcb3618bb07c6753e3f5c982c1fe6adea64
- https://github.com/withstudiocms/studiocms/releases/tag/[email protected]
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32638
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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