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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-30964: Webauthn Framework: allowed_origins collapses URL-like origins to host-only values, bypassing exact origin validation

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.4GHSA-f7pm-6hr8-7ggm

Summary When allowedorigins is configured, CheckAllowedOrigins reduces URL-like values to their host component and accepts on host match alone. This makes exact origin policies impossible to express: scheme and port differences are silently ignored.

Published Mar 10, 2026

Affected packages

web-auth/webauthn-framework

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
>= 5.2.0, < 5.2.4
Fixed in
5.2.4
Check
composer show web-auth/webauthn-framework

web-auth/webauthn-lib

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
>= 5.2.0, < 5.2.4
Fixed in
5.2.4
Check
composer show web-auth/webauthn-lib

web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
>= 5.2.0, < 5.2.4
Fixed in
5.2.4
Check
composer show web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

When allowed_origins is configured, CheckAllowedOrigins reduces URL-like values to their host component and accepts on host match alone. This makes exact origin policies impossible to express: scheme and port differences are silently ignored.

Details

CheckAllowedOrigins stores each configured allowed origin as:

parse_url($allowedOrigin)['host'] ?? $allowedOrigin

and later reduces the received clientDataJSON.origin the same way:

parse_url($C->origin)['host'] ?? $C->origin

If the reduced value matches, the method returns early. As a result, for the normal allowed_origins path, the later HTTPS check is not reached.

This differs from WebAuthn Level 2, which requires verifying that C.origin matches the RP's origin (scheme + host + port), separately from verifying that authData.rpIdHash matches the expected RP ID.

Affected code:

Spec references:

PoC

Configuration:

webauthn:
  allowed_origins:
    - https://login.example.com:8443
  allow_subdomains: false

Send a registration or authentication response whose clientDataJSON.origin is:

https://login.example.com:9443

Observed: the response is accepted, because both values are reduced to login.example.com.

Expected: the response should be rejected, because https://login.example.com:8443 and https://login.example.com:9443 are different origins.

Impact

This is an origin validation error (CWE-346) affecting deployments that use allowed_origins. The most practical browser-facing scenario is same-host / different-port origin confusion. In non-browser or custom clients, scheme confusion may also be relevant.

Fix

Fixed in version 5.2.4 by rewriting CheckAllowedOrigins to perform full origin comparison (scheme + host + port) as required by the WebAuthn spec:

  • Origins configured with a scheme (e.g. https://example.com:8443) are now stored and compared as full scheme://host[:port] values, with default port normalization (443 for HTTPS, 80 for HTTP).
  • Origins configured without a scheme are still matched by host only, for backward compatibility.
  • Subdomain matching now also verifies scheme and port consistency.

See commit b4cd9a43.

Mitigation

Upgrade to web-auth/webauthn-framework (or web-auth/webauthn-lib / web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle) >= 5.2.4.

Credited to dorakemon.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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