CVE-2026-26996: minimatch has a ReDoS via repeated wildcards with non-matching literal in pattern
Summary minimatch is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each compiles to a separate [^/]? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits. The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of characters.
Published Feb 18, 2026 · Updated Feb 24, 2026
Affected packages
minimatch
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 10.0.0, < 10.2.1
- Fixed in
- 10.2.1
- Check
npm ls minimatch
minimatch
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 9.0.0, < 9.0.6
- Fixed in
- 9.0.6
- Check
npm ls minimatch
minimatch
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 8.0.0, < 8.0.5
- Fixed in
- 8.0.5
- Check
npm ls minimatch
minimatch
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 7.0.0, < 7.4.7
- Fixed in
- 7.4.7
- Check
npm ls minimatch
minimatch
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 6.0.0, < 6.2.1
- Fixed in
- 6.2.1
- Check
npm ls minimatch
minimatch
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 5.0.0, < 5.1.7
- Fixed in
- 5.1.7
- Check
npm ls minimatch
minimatch
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.2.4
- Fixed in
- 4.2.4
- Check
npm ls minimatch
minimatch
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 3.1.3
- Fixed in
- 3.1.3
- Check
npm ls minimatch
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
minimatch is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each * compiles to a separate [^/]*? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits.
The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of * characters. With N=15, a single minimatch() call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever.
Details
_Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._
PoC
When minimatch compiles a glob pattern, each * becomes [^/]*? in the generated regex. For a pattern like ***************X***:
/^(?!\.)[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?X[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?$/When the test string doesn't contain X, the regex engine must try every possible way to distribute the characters across all the [^/]*? groups before concluding no match exists. With N groups and M characters, this is O(C(N+M, N)) — exponential.
Impact
Any application that passes user-controlled strings to minimatch() as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This includes:
- File search/filter UIs that accept glob patterns
.gitignore-style filtering with user-defined rules- Build tools that accept glob configuration
- Any API that exposes glob matching to untrusted input
----
Thanks to @ljharb for back-porting the fix to legacy versions of minimatch.
Credited to AkshayJainG, ljharb, G-Rath, thomas-schlein, isaacs, SamanthaPersico.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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