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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-25525: OpenMage LTS has a Path Traversal Filter Bypass in Dataflow Module

mediumCVSS 3.1 4.9GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6

The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (strreplace('../', '', $input)) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like ..././ or ....//, which after the replacement still result in ../. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

Published Apr 21, 2026

Affected packages

openmage/magento-lts

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
< 20.17.0
Fixed in
20.17.0
Check
composer show openmage/magento-lts

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (str_replace('../', '', $input)) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like ..././ or ....//, which after the replacement still result in ../. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

| Metric                   | Value     | Justification                         |
| Attack Vector (AV)       | Network   | Exploitable via admin panel           |
| Attack Complexity (AC)   | Low       | Simple bypass pattern                 |
| Privileges Required (PR) | High      | Requires admin authentication         |
| User Interaction (UI)    | None      | No additional user interaction needed |
| Scope (S)                | Unchanged | Impacts the vulnerable component      |
| Confidentiality (C)      | High      | Can read sensitive system files       |
| Integrity (I)            | None      | Read-only vulnerability               |
| Availability (A)         | None      | No impact on availability             |

Affected Products

  • OpenMage LTS versions < 20.16.1
  • All versions derived from Magento 1.x with these code paths

Affected Files

| File                                                         | Line | Vulnerable Code                          |
| `app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Csv.php`   | 67   | `str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...))` |
| `app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Xml/Excel.php` | 63   | `str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...))` |

Vulnerability Details

The Dataflow module allows administrators to import data from files. The files parameter specifies which file to import from the var/import/ directory. To prevent path traversal, the code uses str_replace() to remove ../ sequences:

$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
    . str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));

However, str_replace() only performs a single pass, making it trivially bypassable:

Bypass Examples

| Input                          | After `str_replace('../', '', ...)` | Result    |
| `..././`                       | `../`                               | Bypass    |
| `....//`                       | `../`                               | Bypass    |
| `..././..././..././etc/passwd` | `../../../etc/passwd`               | File read |

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker gains admin access (via compromised credentials, social engineering, etc.)
  2. Navigate to System > Import/Export > Dataflow Profiles
  3. Create or modify an import profile
  4. Set the files parameter to: ..././..././..././etc/passwd
  5. Run the profile to read the contents of /etc/passwd

Proof of Concept

# Request to Dataflow with bypass pattern
GET /admin/system_convert_gui/run/id/1/?files=..././..././..././etc/passwd

# The str_replace removes '../' leaving:
# ..././..././..././etc/passwd -> ../../../etc/passwd

# Final path resolves to:
# /var/www/html/var/import/../../../etc/passwd -> /etc/passwd

Remediation

Replace the weak str_replace() filter with basename() to extract only the filename:

// Before (vulnerable)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
    . str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));

// After (fixed)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
    . basename(urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));

Using basename() ensures only the filename portion is used, completely preventing any path traversal regardless of the input pattern.

Workarounds

If immediate upgrade is not possible:

  1. Restrict admin access: Limit Dataflow access to trusted administrators only
  2. Disable Dataflow: If not in use, disable the Dataflow module entirely
  3. Web Application Firewall: Block requests containing path traversal patterns
  4. File permissions: Ensure the web server user has minimal filesystem permissions
  5. Monitor admin activity: Alert on suspicious Dataflow profile execution

Impact

An attacker with admin access can read sensitive files including:

  • /etc/passwd - System user information
  • app/etc/local.xml - Database credentials
  • .env files - Environment secrets
  • Log files - Potentially sensitive application data
  • Configuration files - Server and application configuration

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by blackhat2013 through HackerOne.

Timeline

  • 2025-12-31: Vulnerability reported via HackerOne
  • 2026-01-21: Fix developed and tested

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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