CVE-2026-13311: shell-quote: Quadratic-complexity Denial of Service in `parse()` (CWE-407)
Summary shell-quote's parse() finalizes its token list with a reduce that uses Array.prototype.concat as the accumulator. Each prev.concat(arg) copies the entire growing array, so parse() runs in O(n²) in the number of tokens.
Published Jul 20, 2026
Affected packages
shell-quote
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 1.8.4
- Fixed in
- 1.9.0
- Check
npm ls shell-quote
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
shell-quote's parse() finalizes its token list with a reduce that uses Array.prototype.concat as the accumulator. Each prev.concat(arg) copies the entire growing array, so parse() runs in O(n²) in the number of tokens. An unauthenticated attacker who can submit a string to any code path that calls parse() on it can block the single-threaded Node.js event loop for tens of seconds with a small input — a denial of service. The trigger needs no shell metacharacters (plain space-separated words suffice), so input filters that only screen for ;, |, $, or backticks do not help.
Root cause
parse.js (lines 200–203), in parseInternal — this path runs on every parse() call:
}).reduce(function (prev, arg) { // finalize parsed arguments
// TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat
return typeof arg === 'undefined' ? prev : prev.concat(arg);
}, []);prev.concat(arg) allocates a new array and copies all of prev on every iteration, so producing an N-token result costs 1 + 2 + … + N = O(N²) copies. A second acc.concat(s) reduce in the module.exports wrapper (lines 211–224, reached only when env is a function) has the same shape. The maintainer's own // TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat already flags the construct.
Proof of Concept
const { parse } = require('shell-quote');
const ms = fn => { const t = process.hrtime.bigint(); fn(); return Number(process.hrtime.bigint()-t)/1e6; };
for (const N of [16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]) {
console.log(N, 'tokens ->', ms(() => parse('x '.repeat(N))).toFixed(0), 'ms');
}Measured on [email protected], Node v24:
| input (N tokens) | bytes | `parse()` | ratio vs prev (2× input) | | 16 000 | 32 KB | 678 ms | — | | 32 000 | 64 KB | 4 169 ms | ×6.2 | | 64 000 | 128 KB | 14 914 ms | ×3.6 | | 128 000 | 256 KB | **57 319 ms** | ×3.8 |
Time grows ~×4 per 2× input → confirmed O(n²). A ~128 KB input blocks the event loop ~15 s; ~256 KB → ~57 s; a few hundred KB more → minutes.
Impact
parse() is synchronous on the main thread; while it copies arrays quadratically the entire event loop is blocked and the process serves no other requests. Any service that calls parse() on attacker-influenced input (command parsers, chat-ops / bot command handlers, REPLs, build-script / arg-string splitters) can be driven to a sustained DoS with a single small request. No code execution and no data disclosure — availability only.
End-to-end confirmation: a minimal HTTP server that calls parse() on the request body, hit with one POST of 'x '.repeat(32000) (~63 KB), froze for ~4.5 s. An out-of-process probe client issuing harmless GET /ping requests (normally ~1 ms) observed 27 consecutive pings stalled by up to 4374 ms during that single request — i.e. every concurrent client was denied service for the whole parse. Scaling the body to a few hundred KB extends the outage to minutes.
This is the same class as several accepted 2026 advisories for quadratic-parser DoS on untrusted input (e.g. markdown-it CVE-2026-48988, js-yaml CVE-2026-53550, python-multipart CVE-2026-53539). It is distinct from the known shell-quote command-injection issues (CVE-2021-42740, CVE-2016-10541, CVE-2026-9277), which are all in quote(), not parse().
Suggested remediation
Replace the O(n²) concat-in-reduce with a linear flatten that pushes into the accumulator instead of reallocating and copying it on every iteration. Apply the same shape to the wrapper's acc.concat(s) reduce. A defensive input-length cap on parse() is a cheap additional stop-gap.
Maintainer note (edit): the originally-suggested Array.prototype.flat() is > ES2019 / Node 11+, but shell-quote declares engines: node >= 0.4, so .flat() > would silently drop support for older runtimes. The fix instead flattens one-level > array tokens with forEach/push — and deliberately not push.apply(...), since > spreading a large array into function arguments can exceed the engine's argument > count limit. Output is byte-identical to the current code across strings, undefined > holes, one-level array tokens, and {op}/{comment}/{op:'glob'} objects, and > finalizing is now linear (1,024,000 tokens in ~150 ms vs ~57 s for 128,000 before). > Thanks for the clear report and PoC — the analysis and reproduction were spot on.
Disclosure
Found by source audit + wall-clock confirmation against 1.8.4 (and verified the same code is present on main). Reported privately here; no public disclosure until a fix is available.
Credited to bibu123456, Kayiz-PT, ljharb.
References
- https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/security/advisories/GHSA-395f-4hp3-45gv
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13311
- https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/commit/7ff5488599d01c323514f02f5efb74088dd134ec
- https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/releases/tag/v1.9.0
- https://www.npmjs.com/package/shell-quote
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-395f-4hp3-45gv
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
