NewApp Monitoring is liveSign up free
AgentbeamBeta
Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-115923: Backstage catalog rules can be bypassed for URL locations using encoded path segments

mediumCVSS 3.1 6.5GHSA-w658-mh9p-ww8f

Summary @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend matches URL-type locations against catalog.rules location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.

Published Oct 28, 2026

Affected packages

@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
< 3.9.2
Fixed in
3.9.2
Check
npm ls @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend

@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
>= 4.0.0, < 4.0.2
Fixed in
4.0.2
Check
npm ls @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

@backstage/plugin-catalog-backend matches URL-type locations against catalog.rules location patterns using the raw URL string submitted by the user, while URL readers resolve that same string in canonical form when fetching the location's content. A URL can therefore be crafted so that it appears to belong to a trusted location scope during rule evaluation, but is fetched from a different scope.

Details

When a deployment restricts catalog kinds to trusted URL prefixes using catalog.rules location patterns, DefaultCatalogRulesEnforcer applies glob matching directly to the raw location.target string. The URL readers used for ingestion resolve the same target in canonical form, including normalizing percent-encoded dot segments. A registered location such as https://<host>/trusted/%2e%2e/attacker/repo/blob/main/catalog-info.yaml matches a https://<host>/trusted/** pattern as a raw string, but resolves to and is fetched from https://<host>/attacker/repo/... when its content is read.

An authenticated user with permission to register catalog locations (catalog.location.create) can use this to have an entity from an untrusted source admitted as if it originated from a trusted location scope.

Impact

The crossed boundary is the operator-configured catalog ingestion policy: entity content from outside the trusted location scope is ingested as if it were within it. Downstream consequences depend on deployment configuration, for example actions taken with integration credentials by processors or scaffolder when acting on the ingested entity. The assessment of this report found no basis for impact claims beyond the ingestion policy boundary itself.

Patches

This is fixed in @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend 3.9.2 (Backstage release 1.54.10) and 4.0.2 (Backstage release 1.56.1). Version 4.0.1 as published is not fixed.

Workarounds

No complete workaround is available for deployments that rely on URL location patterns to restrict catalog kinds. Restricting location registration permissions reduces exposure.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

More npm vulnerabilities

All npm entries