CVE-2026-110816: qs : qs.stringify with arrayFormat 'comma' throws an uncaught TypeError on array elements carrying a non-callable own toString (DoS)
`qs.stringify` with `arrayFormat: 'comma'` throws an uncaught `TypeError` when an array element has a non-callable own `toString`, such as `{"a":[{"toString":"x"}]}`. In a Node.js service with no synchronous error boundary, one request can crash the process. Affects qs 6.7.0 through 6.16.0. Fixed in 6.16.1.
Published Oct 27, 2026 · Updated Oct 29, 2026 · Analysis Nov 1, 2026
What an attacker can do
With the comma format, qs collapses each array into one string. The default path calls obj.join(',') at lib/stringify.js:156. With encodeValuesOnly, each element goes through the encoder, which calls String(str) at lib/utils.js:292. Both coerce the element to a string. If the element's own toString is not callable, coercion falls through to valueOf, which returns the object, and the engine throws Cannot convert object to primitive value. Nothing in the library catches it. An earlier fix covered only null and undefined elements on the encodeValuesOnly path.
The app must call stringify with arrayFormat: 'comma' on data an attacker can shape. A JSON request body such as {"a":[{"toString":"x"}]} is enough, with no parse option. Parsed input also works with allowPrototypes: true, which Express 4's default query parser, Express 5's extended parser and body-parser's extended urlencoded parser set, or with plainObjects: true.
No login is needed. In a bare http.createServer handler the uncaught exception exits the process. Under Express a synchronous throw becomes a 500 for that request. Only availability is affected.
Who is affected
The npm package qs, versions 6.7.0 to 6.16.0, where arrayFormat: 'comma' exists. The default array format (indices) is not affected. Applications that never serialize with the comma format are unaffected.
Check what you have installed, including copies pulled in by Express or body-parser:
npm ls qsThen search your code for arrayFormat: 'comma' or arrayFormat: "comma".
qs
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 6.7.0, <= 6.16.0
- Fixed in
- 6.16.1
- Check
npm ls qs
How to fix it
Upgrade qs to 6.16.1.
npm install [email protected]For transitive copies, use an overrides entry in package.json or update the parent package. If you cannot upgrade yet, the advisory suggests three interim steps: avoid the comma format for data from untrusted input, avoid allowPrototypes and plainObjects on untrusted input and strip unexpected own properties, or wrap qs.stringify calls in a try/catch so a failure cannot crash the process.
How to tell if you were hit
Look for process exits or crash logs showing TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value with a stack frame in qs/lib/stringify.js or qs/lib/utils.js. Clients seeing ECONNRESET right after sending a request with a toString key in the JSON body or query string is another sign. Review access logs for request bodies or query strings containing toString as a key.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
qs.stringify(obj, { arrayFormat: 'comma' }) throws an uncaught TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value when an array in obj contains an element that carries an own, non-callable toString property (for example { a: [ { toString: 'x' } ] }). A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can influence an object that the application later re-serializes with the comma array format triggers the throw. In a service that lacks a synchronous error boundary around the serialization call, the uncaught exception crashes the worker process, producing a denial of service.
Root Cause
When arrayFormat: 'comma' is selected, the comma branch collapses the whole array into a single value via Array.prototype.join, or, under encodeValuesOnly: true, maps each element through the value encoder before joining. Both paths perform an implicit string coercion (ToPrimitive with hint "string") on each element. For an object whose own toString is a non-callable value, coercion skips the shadowed non-callable toString, falls through to Object.prototype.valueOf (which returns the object rather than a primitive), and throws. The comma branch runs this coercion before the per-element null and skip handling in the main loop, so nothing downstream can neutralize the hostile element, and the throw is never caught inside the library.
lib/stringify.js (comma-array branch)
line 152-154: obj = utils.maybeMap(obj, function (v) { return v == null ? v : encoder(v); }); // encodeValuesOnly path
line 156: objKeys = [{ value: obj.length > 0 ? obj.join(',') || null : void undefined }]; // default comma path
lib/utils.js
line 292: string = String(str); // value encoder coercion reached via the encodeValuesOnly pathImpact
Prerequisites: the application calls qs.stringify with arrayFormat: 'comma' (a documented, supported option) on an object whose shape can be influenced by attacker input. Attacker-controllable sources include qs.parse(input, { allowPrototypes: true }), which retains a toString segment (Express 4's default query parser, Express 5's extended query parser, and body-parser's extended urlencoded parser all set it), qs.parse(input, { plainObjects: true }), whose null-prototype elements throw even without a toString key (eg, a[][b]=c), and JSON.parse of a request body, which needs no qs parse option at all. No authentication or user interaction is required. Demonstrated capability: a single request forces an uncaught synchronous TypeError in the serialization call. In a naive single-process Node service with no synchronous error boundary, this crashes the process and takes the service offline (availability impact). Under a framework such as Express that traps synchronous handler throws, the plausible outcome is a per-request 500 rather than a full outage; that lower-impact case is noted but not the worst credible supported deployment. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact, no memory unsafety, and no prototype pollution.
Proof of Concept
Install qs at the affected version (for example 6.16.0) and run the following script with Node.js. No network setup is required; it demonstrates the throw in isolation.
var qs = require('qs');
// Source A: qs.parse with allowPrototypes retains the hostile toString segment
qs.stringify(qs.parse('a[0][toString]=x', { allowPrototypes: true }), { arrayFormat: 'comma' });
// Source B: a JSON request body, no qs parse option needed
qs.stringify(JSON.parse('{"a":[{"toString":"x"}]}'), { arrayFormat: 'comma' });
// Also affected: the encodeValuesOnly sub-path
qs.stringify(JSON.parse('{"a":[{"toString":"x"}]}'), { arrayFormat: 'comma', encodeValuesOnly: true });A default-join (allowPrototypes) => THREW: TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value
B default-join (JSON.parse) => THREW: TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value
C encodeValuesOnly path => THREW: TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value
N2 callable toString => NO THROW; output="a=z"
N3 isBuffer vector (CVE-2026-82417) => NO THROW; output="a%5Bconstructor%5D%5BisBuffer%5D=x"
qs version: 6.16.0Attack Chain
- Exposure: A remote, unauthenticated request reaches an endpoint whose handler eventually serializes attacker-influenced data with
qs.stringify(obj, { arrayFormat: 'comma' }). - Control: The attacker supplies data that becomes
{ a: [ { toString: <non-callable value> } ] }, either viaa[0][toString]=xparsed withallowPrototypes, or via a JSON body{"a":[{"toString":"x"}]}. - Path: In
stringify, the primitive/buffer guard atlib/stringify.js:134is false for an array, so control reaches the comma branch atlib/stringify.js:149. - Guard: On the
encodeValuesOnlypath, the closurev == null ? v : encoder(v)atlib/stringify.js:152-154passes onlynull/undefinedthrough; a non-null object still reaches the encoder. The default path skips that closure entirely and reachesobj.join(',')atlib/stringify.js:156with no guard at all. - Primitive: The element is coerced to a string (
Array.prototype.join, orString(str)atlib/utils.js:292).ToPrimitiveskips the non-callable owntoString,valueOfreturns the object, and aTypeErroris thrown. - Result: The uncaught synchronous exception propagates out of the serialization call, failing the request and, in a service without a synchronous error boundary, crashing the process (denial of service).
Bypass Evidence
This is a different element type on the code path CVE-2026-8723 (GHSA-q8mj-m7cp-5q26) patched, plus the default comma path, which that fix never covered. CVE-2026-8723 addressed a TypeError crash on null/undefined entries in the comma plus encodeValuesOnly path. Its fix (commit 21f80b3) wraps the encoder in function (v) { return v == null ? v : encoder(v); }, so it only passes null and undefined through. A non-null element with a hostile own toString fails the v == null test, so the encoder still runs and still throws; the encodeValuesOnly case (case C above) throws on the exact fixed code. The default comma path (encodeValuesOnly unset, the library default) never entered that fix at all: git log -S "obj.join(','" -- lib/stringify.js shows no security fix has ever touched the obj.join(',') line, and cases A and B throw with encodeValuesOnly unset. The related isBuffer hardening for CVE-2026-82417 (commit e83d321) is a different sink at the lib/stringify.js:134 guard, which is never entered for the array element; the negative control {a:{constructor:{isBuffer:'x'}}} serializes cleanly. Disproof attempts that failed: a valueOf-only object does not throw (it serializes to [object Object]), confirming the trigger is an element with no callable toString (an own non-callable toString, or a null-prototype object with no toString at all, as qs.parse produces under plainObjects); nested arrays ({"a":[[{"toString":"x"}]]}) throw the same way; a callable toString serializes cleanly; and the default (non-comma) array format serializes cleanly, confirming the comma format is required. All positive and negative cases were reproduced on the exact published 6.16.0 artifact.
Affected Versions
Ecosystem: npmPackage: qsConfirmed affected range: >= 6.7.0, <= 6.16.0Latest release checked: 6.16.0 (npm latest; git tag v6.16.0)Fix status: fixed in 6.16.1 (a952e75)
The arrayFormat: 'comma' join sink was introduced in qs 6.7.0, so 6.7.0 is the lower boundary; releases before 6.7.0 lack the sink. No released version fixes this vector, and the latest published release (6.16.0) reproduces the throw, so the closed upper bound <= 6.16.0 covers every affected release. The encodeValuesOnly sub-path was added later, but the default comma-join vector already affects 6.7.0, so 6.7.0 governs the lower boundary.
Suggested Fix
The comma array serialization must not allow an implicit string coercion of an array element to throw an uncaught exception. Coercion of each comma element should be performed defensively (for example by wrapping the join and per-element encode so that a coercion failure is caught and handled), and this protection must cover both the default obj.join(',') path and the encodeValuesOnly encoder path, not only the previously patched null/undefined case. As an interim mitigation without a code change, applications can avoid arrayFormat: 'comma' when serializing data derived from untrusted input, sanitize parsed objects (avoid allowPrototypes/plainObjects on untrusted input and strip unexpected own properties), or wrap qs.stringify calls in a synchronous error boundary so a coercion failure cannot crash the process.
Reported by zx (GitHub: @manus-pi).
---
Independent report by @Lucidsec
The following was reported separately, after this advisory, and is merged here as a duplicate.
Summary
In project qs, in versions >= 6.7.0, <= 6.16.0 (every version that supports arrayFormat: 'comma'), qs.stringify with arrayFormat: 'comma' can throw an uncaught TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value when an array element has a non-callable own toString. It is fixed in 6.16.1. Related: CWE-248 and CWE-704.
Technical Details
qs.stringify with arrayFormat: 'comma' joins an array at lib/stringify.js:156 via obj.join(','). An element whose own toString is not callable makes Array.prototype.join throw. There is no type check and no catch on that path.
A second path exists with encodeValuesOnly: at lib/stringify.js:151-154, maybeMap only skips v == null, then lib/utils.js:292 does String(str) and throws the same TypeError (this second site exists since v6.11.1; before that, the same input throws at join).
Who can trigger: someone who can shape an array element passed to stringify. The host must use non-default arrayFormat: 'comma'. Default arrayFormat indices does not fold arrays and is not affected. A parse-then-stringify path also needs plainObjects: true (null-prototype elements from lib/parse.js:200) or allowPrototypes: true (which Express 4's default query parser, Express 5's extended query parser, and body-parser's extended urlencoded parser all set). Default qs.parse('a[0][toString]=x') returns {} because the prototype guard drops toString. Direct JSON handed to stringify can supply {"a":[{"toString":"x"}]}.
Cause: the comma fold at lib/stringify.js:149-156 collapses the array into a single value before the main loop at lib/stringify.js:172-212, so skipNulls and strictNullHandling only ever see the joined value, never individual elements. isNonNullishPrimitive / isBuffer at lib/stringify.js:134 inspect the whole value, not each element. A normal object uses Object.prototype.toString and becomes [object Object]. An own non-callable toString is skipped, valueOf returns the object, and join throws. (The skipped TODO test at test/stringify.js:684-689 uses a plain { b: 1 } element, which does not throw; it covers the separate question of what comma format should output for object elements, not this crash.) Earlier comma crash fixes did not cover object elements.
Impact
One small input makes that serialization path throw a synchronous, catchable TypeError. Behind a framework error boundary (eg, a synchronous Express handler), the request fails with a 500 and the process survives. In a host with no error boundary (eg, a bare http.createServer handler), the uncaught exception exits the process (the client sees ECONNRESET). Availability only.
Proof of Concept
Show the proof of concept
Checked on the latest commit that was checked: 07b1d4d82c8f9301c105ea4b94fa2302cfd6e8b4. Still present. Demonstrated.
- Payload
{"a":[{"toString":"x"}]}throws atlib/stringify.js:156. - Baseline
{"a":["x","y"]}returns 200 with bodya=x%2Cy. - A plain object element stringifies to
a=%5Bobject%20Object%5Dand does not throw. encodeValuesOnly: truethrows viautils.js:292.plainObjectsparse plus comma throws.
Suggested Fix
Before join, map elements with the existing primitive check; skip or replace non-primitives so join cannot throw. On the encodeValuesOnly path, do not send non-primitives into String(). Optionally guard lib/utils.js:292. Add new regression tests.
Credited to manus-pi, Lucidsec, manus-use, KeenSecurityLab.
Questions
- Is qs vulnerable if I use the default array format?
No. The default
indicesformat does not fold arrays into a joined string. OnlyarrayFormat: 'comma'reaches the vulnerable code.- Will this crash an Express app?
Usually not the whole process. Express traps synchronous handler throws, so the likely result is a 500 for that request. A service without such a boundary, like a bare
http.createServerhandler, exits.- Which qs version fixes CVE-2026-110816?
6.16.1. The advisory says 6.16.0, the latest release when it was written, still throws.
References
Read for this analysis:
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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