CVE-2026-107399: Mechanize sends credential headers to another origin after a meta refresh
Summary mechanize applied no trust boundary to a meta refresh, so credentials set through Mechanize#requestheaders= followed a refresh that pointed at another origin. Details Mechanize::HTTP::Agent#responsefollowmetarefresh fetched the refresh target with no notion of a crossed origin, so @requestheaders were re-applied in full.
Published Oct 8, 2026
Affected packages
mechanize
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 2.14.1
- Fixed in
- 2.14.1
- Check
bundle info mechanize
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
mechanize applied no trust boundary to a meta refresh, so credentials set through Mechanize#request_headers= followed a refresh that pointed at another origin.
Details
Mechanize::HTTP::Agent#response_follow_meta_refresh fetched the refresh target with no notion of a crossed origin, so @request_headers were re-applied in full. An attacker who could place a meta refresh in a page the agent fetched — through stored content, an open redirect, or control of any page in the crawl — collected the same credentials as through an HTTP redirect, on a code path that had none of the redirect path's protections.
The refresh fetch passes an empty per-request headers hash, so only headers set through Mechanize#request_headers= were exposed.
This requires Mechanize#follow_meta_refresh = true. It is false by default, so an agent in its default configuration is not affected. Crawlers commonly enable it.
Impact
An attacker who can place a meta refresh in any page the agent fetches captures bearer tokens and session cookies set through request_headers=. Disclosure only; no integrity or availability impact.
Patches
Fixed in mechanize v2.14.1. A meta refresh that points at another origin is now subject to the same rule as an HTTP redirect: credentials and cookies are withheld from the request that follows it.
Workarounds
Leave Mechanize#follow_meta_refresh at its default of false, or avoid request_headers= for credentials when it is enabled.
Credited to flavorjones.
References
- https://github.com/sparklemotion/mechanize/security/advisories/GHSA-c6rp-p8xm-4q9f
- https://github.com/sparklemotion/mechanize/pull/676
- https://github.com/sparklemotion/mechanize/commit/02a1235842d6eda8d4a5a3d8f13aba2cecf52e4f
- https://github.com/sparklemotion/mechanize/commit/84c74df87d15f5d119df268ba6aa79bc1e16a2c3
- https://github.com/sparklemotion/mechanize/releases/tag/v2.14.1
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c6rp-p8xm-4q9f
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
