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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-107380: enshrined/svg-sanitize: Stored XSS via DTD Entity / HTML5 Named Character Reference Collision

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.4GHSA-9rjx-3jch-6vjf

Summary A crafted SVG bypasses enshrined/svg-sanitize's href validation and delivers a javascript: URL through the sanitizer unchanged. The bypass exploits a semantic mismatch between XML entity resolution (used during sanitization) and HTML5 Named Character Reference resolution (used by the browser when the SVG is rendered inline). This is a logic bug in svg-sanitize.

Published Oct 8, 2026

Affected packages

enshrined/svg-sanitize

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
<= 0.22.0
Fixed in
1.0.0
Check
composer show enshrined/svg-sanitize

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

A crafted SVG bypasses enshrined/svg-sanitize's href validation and delivers a javascript: URL through the sanitizer unchanged. The bypass exploits a semantic mismatch between XML entity resolution (used during sanitization) and HTML5 Named Character Reference resolution (used by the browser when the SVG is rendered inline).

This is a logic bug in svg-sanitize. It does NOT depend on any PHP ext/dom bug — it works on any PHP version.

Affected installations:

  • enshrined/svg-sanitize: 45.2M Packagist downloads, 1.3M/month, 90+ dependents
  • WordPress Safe SVG plugin: 1M+ active installs (inline SVG rendering via themes)
  • TYPO3, Drupal and 90+ other Packagist dependents

Vulnerability Details

Mechanism

  1. Attacker defines a DTD entity whose name collides with an HTML5 Named Character Reference: ``xml <!ENTITY Tab "#"> ` In XML, &Tab; expands to the literal string "#" (from the DTD definition). In HTML5, &Tab;` is a Named Character Reference that resolves to U+0009 (TAB character).
  1. The SVG uses this entity in an href: ```xml

3. **During sanitization** (XML context): `&Tab;` → `"#"` → the sanitizer sees `href="#javascript:alert(document.domain)"` → starts with `#` → `isHrefSafeValue()` returns **TRUE** → passes through.

4. **Sanitizer output:** `saveXML()` outputs the entity reference `&Tab;` (not the expanded value), and strips the DOCTYPE declaration.

5. **In the browser** (HTML5 context): Without the DOCTYPE, `&Tab;` is resolved as the HTML5 Named Character Reference → U+0009 (TAB). The URL parser strips leading whitespace → `javascript:alert(document.domain)` **executes**.

### Root Cause (Sanitizer.php)

// isHrefSafeValue() — evaluates EXPANDED value (after XML entity resolution) protected function isHrefSafeValue($value) { if ('#' === substr($value, 0, 1)) { return true; // Fragment identifier — "safe" } // ... }

// But saveXML() preserves the entity REFERENCE, not the expanded value // And the DOCTYPE (which defines the entity) is stripped from output // → semantic mismatch between validation and output contexts


## Proof of Concept

### Malicious SVG (xss.svg)

<!DOCTYPE svg [<!ENTITY Tab "#">]>

CLICK ME


### Sanitizer processing

<?php require_once 'vendor/autoload.php';

$svg = file_get_contents('xss.svg'); $sanitizer = new \enshrined\svgSanitize\Sanitizer(); $clean = $sanitizer->sanitize($svg); echo $clean;


**Output:**

CLICK ME


The `javascript:` href passes through the sanitizer. The DOCTYPE is stripped, but the `&Tab;` entity reference is preserved.

### Browser exploitation

Embed the sanitized SVG inline in HTML:

<!-- sanitized SVG output inserted here -->

CLICK ME


**Clicking the red rectangle executes `alert(document.domain)`.**

**Confirmed:** Chrome 148. PoC file: `XSS_CONFIRMED_POC.html`

### Exploitable Named Character References

Any HTML5 Named Character Reference that expands to a URL-parser-ignored character:
- `&Tab;` → U+0009 (Horizontal Tab)
- `&NewLine;` → U+000A (Line Feed)

These are stripped by the URL parser's scheme extraction, allowing `javascript:` to be the effective scheme.

## Impact

### Stored XSS

- Attacker uploads SVG as Author (WordPress) or via any svg-sanitize-protected upload endpoint
- SVG passes sanitization — sanitizer reports no issues
- When SVG is rendered inline in HTML page, clicking the link executes JavaScript in the page's origin
- **Account takeover:** `document.cookie`, `fetch('/wp-admin/...')`, session hijacking

### Context requirement

The sanitized SVG must be embedded **inline in HTML** (not as ``). Common scenarios:
- WordPress themes that `echo file_get_contents($svg_path)` for inline SVG rendering
- WordPress block editor SVG preview
- Any web application rendering svg-sanitize output directly in HTML

Standalone `` is NOT affected (browser uses XML parser, `&Tab;` without DOCTYPE = XML parse error).

## CVSS

**CVSS 3.1: 6.1 (Medium)** — stored XSS, requires user click

`AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N`

With session stealing / admin takeover chain: effective severity **High**.

## Suggested Fix

### Option 1: Strip DOCTYPE before parsing (recommended)

$dirty = preg_replace('/<!DOCTYPE[^>]*(?:\[.*?\])?\s*>/si', '', $dirty);


Eliminates entity definitions entirely. No DTD entities = no collision.

### Option 2: Validate href after serialization

$clean = $this->xmlDocument->saveXML(...); // Post-serialization check: re-validate all href values in the OUTPUT // (catches entity references that bypass the XML-expanded check)


### Option 3: Expand entities before validation

Validate `getAttribute()` return value AND the serialized form:

$href = $element->getAttribute($attrName); $serialized = $this->xmlDocument->saveXML($element); // Check both for javascript: scheme


## Environment

- enshrined/svg-sanitize 0.22.x
- Chrome 148 (confirmed XSS execution)
- PHP 8.3.24 (any version — bug is in PHP sanitizer logic, not ext/dom)

**Reported by ExPatch Security Research — [expatch.llc](https://expatch.llc/)
Denis Rostilov**

Credited to ExPatch-LLC.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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